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A DISCUSSION OF THE CONCEPTS REASON, REVELATION 
AND NATURE IN BISHOP BUTLER'S MORAL PHILOSOPHY 
by 
Marilyne A. MacLaren 
A t h e s i s presented i n candidature f o r the degree 




T h i s t h e s i s i s a study of the t h r e e concepts Reason, 
R e v e l a t i o n and Nature i n the moral philosophy of Bishop B u t l e r . 
B u t l e r was a C h r i s t i a n a p o l o g i s t who wanted to provide an e m p i r i c a l 
theory of morals i n keeping with the s e c u l a r tone of h i s age, 
y e t which did not exclude the d i v i n e . His method of study was 
to i n v e s t i g a t e the c o n s t i t u t i o n of human nature, and from t h i s 
he concluded t h a t to follow nature was to follow the path of 
v i r t u e . Although h i s method of study appears c o n s i s t e n t l y 
e m p i r i c a l , B u t l e r ' s use of s p e c u l a t i v e reason and admittance 
of r e v e a l e d knowledge i n d i c a t e s that he was not a s t r i c t 
e m p i r i c i s t i n c o n v i c t i o n . 
B u t l e r ' s n a t u r a l i s m i s f i r m l y grounded i n r e l i g i o n , 
by h i s b e l i e f t h a t man i s 'the work of God, i s n a t u r a l l y v i r t u o u s , 
and t h a t t h i s , together with the commands of conscience, leads 
man to a c t a j u s t and good r o l e i n l i f e . I t i s i n B u t l e r ' s 
conception of conscience t h a t we most c l e a r l y see how Reason, 
R e v e l a t i o n and Nature a r e r e l a t e d to each other i n h i s philosophy. 
I i n t e r p r e t B u t l e r ' s view of conscience as a moral f a c u l t y with 
two o p e r a t i o n a l l e v e l s , the r a t i o n a l p a r t which takes note of a l l 
the f a c t s i n a moral s i t u a t i o n , and the i n t u i t i o n a l p a r t by which 
a moral pronouncement i s made. This l a t t e r process i s e a s i e r to 
understand when i t i s r e a l i z e d t h a t conscience f o r B u t l e r i s a 
medium of communication between God and man. 
B u t l e r ' s c o n t r i b u t i o n to moral philosophy stems not 
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only from h i s i n t e r e s t i n g a n a l y s i s of conscience, but a l s o 
from the way he r e c o n c i l e s s e l f - i n t e r e s t and duty. According 
t o B u t l e r , men a c t v i r t u o u s l y , because they are secure i n the 
knowledge t h a t they a r e obeying God and so w i l l be u l t i m a t e l y 
rewarded. There i s an a d d i t i o n a l s a n c t i o n i n a c t i n g v i r t u o u s l y , 
we have a b e t t e r chance of happiness because i t i s obeying our 
own nature to so do. 
Thus a man knows h i s o b l i g a t i o n s not only through the 
r e v e l a t o r y medium of the S c r i p t u r e s , but through the nature 
of man, and s p e c i f i c a l l y through the d i v i n e l y implanted moral 
f a c u l t y . 
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The e i g h t e e n t h century was c h a r a c t e r i z e d by a 
r e a c t i o n a g a i n s t a l l that was t r a d i t i o n a l and accepted, 
whether i n p o l i t i c s , r e l i g i o n , philosophy or any of the 
s c i e n c e s . I t was an age of optimism, of hope and a b e l i e f 
i n the p e r f e c t i b i l i t y of man. 
'Hope sp r i n g s e t e r n a l i n the human b r e a s t , 
Man never I s , but always to be b l e s t . ' 
(Pope Essay on Man''^ , 1, p. 39) 
The march of p h y s i c a l and astronomical s c i e n c e l e d by Newton 
had overthrown the C h r i s t i a n cosmos with i t s h i e r a r c h y , 
and opened up an i n f i n i t e u n i v e r s e , ordered by l-aws u n i v e r s -
a l l y and uniformly a p p l i c a b l e . T h i s r a p i d development of 
e m p i r i c a l knowledge and i t s a p p l i c a t i o n r a i s e d problems i n 
the f i e l d of s o c i a l theory and moral values that the theology 
of the time d i d not s a t i s f a c t o r i l y answer. 
One man who made no mean c o n t r i b u t i o n to the constant 
f l u x of i d e a s was Bishop B u t l e r , and i n h i s work there i s 
v i s i b l e a s y n t h e s i s between the long-held tenets of r e l i g i o n 
and the new s c i e n t i f i c theism and r a t i o n a l i s m that was 
^ References to works by w r i t e r s other than B u t l e r , are 
taken from e d i t i o n s s p e c i f i e d i n the bibliography. 
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emerging. Although there was not present an open c o n f l i c t 
between s c i e n c e and R e l i g i o n , as there was, f o r example a f t e r 
2 
the p u b l i c a t i o n of Darwin's work , the new d i s c o v e r i e s 
o b v i o u s l y changed men's conceptions of the un i v e r s e and i t s 
workings, and encouraged the emancipation of philosophy 
from theology. R e l i g i o u s i n s t i t u t i o n s and r e l i g i o u s explan-
a t i o n s were slowly d i s p l a c e d from the c e n t r e of l i f e to i t s 
periphery. The dangers of s e c u l a r i s a t i o n and consequent 
d o c t r i n e s such as atheism and m a t e r i a l i s m a i d i n g the decay 
of 'true r e l i g i o n ' were r e a l i z e d w i t h some anxiety by v a r i o u s 
Churchmen. Thus Samual C l a r k e c a l l e d the eighteenth century, 
" t h i s s c e p t i c a l and profane age", (P r e f a c e - Boyles L e c t u r e s ) 
w h i l s t B u t l e r was very conscious of the growth of a n t i -
r e l i g i o u s f e e l i n g , and the inordinate prevalence of a narrow 
s e l f - r e g a r d . 
' I t i s come I know not how, to be taken 
f o r granted by many persons, t h a t 
C h r i s t i a n i t y i s not so much a 
s u b j e c t of i n q u i r y : but th a t i t 
i s , now a t leng t h , discovered to be 
f i c t i t i o u s . And accordingly they t r e a t 
i t as i f , i n the present age, t h i s were 
an agreed point among a l l people of 
2 
Boyle wrote t h a t by being addicted to experimental philosophy 
a man was r a t h e r a s s i s t e d than indisposed to be a good 
C h r i s t i a n (The C h r i s t i a n V i r t u o s o 1690). Whilst Newton wrote 
a c o n s i d e r a b l e number of t h e o l o g i c a l works and was venerated 
as the great defender of C h r i s t i a n i t y , as God was manifested 
through Nature. 
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discernment; and nothing remained, 
but to s e t i t up as a p r i n c i p a l 
s u b j e c t of m i r t h and r i d i c u l e , as 
i t were by way of r e p r i s a l s , f o r i t s having 
so long i n t e r r u p t e d the p l e a s u r e s of 
the world.' 
3 
(Advertisement to the Analogy, 2, p . l ) 
S w i f t a l s o p r o t e s t e d : 
' I t w i l l be granted, that hardly one 
i n a hundred among our people of q u a l i t y 
or gentry appears to a c t by any p r i n c i p l e 
of r e l i g i o n ; t h a t g r e a t numbers of them 
do e n t i r e l y d i s c a r d i t . . . . Nor i s the 
case much b e t t e r among the vu l g a r . ' 
(A P r o j e c t f o r the Advancement of R e l i g i o n 
and the Reformation of Manners. Works, 
Vo l . X I I I , p.205) 
Such i n d i g n a t i o n was not merely a clergyman's touchiness, 
f o r there i s c o n s i d e r a b l e evidence that the E s t a b l i s h e d Church 
was under severe a t t a c k , and t h a t there was prevalent a great 
d e a l of d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h the way the Clergy were performing 
I have a l r e a d y mentioned my general conventions of r e f e r e n c e . 
References to the w r i t i n g s of B u t l e r are from Gladstone's 
e d i t i o n s of the Sermons and Analogy. References are given by 
p a r t , chapter, s e c t i o n and then page number. 
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t h e i r d u t i e s . Even B u t l e r i s reported to have s a i d at the 
time t h a t Thomas Sherlock, Bishop of London, refused the 
primacy of a l l England i n Canterbury on the grounds t h a t , 
" i t was too l a t e f o r him ( S h e r l o c k ) to t r y to support a 
f a l l i n g Church." At the t u r n of the eighteenth century, the 
Church as an i n s t i t u t i o n was viewed by many as n e g l e c t f u l 
of i t s s p i r i t u a l d u t i e s , complacent, h y p o c r i t i c a l and g e n e r a l l y 
i n a s t a t e of d e c l i n e . A fundamental re-statement of r e l i g i o u s 
i d e a s and a g r e a t e r concern f o r the moral we l l - b e i n g of the 
congregation was c a l l e d f o r . 
In t h i s study we are concerned p r i n c i p a l l y w i t h 
B u t l e r ' s moral philosophy, but we s h a l l f i n d that t h i s 
cannot be s t u d i e d i n i s o l a t i o n , away from h i s t h e o l o g i c a l 
d o c t r i n e . Hence, i n the f i r s t chapter of t h i s t h e s i s I have 
t r i e d to show the important connections between h i s t h e o l o g i c a l 
c o n v i c t i o n s , and the methodological c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of h i s 
moral philosophy. B u t l e r d e l i b e r a t e l y s e t out from the p o s i t i o n 
of a zealous Churchman to g i v e an answer to the v a r i o u s moral 
problems b e s e t t i n g C h r i s t i a n s , an answer couched i n the 
e m p i r i c a l method of h i s day. The h i s t o r y of eighteenth century 
r e l i g i o u s s p e c u l a t i o n i s one of c h a l l e n g e and response. 
The c h a l l e n g e came from the emptiness which ensued i n the 
minds of many t h i n k i n g men from the c o l l a p s e of the t r a d -
i t i o n a l world p i c t u r e . The response came from such w r i t e r s 
as the B r i t i s h M o r a l i s t s (among whom was B u t l e r ) who b e l i e v e d 
t h a t i f we know the o r i g i n of moral l i f e , then we would know 
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i t s s t a t u s ; whether i t was God-given, n a t u r a l , or a r t i f i c i a l , 
i . e . c r e a t e d by man s o l e l y f o r h i s own purposes. These men 
wished a l s o to i n v e s t i g a t e moral c r i t e r i a : given that mankind 
does d i s t i n g u i s h between a c t i o n s and approves and disapproves, 
deeming some a c t i o n s 'good' others 'bad', how does t h i s 
moral discernment occur? On these i s s u e s the B r i t i s h M o r a l i s t s 
were d i v i d e d i n t h e i r o p inions, as we s h a l l d i s c o v e r , but 
one aim they shared was to make men v i r t u o u s . T h i s concern 
was not j u s t a t h e o r e t i c a l one, i t seemed to be t h e i r t a s k 
to l e a d men away from v i c e . Perhaps the reason f o r t h i s l i e s 
i n the evident l i n k between e t h i c a l and p o l i t i c a l s p e c u l a t i o n . 
The p h i l o s o p h e r s were most concerned w i t h the s e c u r i t y of 
s o c i e t y , f o r s o c i a l l i f e was a n e c e s s i t y i f man was to 
s u r v i v e , and i t s s u c c e s s r e q u i r e d a subordination of p r i v a t e 
i n t e r e s t f o r p u b l i c b e n e f i t . C e r t a i n l y t h i s was the opinion 
of such men as Mandeville and Hume, and even as f a r back as 
Hobbes i n the seventeenth century. 
'And t h e r e f o r e so long a man i s i n the 
c o n d i t i o n s of mere nature (which i s a 
c o n d i t i o n of war) as p r i v a t e a p p e t i t e 
i s the measure of good and e v i l : and 
consequently a l l men agree on t h i s , 
t h a t peace i s good, and t h e r e f o r e a l s o 
the way, or means of peace which 
are j u s t i c e , g r a t i t u d e , modesty, equity, 
mercy and the r e s t of the laws of 
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nature, are good; that i s to say: 
moral v i r t u e s : and t h e i r c o n t rary 
v i c e s e v i l . ' 
(Hobbes, L e v i a t h a n i n Raphael, Vol. i , p.51) 
' I t was more b e n e f i c i a l f o r every 
Body to conquer than indulge h i s 
i n t e r e s t , and mudi b e t t e r to mind 
the P u b l i c k than what seemed h i s 
p r i v a t e i n t e r e s t . ' 
(Mandeville The Fable of the Bees I , p.28) 
' A l l men a r e s e n s i b l e of the n e c e s s i t y 
to maintain peace and order Yet 
not w i t h s t a n d i n g t h i s strong and 
obvious n e c e s s i t y such i s the f r a i l i t y 
and p e r v e r s e n e s s of our nature.* I t i s 
i m p o s s i b l e to keep men f a i t h f u l l y and 
u n e r r i n g l y i n the paths of j u s t i c e . 
Some e x t r a o r d i n a r y circumstances may 
happen i n which a man f i n d s h i s i n t e r e s t s 
to be more promoted by fraud and rapine 
than hurt by the breach which h i s 
i n j u s t i c e makes i n the s o c i a l union. 
But much more f r e q u e n t l y he i s seduced 
from h i s g r e a t and important but 
d i s t a n t i n t e r e s t s , by the allowment 
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of present, though often very 
f r i v o l o u s temptations. T h i s great 
weakness i s i n c u r a b l e i n human nature. 
Men must t h e r e f o r e , endeavour to 
p a l l i a t e what they cannot cu r e . ' 
(Hume Of the O r i g i n of Government, p.35) 
Having s t a t e d the problem, philosophers advanced v a r i o u s 
ways i n which men could a c q u i r e the s o c i a l v i r t u e s . F o r 
i n s t a n c e Hobbes a b s c r i b e d to the sovereign the power of the 
Old Testament God. The moral was i d e n t i f i e d w i t h the p o s i t i v e 
law; t h a t i s wrong which the sovereign f o r b i d s ; t h a t i s 
r i g h t which he a l l o w s . Mandeville agreed w i t h Hobbes that 
moral r e g u l a t i o n i s not n a t u r a l to man, but i s e x t e r n a l l y 
imposed upon him. He put forward the t h e s i s that p r i v a t e 
v i c e s promoted p u b l i c b e n e f i t , f o r man needed the t h r e a t 
of e v i l to overcome h i s indolence, and needed v a n i t y and greed 
to f u r n i s h m otivation f o r those accomplishments which separate 
c i v i l i s a t i o n from barbarianism. Hume d i f f e r e d somewhat 
from the other two, i n that f o r him p o l i t i c a l and moral 
problems were not synonymous. His moral theory r e s t e d on 
the assumption t h a t sympathy i s not a form of egoism, and 
t h a t moral sentiments are a s p e c i e s of sympathy; but h i s 
p o l i t i c a l theory takes f o r granted that man i s predominantly 
s e l f i s h and o f t e n f o o l i s h . He maintains t h a t men are t r u l y 
benevolent i n the c i r c l e of t h e i r f a m i l y and f r i e n d s , but that 
t h i s benevolence i s too weak to operate towards mankind i n 
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g e n e r a l . So, he urges men to a c t v i r t u o u s l y i n order to 
p r e s e r v e s o c i e t y and c e r t a i n p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s a r e s e t 
up to a i d them i n t h i s aim. 
E a r l i e r i n the century John Locke had maintained 
t h a t the p r a c t i s i n g of v i r t u e i n regard to one's f e l l o w men 
was f u r t h e r r e i n f o r c e d by God's causing happiness to occur 
i n a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h v i r t u e . 
'For God having by i n s e p a r a b l e connection 
j o i n e d v i r t u e and p u b l i c happiness 
together; and made the p r a c t i c e 
thereof n e c e s s a r y to the p r e s e r v a t i o n 
of s o c i e t y , and v i s i b l y b e n e f i c i a l 
to a l l , w i t h whom the v i r t u o u s man 
has to do.' 
( E s s a y Concerning Hvmian Understanding 
i n Works, Vol. I , p.37) 
As we s h a l l l a t e r d i s c o u r s e i n Chapter I I I t h i s was a 
po p u l a r l y held opinion from which B u t l e r d i d not d i s s e n t . 
L i k e h i s contemporaries, B u t l e r b e l i e v e d that man was essent-
i a l l y a s o c i a l animal. 
'And t h e r e f o r e to have no r e s t r a i n t from, 
no regard to others i n our behaviour, 
i s the s p e c u l a t i v e a b s u r d i t y of c o n s i d e r i n g 
o u r s e l v e s as s i n g l e and independent, as 
having nothing i n our nature which has 
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r e s p e c t to our f e l l o w - c r e a t u r e s , 
reduced to a c t i o n and p r a c t i c e . 
And t h i s i s the same a b s u r d i t y , as to 
suppose a hand or any p a r t to have no 
n a t u r a l r e s p e c t to any other, or 
to the whole body.' 
(.Sermon I , 10, p.45) 
But he had no i l l u s i o n s concerning the f a i l u r e of the m a j o r i t y 
of men to behave v i r t u o u s l y i n s o c i e t y , and so the n e c e s s i t y 
of encouraging such behaviour. 
As I maintain t h a t B u t l e r ' s moral theory c e n t r e s 
around h i s use of the t h r e e concepts. Reason, R e v e l a t i o n 
and Nature, I have, i n d i s c u s s i n g h i s examination of man's 
nature and motivations, been p r i n c i p a l l y concerned w i t h h i s 
manipulation of these three i d e a s . L e t us f o r the moment 
look a t the concepts i n a general way. Throughout the ages, 
p h i l o s o p h e r s i n t h e i r quest to d i s c o v e r the source of m o r a l i t y , 
had to c o n s i d e r whether moral knowledge was a t t a i n e d by reason, 
or r e v e a l e d to men by God. Between these two choices stood 
the d o c t r i n e of N a t u r a l Law, which held moral t r u t h s to be 
p r i o r to experience and God given, y e t d i r e c t l y d i s c o v e r a b l e 
by each human being through reason. Four t e x t s quoted i n 
d'Entreves which are r e l e v a n t to our study, w i l l f ollow 
below.. They s t r e t c h from a n c i e n t times to the seventeenth 
century and i n them can be seen some of the d i f f e r e n t i n t e r -
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p r e t a t i o n s of Natural Law. There were attempts to prove t h a t 
v a r i o u s maxims of conduct were the d i c t a t e s of Nature, and 
t h a t any mode of t h i n k i n g , f e e l i n g or a c t i n g when 'according 
to n ature' should be accepted as strong argument f o r i t s 
goodness. Indeed, C i c e r o ' s idea of Natural Law i s most 
i n t e r e s t i n g f o r i t s s i m i l a r i t y w i t h l a t e r C h r i s t i a n conceptions. 
'True law i s r i g h t reason i n agreement w i t h 
Nature: i t i s of u n i v e r s a l a p p l i c a t i o n , 
unchanging and e v e r l a s t i n g : i t summons 
to duty by i t s commands, and a v e r t s from 
wrong-doing by i t s p r o h i b i t i o n s . ' 
'And there w i l l not be d i f f e r e n t laws 
at Rome and a t Athens, or d i f f e r e n t 
laws now and i n the f u t u r e , but one 
e t e r n a l and unchangeable law w i l l be 
v a l i d f o r a l l n a t i o n s and f o r a l l 
times, and t h e r e w i l l be one master and 
one r u l e r , t h a t i s good over us a l l , f o r 
He i s the author of t h i s law, i t s promulgator 
and i t s e n f o r c i n g judge.' 
(de Republica I I I , c X X I I , 33 quoted i n 
d'Entreves, p.21) 
For the Greeks pure r a t i o n a l knowledge was supreme and i t was 
by t h i s t h a t men d i s c e r n e d N a t u r a l Law, whereas the E a r l y 
Church d i f f e r e d i n t h e i r d e s i r e to f i n d a j u s t i f i c a t i o n and 
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knowledge of the Na t u r a l Law i n the S c r i p t u r e s . T h i s l a t t e r 
e l e v a t i o n of the S c r i p t u r e s was c a r r i e d i n t o the medieval 
world, where f o r i n s t a n c e , S t . Augustine's p e s s i m i s t i c view 
of l i f e r e s u l t e d i n a r e d u c t i o n i n importance of Natural Law. 
As d'Entreves wrote: 
'With Nature c o r r u p t , w i t h an absolute 
i d e a l of C h r i s t i a n p e r f e c t i o n , l i t t l e 
room was l e f t f o r a n a t u r a l order 
of t h i n g s , f o r a system of e t h i c s 
based on men's nature.' 
( N a t u r a l Law p.37) 
For Augustine the s a f e s t way to reach t r u t h was to s t a r t 
from f a i t h , and then to go on from R e v e l a t i o n to Reason, 
f o r understanding was the reward of f a i t h . 
By the Middle Ages however, a new-found f a i t h i n 
man's own c a p a b i l i t i e s l e d to the re-establishment of a 
system of n a t u r a l e t h i c s . Aquinas, the great r e p r e s e n t a t i v e 
of t h i s movement, maintained t h a t although man was a s u b j e c t 
of God, he was a l s o a co-operator by the e x e r c i s e of n a t u r a l 
reason. 
'But, of a l l o t h e r s , r a t i o n a l c r e a t u r e s 
are s u b j e c t to d i v i n e Providence i n a 
very s p e c i a l way; being themselves made 
- 12 -
p a r t i c i p a t o r s i n Providence i t s e l f , 
i n t h a t they c o n t r o l t h e i r own a c t i o n s 
and the a c t i o n s of others. So they 
have a c e r t a i n share i n the d i v i n e 
reason i t s e l f , d e r i v i n g therefrom 
a n a t u r a l i n c l i n a t i o n to such a c t i o n s 
and ends as are f i t t i n g . T h i s p a r t i c -
i p a t i o n i n the E t e r n a l Law by r a t i o n a l 
c r e a t u r e s i s c a l l e d the Natural Law.' 
(Aquinas Summa Theologica, 91, A r t . 1 
and 2 i n d'Entreves, p.40) 
During the succeeding c e n t u r i e s Nature as a b a s i s 
f o r m o r a l i t y grew i n i n f l u e n c e , and by the seventeenth 
and e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r i e s , u n b e l i e v e r s used a g a i n s t theology 
a p u r e l y p h i l o s o p h i c a l wisdom th a t was e x c l u s i v e l y based 
upon the p r i n c i p l e s of n a t u r a l reason and independent of 
r e l i g i o u s r e v e l a t i o n . Consequently there was a d e c i s i v e s p l i t 
between r e l i g i o n and e t h i c s , and S c r i p t u r e was often no longer 
appealed to f o r the laws and s a n c t i o n s of m o r a l i t y . The man 
who i s g e n e r a l l y h e l d to have i n f l u e n c e d t h i s s e c u l a r movement 
w i t h regards to Na t u r a l Law i s G r o t i u s . According to him, 
law must be independent of the a r b i t r a r y w i l l of God, and i t 
would be p o s s i b l e to b u i l d a theory of laws without t h e o l o g i c a l 
p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s . 
'What we have been saying would have 
a degree of v a l i d i t y even i f we should 
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concede t h a t which cannot be conceded 
without the utmost wickedness, that 
there i s no God or that the a f f a i r s of 
men a r e of no concern to him.' 
( G r o t i u s De Lure B e l l i ac P a c i s , I I , 
quoted i n d'Entrev.es, p. 52) 
G r o t i u s ' s theory i s purely r a t i o n a l , he wanted the study of 
N a t u r a l Law to be t r e a t e d as a s c i e n c e , and f o r t h i s end 
used mathematics as an analogy. 
'Measureless as i s the power of God, 
n e v e r t h e l e s s i t can be s a i d that there 
ar e c e r t a i n t h i n g s over which that 
power does not extend... J u s t as even 
God cannot cause that two times two 
should not make four, so He cannot 
cause t h a t t h a t which i s i n t r i n s i c a l l y 
e v i l be not e v i l . ' 
( G r o t i u s , De Lure B e l l i ac P a c i s quoted 
i n d'Entrev.es, p.53) 
T h i s hypothesis was used by eighteenth century s c h o l a r s who 
wished to advance a s e c u l a r Natural Law theory; although 
G r o t i u s h i m s e l f had never excluded God from h i s philosophy. 
He always maintained t h a t the Law of Nature was implanted i n 
man by God, and moreover, th a t the r e v e a l e d laws of God can 
confirm and a s s i s t men i n t h e i r knowledge of the Law of Nature. 
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The growing emphasis upon Reason i n the seventeenth 
century, which l e d to a v e n e r a t i o n f o r ' c l e a r and d i s t i n c t 
ideas';, r e s u l t e d not only i n the establishment of a n a t u r a l i s t i c 
e t h i c , but a l s o i n a re-statement of C h r i s t i a n i t y that d i d 
not destroy the u n d e r l y i n g t r u t h s . R a t i o n a l i s m was adopted 
e s p e c i a l l y by a group of theologians, known c o l l e c t i v e l y as 
the Cambridge P l a t o n i s t s , who were concerned to defend 
r e l i g i o n from Hobbesian m a t e r i a l i s m , mechanism, s e c t a r i a n i s m , 
'enthusiasm' and dogmatism. I n order to conserve what they 
co n s i d e r e d to be v i t a l i n r e l i g i o u s t r a d i t i o n , t h e Cambridge 
phil o s o p h e r s turned to P l a t o n i c philosophy, and attempted 
to r e c o n c i l e i t w i t h C h r i s t i a n i t y . They ref u s e d to d i v o r c e 
the r a t i o n a l from the s p i r i t u a l : 
'There i s nothing so i n t r i n s i c a l l y R a t i o n a l , 
as R e l i g i o n i s ; nothing, t h a t can so 
J u s t i f y i t s e l f ; nothing, that has 
so pure Reason to recommend i t s e l f ; 
as R e l i g i o n has.' 
(Whichcote Aphorisms, number 221, quoted 
i n C a s s i x e r , p.53) 
For the use rf Reason not only involved the d i s c i p l i n e of 
t h i n k i n g e x a c t l y and p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y , but involved the 
p u r i f i c a t i o n of the h e a r t and the c o n t r o l l i n g of the w i l l , 
i n the p u r s u i t of Truth. S p i r i t u a l knowledge was achieved by 
the s o u l c r e a t i n g the d i v i n e w i t h i n i t s e l f and thereby making 
i t s e l f l i k e the d i v i n e . Reason i n man was l i k e 'the candle 
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of the Lord', and to go a g a i n s t Reason was to go a g a i n s t God. 
There was never any c o n f l i c t between n a t u r a l and r e v e a l e d t r u t h 
( t h a t i s by reason and by f a i t h ) because r e v e l a t i o n a n t i c i p a t e d 
and completed the f i n d i n g s of reason. 
Concentration on the c r e a t i v e s i d e of knowing 
meant th a t m o r a l i t y was conceived as the n a t u r a l r e s u l t of 
a d i v i n e l i f e . Right and wrong belonged to the e t e r n a l 
n a t ure of things,and even the w i l l of God could not change 
them. 
'Wherefore i n the f i r s t p l a c e , i t i s 
a t h i n g which we s h a l l very e a s i l y 
demonstrate, t h a t moral good and 
e v i l , j u s t and u n j u s t , honest and 
d i s h o n e s t ( i f they be not mere names 
without any s i g n i f i c a t i o n , or names 
f o r nothing e l s e but w i l l e d and 
commanded, but have a r e a l i t y i n r e s p e c t 
of the persons obliged to do and avoid them) 
cannot p o s s i b l y be a r b i t r a r y t h i n g s , made 
by w i l l without nature; because i t i s 
u n i v e r s a l l y t r u e , t h a t things are what 
they a r e , not by w i l l but by nature.' 
(Cudworth, A T r e a t i s e concerning E t e r n a l and 
Immutable Morality, Book I , Chpt. I I , i n 
Raphael, p.106) 
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The Cambridge P l a t o n i s t s f i r m l y r e j e c t e d the C a r t e s i a n and 
Hobbesian d e r i v a t i o n of r i g h t and wrong; i n s t e a d m o r a l i t y 
was conceived as an i n t e g r a l law of man's being. Each i n d i v i d u a l 
had h i s own guide to conduct i n the form of conscience, 
which was governed by reason, and i l l i m i i n a t e d by r e v e l a t i o n 
which could not be i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h reason i t s e l f . The 
Cambridge phi l o s o p h e r s moved away from the very dogmatic 
and d o c t r i n a i r e approach to m o r a l i t y , found f o r example i n 
P u r i t a n i s m , to a m o r a l i t y t h a t s t r e s s e d the i n s i g h t and 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of every man, and i n t h i s they were the f o r e -
runners of many eigh t e e n t h century e t h i c a l t h e o r i e s . 
The Cambridge P l a t o n i s t s serve as a v a l u a b l e i n t r o -
d u c t i o n to what we a r e going to study i n t h i s t h e s i s f o r 
s e v e r a l reasons. 
( 1 ) They are a u s e f u l c o n t r a s t to the r a t i o n a l i s m 
of the e i g h t e e n t h century. Men such as C l a r k e 'humanised' 
Reason, i t was no long e r a d i v i n e l i g h t working w i t h i n man, 
but was e n t i r e l y a human f a c u l t y . The i l l u m i n a t i v e aspect 
of Reason, g i v i n g 'new' knowledge t o men was no longer important 
i n the e i g h t e e n t h century. Philosophers such as C l a r k e 
wanted a geometrical i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of n a t u r a l phenomena, 
they wished to c o n t r o l nature, whereas the Cambridge P l a t o n i s t s 
aimed only to contemplate and understand nature. But, i t 
i s the m y s t i c a l element i n the Cambridge conception of r e l i g i o u s 
reason as something more than the power of t h i n k i n g alone, that 
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c l e a r l y d i s t i n g u i s h e s them from l a t e r r a t i o n a l i s t s . For, 
as the eighteenth century progressed Reason was seen by 
some phil o s o p h e r s i n i n c r e a s i n g l y narrow terms which r e s u l t e d 
i n an a r i d i n t e l l e c t u a l i s m , perhaps most v i s i b l e i n the 
D e i s t s . 
( 2 ) I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note the r e l a t i o n s h i p 
between the Cambridge P l a t o n i s t s and empiricism. The study 
of n a t u r a l s c i e n c e was al r e a d y developing i n the seventeenth 
century and had t h e r e f o r e to be considered by theologians. 
The Cambridge philosophers were not a g a i n s t experimental 
r e s e a r c h , indeed Cudworth and Moore were members of the Royal 
S o c i e t y , but they d i d not l i k e the p h i l o s o p h i c narrowing 
of the concept of experience, to cover only sense perceptions, 
f o r then moral and r e l i g i o u s experience would be excluded. 
Some of the l a t e r e m p i r i c i s t s saw these d i f f i c u l t i e s t h a t 
t h e i r t h e o r i e s caused, and t r i e d to remedy the s i t u a t i o n by 
ma i n t a i n i n g t h a t r e v e l a t i o n was a v a l u a b l e but independent 
source of knowledge. R e v e l a t i o n was admitted to be an in n e r 
e x p e r i e n c e j u s t as s e n s a t i o n was an e x t e r n a l experience. 
Indeed, B u t l e r attempts to do something l i k e t h i s i n h i s 
philosophy, s e p a r a t i n g Reason and R e v e l a t i o n , yet maintaining 
t h a t both a re e q u a l l y v a l u a b l e sources of moral and r e l i g i o u s 
knowledge. 
(3 ) L a s t l y , the Cambridge P l a t o n i s t s can be held 
to have had some i n f l u e n c e upon B u t l e r . Both aimed a t a 
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r e - i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of r e l i g i o n i n an i n c r e a s i n g l y s e c u l a r age, 
and both wished to r e - u n i t e r e l i g i o n and philosophy, and 
r e l i g i o n and morals; Reason was seen as a u s e f u l instrument 
i n t h i s e x e r c i s e . C e r t a i n l y t h e i r methods were very d i f f e r e n t , 
but d e s p i t e t h i s one can d i s c e r n s i m i l a r i t i e s , e s p e c i a l l y i n 
the treatment of conscience and r e v e l a t i o n . 
By the eigh t e e n t h century there was a movement to 
topple Reason from her l o f t y p h i l o s o p h i c a l p i n n a c l e . I n 
1711 Addison wrote t h a t the aim of the period was to bring 
'philosophy out of c l o s e t s and l i b r a r i e s , 
s c h o o l s and c o l l e g e s to dwell i n c l u b s , 
and a s s e m b l i e s , a t t e a - t a b l e s and i n 
c o f f e e houses.' 
( S p e c t a t o r , No.16, March) 
T h i s movement together w i t h the advent of the New Science, 
which i n i t s quest f o r pure knowledge attempted to under-
stand man's p o s i t i o n w i t h i n Nature, l e d to the e l e v a t i o n of 
the concept of Nature as the formal c r i t e r i o n of v a l i d i t y . 
'Unerring Nature, s t i l l d i v i n e l y b r i g h t . 
One c l e a r , unchang'd, and U n i v e r s a l L i g h t , 
L i f e , Force and Beauty, must to a l l impart, 
At once the Source and End and T e s t of A r t . ' 
(Pope, E s s a y on C r i t i c i s m , 1, p.6) 
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Although p h i l o s o p h e r s , theologians and m o r a l i s t s were s t i l l 
concerned w i t h the q u a l i t i e s and uses of the human f a c u l t y 
they c a l l e d Reason, i t was the concept of Nature that was 
e s t a b l i s h e d i n the t h i n k i n g of the time w i t h a unique domin-
ance. I t was a concept t h a t had a v a r i e t y of meanings, of 
which many were c o n t r a d i c t o r y . For i n s t a n c e , consider 
S h a f t s b u r y ' s confusing usage. 
'Strange.' That there should be i n 
Nature the idea of an Order and 
P e r f e c t i o n , which Nature h e r s e l f 
wants.' That Beings which a r i s e 
from Nature shou'd be so p e r f e c t as to 
d i s c o v e r Imperfection i n her C o n s t i t u t i o n : 
and be wi s e enough to c o r r e c t that Wisdom 
by which they were made.'' 
( C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of Men, Manners, Opinions 
and Times, I I , p.284) 
Nature was sometimes opposed to the products of Reason such 
as a r t and c u l t u r e , and was even considered by a few to be 
non-moral and n o n - r a t i o n a l . Another meaning of 'Nature' 
opposed i t to the s u p e r n a t u r a l , and another to what i s o r i g i n a l . 
The concept appeared f r e q u e n t l y i n the l i t e r a t u r e of the age; 
Defoe's Robinson Crusoe i s a study of a man i n 'a s t a t e of 
nat u r e ' , James Thompson (1700-48), Thomas Gray (1716-71) 
and many othe r s wrote of Nature i n t h e i r poetry. As f a r as 
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moral philosophy was concerned, I think the b e l i e f that what 
was n a t u r a l was what was good and r i g h t , and most often 
r a t i o n a l , was the one g e n e r a l l y maintained. As Diderot 
wrote i n h i s a r t i c l e on 'heibnizism' i n the Encyclopedia 
'morality i n a good man i s but another name f o r Nature.' 
The C h r i s t i a n a p o l o g i s t s such as B u t l e r found 
themselves i n a somewhat ambiguous p o s i t i o n when expr e s s i n g 
t h e i r e t h i c a l c o n c l u s i o n s i n n a t u r a l i s t terms. Wishing to 
remain f a i t h f u l to the N a t u r a l Law t r a d i t i o n , they yet 
wanted to separate themselves from e s t a b l i s h e d t h e o l o g i c a l 
c o n v i c t i o n s , such as those expounded by W i l l i a m Law. He 
founded moral law on the a r b i t r a r y w i l l of God, so that the 
whole of v i r t u e c o n s i s t e d i n conforming to, and the whole 
nature of v i c e i n d e c l i n i n g from the w i l l of God. The 
s o l u t i o n f o r B u t l e r l a y i n the maxim th a t to follow nature 
was to f o l l o w v i r t u e ; and to vollow v i r t u e was to follow 
God. 
B u t l e r ' s e m p i r i c a l approach has caused s c h o l a r s 
to wonder whether h i s e t h i c a l s t u d i e s can be separated from 
h i s theology. For i n s t a n c e , Duncan-Jones i s of the opinion 
t h a t 
' I t i s p o s s i b l e to e x t r a c t from B u t l e r ' s 
w r i t i n g s a moral philosophy conceived 
i n p u r e l y n a t u r a l terms: t h a t i s to 
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say, i n which there i s or need 
be no mention of the s u p e r n a t u r a l . ' 
( B u t l e r ' s Moral Philosophy, Chpt.7 
p.142) 
I do not agree w i t h t h i s statement, as I t h i n k B u t l e r ' s 
moral philosophy i s most u n s a t i s f a c t o r y without r e f e r e n c e 
to h i s t h e o l o g i c a l b e l i e f s . The Analogy was w r i t t e n to show 
men t h e i r o b l i g a t i o n s and d u t i e s , and must t h e r e f o r e be 
considered w i t h the Sermons i n any study on moral p h i l o s -
ophy. Indeed, B u t l e r ' s e mpiricism i s c a r r i e d i n t o h i s 
r e l i g i o u s i n v e s t i g a t i o n s , as f o r example when he uses the 
conception of analogy to demonstrate h i s c o n c l u s i o n that 
t h e r e i s a moral governor of the world, i . e . God. The matter 
of f a c t from which B u t l e r begins concerns the c o n s t i t u t i o n 
of nature used i n the general sense i n h i s theology, and i n 
the p a r t i c u l a r , i . e . human nature, i n h i s moral philosophy. 
B u t l e r does not p o s i t a r e l i g i o u s and moral theory 
t h a t s o l v e s a l l doubts, and t h a t was never h i s aim. He 
admits i n the Analogy 
' I t i s the most r e a d i l y acknowledged, 
t h a t the foregoing T r e a t i s e i s by no 
means s a t i s f a c t o r y ; v e i y f a r indeed 
from i t : but so would any n a t u r a l 
i n s t i t u t i o n of l i f e appear, i f 
reduced i n t o a system, together 
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w i t h i t s evidence.' 
( I I , V I I I , 17, p.362) 
H i s aim was s i m i l a r to Newmans. 
'Revelation was not given to s a t i s f y 
doubts, but to make us b e t t e r men 
th a t i t becomes l i g h t and peace to 
our s o u l s , even though to the end 
of l i f e we s h a l l f i n d d i f f i c u l t i e s 
i n i t and i n the world around u s . ' 
( P a r o c h i a l Sermons, I , Sermon 18) 
In B u t l e r ' s c a s e i t was not only R e v e l a t i o n , but a l s o Reason 
and Nature which threw l i g h t on men's d u t i e s and purpose i n 
l i f e . 
I have d i v i d e d t h i s study i n t o four chapters. 
I n the f i r s t , B u t l e r ' s e m p i r i c a l method i s d i s c u s s e d as a 
r a t i o n a l e f o r what f o l l o w s , and le a d s on to an account of 
B u t l e r ' s n a t u r a l i s m i n the second chapter. From t h i s we go 
on to c o n s i d e r two p r i n c i p a l moral questions - what i t i s 
t h a t motivates man, and how does a man know what are h i s 
d u t i e s ; these n e c e s s i t a t e a d e t a i l e d review of B u t l e r ' s 
use of the concepts 'happiness' and 'conscience'. 
C H A P T E R 
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BUTLERS METHODOLOGY 
Natural philosophy which included e t h i c a l i n q u i r i e s was 
concerned with an improved methodology as w e l l as advancing explan-
a t i o n s of the world, and t h i s dual preoccupation was a l s o r e f l e c t e d 
i n n a t u r a l theology. For: 
'Newton's age, from Bacon through Locke, 
was preoccupied w i t h methodological c o n s i d e r a t i o n s 
f o r the reason t h a t the s c i e n t i f i c r e v o l u t i o n 
i n s t i t u t e d by G a l i l e o and Newton was even more of 
a r e v o l u t i o n i n methodology than of systems and 
c o n c l u s i o n s . ' 
( H u r l b u t t , Hume, Newton and the Design Argument, pp 20) 
What then, was the methodological l i n k between philosophy and s c i e n c e ? 
There a r e two a s p e c t s : one i s the p u r s u i t of mathematical methods 
i 
i n t o the realm of metaphysical s p e c u l a t i o n , r e s u l t i n g i n the claiming 
of c e r t i t u d e f o r t h e o l o g i c a l and e t h i c a l c o n v i c t i o n s . Such an 
approach was followed by Samuel C l a r k e . The other a l t e r n a t i v e i s to 
main t a i n that p h i l o s o p h i c a l argument proceeds along a p o s t e r i o r i l i n e s 
by means of a n a l o g i c a l reasoning based on observation and experiment. 
I t was thought t h a t philosophy, l i k e Newtonian s c i e n c e involved 
i n f e r e n c e from phenomena i . e . matters of f a c t , and the r e s u l t i n g 
knowledge was claimed to be only probable. Whether Bishop B u t l e r read 
Newton we s h a l l never know, but what i s c e r t a i n i s that he followed 
- 24 -
the Newtonian a p o s t e r i o r i l i n e of thought and so r e j e c t e d a pr i o r i s m . 
As many of the r a t i o n a l i s t t h i n k e r s were i n d i r e c t c o n t r a d i c t i o n to 
B u t l e r l e t us b r i e f l y look a t t h e i r p h i l o s o p h i c a l p o s i t i o n . ^ 
T h e i r p r i n c i p l e b e l i e f was that there were fundamental t r u t h s 
which were s i m i l a r to the t r u t h s of geometry and thereby s e l f - e v i d e n t 
and known by reason. The i m p l i c a t i o n i s that these t r u t h s e x i s t 
before a man conceives them; they are part of an e t e r n a l order, 
e i t h e r i n s t i t u t e d by God or s e l f - e x i s t e n t . The f a c t s of m o r a l i t y , f o r 
i n s t a n c e , were r e v e a l e d by s t r i c t knowledge, not j u s t opinion or 
b e l i e f , so t h a t the p r o p o s i t i o n " I know abortion i s wrong" would be 
comparable to " I know the b a l l has landed i n the f i e l d : I saw i t 
f a l l " . I n a s i m i l a r manner the e x i s t e n c e of God was regarded as 
e q u i v a l e n t to mathematical t r u t h , w h i l s t the d i v i n e nature was reduced 
e n t i r e l y i n t o a b s t r a c t terms. 
'The s e l f - e x i s t e n t being, must of n e c e s s i t y be but 
one. T h i s e v i d e n t l y f o l l o w s from h i s being neces-
s a r i l y - e x i s t e n t . For n e c e s s i t y absolute i n i t s e l f 
i s simple and uniform, without any p o s s i b l e d i f f e r e n c e 
or v a r i e t y : and a l l v a r i e t y or d i f f e r e n c e of e x i s t e n c e 
must needs a r i s e from some e x t e r n a l cause and be 
When r e f e r r i n g to r a t i o n a l i s t s i n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r d i s c u s s i o n I am 
ex c l u d i n g the Cambridge P l a t o n i s t s , whose d o c t r i n e we have examined i n 
the I n t r o d u c t i o n . Although there i s great emphasis on the use of reason 
i n the work of the Cambridge philosophers, t h e i r methodology and 
subsequent c o n c l u s i o n s a r e to be s h a r p l y d i s t i n g u i s h e d from the eighteenth 
century r a t i o n a l i s t s such as C l a r k e and Wollaston. 
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dependent upon i t Whatsoever, t h e r e f o r e , 
e x i s t s n e c e s s a r i l y i s the one simple essence of 
the s e l f - e x i s t e n t Being; and whatsoever d i f f e r s 
from t h a t i s not n e c e s s a r i l y e x i s t i n g . Because i n 
absolute n e c e s s i t y there can be no d i f f e r e n c e or 
d i v e r s i t y of e x i s t e n c e . ' 
( S . C l a r k e , A Demonstration, pp. 74-75) 
Such a c t i v i t i e s d i d not escape s a t i r i z a t i o n by Pope, who observed: 
'We nobly take the high P r i o r i Road, 
And reason downward t i l l we doubt of God.' 
(The Dunciad, IV, p.214) 
R a t i o n a l i s t s had b e l i e v e d themselves to be soundly i n f l u e n c e d by Newton, 
but i t i s important f o r us to remember that the l a t t e r only claimed 
p r o b a b i l i t y , and b e l i e v e d t h a t h i s mathematical mechanical p r i n c i p l e s 
had to be e m p i r i c a l l y grounded. As R. H. Hurlbutt commented: 
'the w e l l balanced methodology of Newton, which 
gave mathematics and experiment t h e i r due import-
ance, was not c o n s i s t e n t l y understood by some of 
h i s f o l l o w e r s , hence they were l e d to frame t h e o r i e s 
which p l a c e d an e x c l u s i v e emphasis upon e i t h e r one or 
the other f a c e t of h i s thought.' 
(Hume, Newton and the Design Argument p.64) 
Such a m i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n - i f one could c a l l i t that - was made by 
C l a r k e , who i n s p i r e d by Newtonian ideas s e t new standards of c l a r i t y 
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and cogency, r e l y i n g on: 
'one only method or continuing thread of arguing, 
which I have endeavoured should be as near to mathematical 
as the nature of such a d i s c o u r s e would allow.' 
(A Demonstration P r e f a c e ) 
The importance of such views f o r t h i s d i s c u s s i o n l i e s i n the undoubted 
i n f l u e n c e of C l a r k e upon the young B u t l e r . 
The two men had entered i n t o a correspondence from which we 
l e a r n t h a t B u t l e r , as an eager student, had sought to f i n d a demon-
s t r a t i v e proof of the beings and a t t r i b u t e s of God. But h i s quest 
was to no a v a i l : 'thd' I have got very l i t t l e way w i t h Demonstration 
i n the proof of those t h i n g s ' , and even a f t e r the c a r e f u l explanations of 
C l a r k e , B u t l e r remained unconvinced of the u s e f u l n e s s of a b s t r a c t 
arguments. T h i s i s not to say that B u t l e r was c l a i m i n g C l a r k e ' s 
method to be i n v a l i d , only t h a t as f a r as he was concerned i t was 
u n f r u i t f u l . Indeed, he admitted i n a l e t t e r to h i s colleague that 
i t may be the case of: 
'two d i f f e r e n t e x p r e s s i o n s of the same thing, tho' 
e q u a l l y c l e a r to some persons, yet to others, one 
of them i s sometimes very obscure, tho' the other 
may be p e r f e c t l y i n t e l l i g i b l e . ' 
( B u t l e r , F i r s t L e t t e r p 4 l 3 ) 
W h i l s t i n the Sermons B u t l e r c l e a r l y recognises the l e g i t i m a c y of a 
n a t i o n a l I n q u i r y i n t o the a b s t r a c t r e l a t i o n of things concerning 
m o r a l i t y , admitting t h a t i n some r e s p e c t s i t was l e a s t l i a b l e to c a v i l 
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and d i s p u t e . I t could be s a i d that B u t l e r was i n c o n s i s t e n t about a 
p r i o r i reasoning, f o r although a thorough-going e m p i r i c i s t i n 
methodology, he was not so i n c o n v i c t i o n . His opinion of such 
procedures as used by D e s c a r t e s , f o r example, are s t a t e d p l a i n l y 
i n h i s i n t r o d u c t i o n to the Analogy; 
'Forming our notions of the c o n s t i t u t i o n and govern-
ment of the world upon reasoning, without foundation 
f o r the p r i n c i p l e s which we assume, whether from the 
a t t r i b u t e s of God, or anything e l s e , i s b u i l d i n g 
upon hypothesis'. 
(9 p.10) 
He d i s d a i n s the p r a c t i c e of reasoning from c e r t a i n p r i n c i p l e s which 
a r e a p p l i e d to c a s e s to which we have no ground to apply them. For 
example: 
'those who e x p l a i n the s t r u c t u r e of the human body 
and the nature of d i s e a s e s and medicines from 
mere mathematics without s u f f i c i e n t data.' 
(Analogy I n t r o d u c t i o n 9 p.11) 
What then, does B u t l e r c o n s i d e r s u f f i c i e n t data? The answer i s 
t h r e e f o l d f o r h i s u s u a l method proceeds from: f a c t s known to others 
which a r e l i k e them, from the p a r t to the whole, and l a s t l y from the 
pre s e n t to what i s probable i n the f u t u r e . But having s a i d a l l t h i s , 
i f we t u r n to Chapter 8, i n P a r t I I of the Analogy we f i n d B u t l e r 
a d m i t t i n g t h a t he has d e l i b e r a t e l y omitted from h i s d i s c u s s i o n two 
a b s t r a c t p r i n c i p l e s i n which he b e l i e v e ^ t h a t of l i b e r t y and moral 
f i t n e s s . The reason f o r t h i s a c t i o n i s revealed when he says that 
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q u e s t i o n s concerning these p r i n c i p l e s 'have been perplexed with 
d i f f i c u l t i e s and abtruse reasonings', and without l i b e r t y and moral 
f i t n e s s , r e l i g i o n can be considered as a question of f a c t . And f o r 
B u t l e r the most s a t i s f y i n g way was to argue from matters of f a c t 
which: 
' i s i n a p e c u l i a r manner adapted to s a t i s f y a f a i r 
mind; and i s more e a s i l y a p p l i c a b l e to the s e v e r a l 
p a r t i c u l a r r e l a t i o n s and circumstances i n l i f e . ' 
(Sermons Pr e f a c e 7 p.6) 
B u t l e r i s not denying t h a t man i s capable of t h i n k i n g a b s t r a c t l y , 
indeed he appears to t h i n k t h a t there are c e r t a i n questions which 
can be d e a l t w i t h only s p e c u l a t i v e l y , but he p r e f e r s to leave the 
2 
c o m p l e x i t i e s and i n t r i c a c i e s of such i s s u e s w e l l alone . Always a 
c a u t i o u s man, he accepted that the evidence of one's own experience 
was more c e r t a i n than h y p o t h e t i c a l argument. 
'For to pretend to a c t upon reason, i n opposition 
to p r a c t i c a l p r i n c i p l e s , which the Author of our 
nature gave us to a c t upon: and to pretend to apply 
our reason to s u b j e c t s w i t h regard to which our own 
short views and even'our experience w i l l show us, i t 
cannot be depended upon t h i s i s v a n i t y , c o n c e i t 
and unreasonableness.' 
(Analogy I 3) 
2 
Another example s i m i l a r to the p r i n c i p l e of freedom and moral f i t n e s s 
i s the question of God's e x i s t e n c e , which B u t l e r accepts but does not 
d i s c u s s . He merely t a l k s of d i s c e r n i n g i n t u i t i v e l y something e x t e r n a l to 
o u r s e l v e s , and concludes i n a burst of a b s t r a c t s p e c u l a t i o n t h a t t h i s i s : 
'an i n f i n i t e , an immense e t e r n a l being e x i s t i n g p r i o r to c o n t r i b u t i n g 
to h i s e x i s t e n c e and e x c l u s i v e of i t ' . (Analogy) 
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He wished to repudiate the kind of absolute c e r t a i n t y guaranteed 
by a u n i v e r s a l and i n f a l l i b l e reason, as advanced by the r a t i o n a l -
i s t s , beca;use he maintained t h a t such a c l a i m f e l l short of i t s 
p r e t e n s i o n s . 
B u t l e r i s not concerned with what might be, but what i s , to 
wonder how the world might p o s s i b l y have been framed otherwise than 
i t i s , he regards as v a i n and i d l e s p e c u l a t i o n . Instead he always 
c o n f i n e s h i m s e l f to h i s experimental method which, along with h i s 
i n s i s t e n c e upon man's ignorance, leads him to h i s view t h a t , more 
often than not, c e r t a i n knowledge i s out of our reach. He c o n t i n u a l l y 
emphasised the f a c t of man's imperfect knowledge concerning the 
g r e a t e r i m p l i c a t i o n s of nature's work. The u n i v e r s e c o n s i s t s of many 
p a r t s , and ) one cannot be understood without knowing the r e l a t i o n -
s h i p to the whole, of which we are i n ignorance: 
'we are i n no.wise judges of many t h i n g s , of which 
we a r e apt to think o u r s e l v e s very competent ones.' 
(Analogy I I 3, 4 p.223) 
F u r t h e r , there a r e many dealings of God, which are not yet completed, 
and so we see before us only u n f i n i s h e d work and thus cannot Judge the 
r e s u l t s . A l l we can Judge i s that which l i e s before us. 
So, f o r B u t l e r , l e g i t i m a t e reasoning i s that which argues by 
analogy arid o b s e r v a t i o n , and there i s no doubt that he would have 
agreed with the f o l l o w i n g words of Hume: 
' A l l our reasonings concerning matters of f a c t 
a r e founded on a s p e c i e s of Analogy, which leads us 
to expect from any cause the same events, which we 
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have observed to r e s u l t from s i m i l a r causes.' 
(An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding IX, 104) 
Analogy was B u t l e r ' s key concept and to argue thus, an e m p i r i c a l 
methodology i s e s s e n t i a l , because one begins from premises which 
d e s c r i b e nature, and are thereby observable. B u t l e r advances from 
t h a t about which reason and experience inform him, to that which 
l i e s o u t s i d e such knowledge. Holding the opinion, along with Spinoza, 
Locke and many of h i s contemporaries that there was an e t e r n a l order 
i n t h i n g s , he concluded t h a t by observing n a t u r a l phenomena i t was 
p o s s i b l e to d i s c o v e r c e r t a i n constant laws; and the p r i n c i p l e of 
analogy provided u s e f u l machinery i n e l u c i d a t i n g t h i s n a t u r a l order, 
i n t h a t an i n f e r e n c e can be made from l i k e events, that a general 
r u l e probably p e r t a i n s regarding these events. B u t l e r ' s method 
proceeds thus: i f event Y happened onie day, then the next, then the 
day a f t e r , and keeps on. o c c u r r i n g d a i l y , then the p r o b a b i l i t y grows 
t h a t event Y w i l l always happen. U l t i m a t e l y we become very sure of 
our f a c t s , f o r i n s t a n c e : 
'there i s no man can make a question, but that the 
sun w i l l r i s e tomorrow and be seen,vhere i t i s 
seen a t a l l , i n the f i g u r e of a c i r c l e and not i n 
t h a t of a square.' 
(Analogy I n t r o d u c t i o n 8, p.9) 
By comparing the events of yesterday and today we are able to d i s c e r n 
s i m i l a r i t i e s and thus expect r e p e t i t i o n of the same events i n the 
same circumstances tomorrow. 
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'A man's having observed the ebb and flow of the t i d e 
today, a f f o r d s some s o r t of presumption, tho' the 
lowest imaginable, that i t may happen again 
tomorrow, but the observation of t h i s event for 
so many days and months and ages together as i t has 
been observed by mankind gives us a f u l l assurance 
t h a t i t w i l l . ' 
(Analogy I n t r o d u c t i o n p.2) 
The c a u s a l i m p l i c a t i o n s of such an argument are i n t e r e s t i n g 
i n t h i s d i s c u s s i o n on methodology, because they serve to b r i n g out the 
d i s t i n c t i o n between the r a t i o n a l i s t and e m p i r i c i s t ways of thought. 
B u t l e r b e l i e v e d t h a t we were siorrounded by a m u l t i p l i c i t y of r e l a t e d 
o b j e c t s , and he would not deny t h a t each o b j e c t points beyond i t s e l f 
t o a cause of i t s c o n d i t i o n ; but a c a u s a l i n f e r e n c e , he would s t a t e , 
i s founded upon the r e l a t i o n a l aspects of that which we observe, 
r e v e a l e d by constant a s s o c i a t i o n and r e p e t i t i o n . B u t l e r did not 
• a s c r i b e to the t r a d i t i o n a l metaphysical c a u s a l s p e c u l a t i o n , but 
r a t h e r approached the l a t e r Humean p o s i t i o n . He refused to e x p l a i n 
c a u s a l i t y by a p r i o r i reasoning and was t h e r e f o r e of n e c e s s i t y l i m i t e d 
in h i s c o n c l u s i o n s . 
' I t i s indeed i n general no more than e f f e c t s that the 
most knowing a r e acquainted with; f o r as to causes, 
they are e n t i r e l y i n the dark as the most ignorant. 
What ( e l s e ) a r e the laws by which matter a c t s upon 
matter; but c e r t a i n e f f e c t s which some, having 
observed to be f r e q u e n t l y repeated, have reduced 
to general r u l e s . ' 
(Analogy I I 260) 
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There a r e c e r t a i n d i f f i c u l t i e s inherent i n t h i s notion of man's 
ignorance, i n t h a t although B u t l e r would say that everything i s 
u l t i m a t e l y for the b e s t , the c y n i c would r e p l y that there i s j u s t 
as much evidence t h a t when we see the whole p i c t u r e everything w i l l 
3 
be f o r the worse. The very idea of an i n f e r e n c e from the known to 
the unknown seems to e n t a i l a leap of f a i t h , not l o g i c . We have to 
b e l i e v e t h a t i f God has arranged things i n the p a s t , he i s somehow 
committed to doing the same things i n the f u t u r e . But i t i s p e r f e c t l y 
reasonable to suppose t h a t t h i s may not be the case; although the 
t i d e has ebbed and flowed s i n c e c r e a t i o n , God may have a very good 
re a s o n for stopping i t s movement next Monday. The weakness of the 
argument l i e s i n our ignorance, for granted t h a t we do not know the 
vdiole, we can only r e l y on what i s observed, and t h i s may be changed 
at any moment. B u t l e r begins from h i s assumption of a God and i n f e r s 
h i s workings by observing n a t u r a l phenomena; but c o n s i d e r the i n f e r -
ence made to God's j u s t i c e . One could maintain t h a t the poor and 
weak a r e downtrodden, and i t i s the strong and r u t h l e s s who succeed. 
I f t h i s i s the c a s e how can we conclude that j u s t i c e always p r e v a i l s ? 
Indeed, when we see men a c t i n g u n j u s t l y , would we not i n f e r that God 
a c t s u n j u s t l y ? B u t l e r would answer both these arguments by s t a t i n g 
t h a t had we more knowledge we would r e a l i z e that u l t i m a t e l y a l l i s 
f o r the b e s t . 
3 
I t i s to be remembered that B u t l e r never intended analogy to prove 
anything concerning the wisdom or goodness of religion-. The analogy 
of nature only g i v e s a strong c r e d i b i l i t y to the general d o c t r i n e 
of r e l i g i o n . (Analogy, Chapter V I I ) 
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F u r t h e r complications i n B u t l e r ' s methodology are apparent 
when we c o n s i d e r h i s analogy between n a t u r a l and r e v e a l e d r e l i g i o n . 
Having e x t r a p o l a t e d c e r t a i n laws from the n a t u r a l world, B u t l e r 
reasons that these laws a r e a l s o a p p l i c a b l e to the realm of Providence. 
'And l e t us compare the known c o n s t i t u t i o n and 
course of things with what i s s a i d to be the moral 
system of nature; the acknowledged d i s p e n s a t i o n s 
of Providence, or t h a t government which we f i n d 
o u r s e l v e s under, w i t h what r e l i g i o n teaches us to 
b e l i e v e and expect; and see whether they a r e not analogous 
and of a p r i c e . And upon such a comparison i t w i l l , I 
t h i n k , be found t h a t they a r e very much so; that both may be 
t r a c e d up to the same general laws and r e s o l v e d i n t o 
the same p r i n c i p l e s of d i v i n e conduct'. 
(Analogy I n t r o d u c t i o n , 14 p.15) 
But how can one i n f e r the s t a t e of something not known? B u t l e r 
c o n s i d e r s t h a t the p h y s i c a l world a f f o r d s us i n s t a n c e s of d i v i n e 
government, but perhaps we have read the s i g n s or e f f e c t s that we 
ecperience wrongly, so t h a t the t r u e s t a t e of Providence i s completely 
4 
opposite to what B u t l e r imagines. Leaving the argument thus, i t 
appears t o t a l l y u n s a t i s f a c t o r y to an u n b e l i e v e r , but i f we consider 
the p l a c e of r e v e l a t i o n , B u t l e r ' s procedure i s more e a s i l y understood. 
4 The complete s c e p t i c would say there a r e no s i g n s to read. 
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For although the ways of God cannot be known e m p i r i c a l l y , they are 
not completely "unknown", i n that they are r e v e a l e d to us. Hence, 
the concept of r e v e l a t i o n r e i n f o r c e s B u t l e r ' s methodology j u s t when 
needed, f o r h i s a n a l o g i c a l arguments concerning n a t u r a l and r e v e a l e d 
r e l i g i o n played a v i t a l r o l e i n h i s polemic a g a i n s t the D e i s t s . B u t l e r 
attempted to convince the l a t t e r that God, who was the n a t u r a l governor 
of the world, was a l s o the author of the Old and New Testaments. 
T h i s was denied by the D e i s t s on the grounds th a t there were too many 
d i f f i c u l t i e s and c o n t r a d i c t i o n s i n the S c r i p t u r e s . B u t l e r pointed 
out, however, th a t t h i s was a l s o the case i n nature and y.et t h i s 
d i d not exclude a b e l i e f i n God as Creator.. I f a l i k e n e s s be conceded 
to e x i s t between n a t u r a l and r e v e a l e d r e l i g i o n , these o b j e c t i o n s 
r a i s e d a g a i n s t the l a t t e r would d i s c r e d i t the former as w e l l . 
C o n v e r s e l y , b e l i e f i n the former demands b e l i e f i n the l a t t e r too. 
From what has p r e v i o u s l y been s a i d i t can be seen t h a t one 
of the dangers a r i s i n g from B u t l e r ' s method of drawing analo g i e s from 
matters of f a c t i s the p o s s i b i l i t y of m i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . He himself 
r e l a t e s the L o c k i a n example of the p r i n c e who, having always Uved 
i n a warm c l i m a t e , was convinced t h a t there was no such thing as 
water becoming hard, as he had always observed i t i n i t s f l u i d s t a t e . 
Again, we need only c o n s i d e r Hume's and B u t l e r ' s r e s p e c t i v e p o s i t i o n s 
on l i f e a f t e r death, f o r they both s e l e c t d i f f e r e n t a v a i l a b l e f a c t s 
from the course of nature i n order to e s t a b l i s h d i f f e r e n t c e r t a i n 
laws. According to B u t l e r , i t i s reasonable to maintain that what 
now e x i s t s w i l l continue to e x i s t , u n l e s s there i s any reason for i t 
to c e a s e e x i s t i n g , and we a r e encouraged by the course of nature to 
presume that things continue to e x i s t . He begins from the v a r i o u s 
changes to which n a t u r a l things a r e s u b j e c t , while p r e s e r v i n g t h e i r 
e s s e n t i a l q u a l i t i e s ; f o r example, one person t r a v e l s through 
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babyhood and childhood to become an a d u l t and y e t s t i l l r e t a i n s the 
same c h a r a c t e r . I t i s probable t h e r e f o r e that the same man can l i v e 
a f t e r death though r a d i c a l l y changed. Hume, on the other hand, 
p o s i t s t h a t e v e r y t h i n g i s i n a constant s t a t e of f l u x and change 
and, 
'no form can continue when t r a n s f e r r e d to a c o n d i t i o n 
of l i f e very d i f f e r e n t from the o r i g i n a l one, i n which 
i t was p l a c e d . Trees p e r i s h i n the water; f i s h e s i n the 
a i r ; animals i n the e a r t h . ' 
( E s s a y s Moral, P o l i t i c a l and L i t e r a r y 11IVp.602) 
I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to see t h a t B u t l e r i n v e s t i g a t e s t h i s question 
o f whether our i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of what we observe and experience i s 
a t r u e one, by means of analogy. Truth for B u t l e r seems to depend to 
a l a r g e extent upon events f u l f i l l i n g the f o r e c a s t s of men. There i s 
no s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d c h o i c e between something being true or being f a l s e , 
indeed B u t l e r uses morals such as ' c r e d i b l e ' , 'supposable', 'may 
possibly be t r u e ' , 'presume t r u e ' and so f o r t h ; i t i s a l l a question 
o f degree and the most B u t l e r w i l l say as a general maxim i s that 
only p r o b a b i l i t y i s the guide of l i f e . We a r e thus i n s t r u c t e d to 
p r o c e e d i n the f o l l o w i n g way, 
' i n q uestions of d i f f i c u l t y , or such as are thought so, 
where more s a t i s f a c t o r y evidence cannot be had, or i s 
not seen: i f the r e s u l t of examination be, that there 
appears upon the whole, any the lowest presumption on 
one s i d e , and none on the other, or a g r e a t e r presumption 
on one s i d e , though i n the lowest degree g r e a t e r ; t h i s 
- 36 -
determines the question, even i n matters of s p e c u l a t i o n . ' 
(Analogy I n t r o d u c t i o n , 5 p.6) 
And f u r t h e r , we a r e obliged i n our i n t e r e s t to a c t upon t h i s p r o b a b i l i t y , 
however low i t may be. I t i s no wonder t h a t so doubtful a procedure 
that i s wide open to m i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n should have roused Hobbes 
to say i n the seventeenth century 
'He th a t b e l i e v e s a t h i n g only because i t may 
be so, may as w e l l doubt of i t because i t may 
be otherwise.' 
(Quoted from Mossner Bishop B u t l e r and the Age of 
Reason, p.101) 
Had B u t l e r i n attempting to escape from the p o s i t i o n of extreme 
doubt ( i . e . we cannot say anything about the worl d ) , and from the 
other extreme, a p r i o r i c e r t a i n t y , a r r i v e d a t a v a c i l l a t i n g and weak 
p o s i t i o n , c o n t r i b u t i n g very l i t t l e to the search for t r u t h ? I think 
B u t l e r ' s defence of h i s c o n c l u s i o n s would l i e p r i n c i p a l l y with h i s 
i n s i s t e n c e upon the reasonableness of f o l l o w i n g common sense. There 
are many occasions i n everyday l i f e where we take d e c i s i o n s based 
on only probable evidence: why then, he would say, can we not accept 
such d e c i s i o n s i n e t h i c s and theology? We should be content with our 
imperfect knowledge and fo l l o w the l i g h t a v a i l a b l e . 
' I f a man were to walk by t w i l i g h t , must he not follow 
h i s eyes as much as i f i t were broad day and c l e a r sun-
s h i n e ? Or i f he were obliged to take a Journey by night, 
would he not g i v e heed to any l i g h t showing i n the darkness, 
t i l l the day should break and the daystar a r i s e . ' 
(Sermon XV 11, pp.267) 
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B u t l e r b e l i e v e s i n a statement when i t has a high p r o b a b i l i t y of 
t r u t h , he thereby a c t s as i f i t were t r u e , i n other words he accepts 
i t s s u f f i c i e n c y as a reason f o r a c t i o n . 
Having p o s t u l a t e d h i s e m p i r i c a l epistemology B u t l e r f u r t h e r complicates 
matters by h i s b e l i e f t h a t knowledge i s given by God to man i n two 
ways, t h a t i s by reason and experience, and r e v e l a t i o n . In the l a t t e r 
we must expect to f i n d new t r u t h s , f o r we cannot determine beforehand 
by reason what w i l l be r e v e a l e d . For what i s the point of r e v e l a t i o n 
i f i t only communicates what i s already known? B u t l e r t h e r e f o r e 
concluded t h a t , i f S c r i p t u r e i s the record of r e v e l a t i o n , we s h a l l 
expect that i t w i l l teach us some things which we could not d i s c o v e r 
without i t s a i d . So i t would seem at f i r s t glance that reason and 
r e v e l a t i o n . ^ p e a r to exclude each other; and t h i s f a c t i s v i s i b l e i n 
many of the w r i t i n g s of the century. Indeed a l a r g e number of 
B u t l e r ' s contemporaries, though having s i m i l a r opinions about n a t u r a l 
r e l i g i o n , departed from him on the point of acceptance of r e v e l a t i o n . 
L e t us d i g r e s s a l i t t l e to d i s c u s s b r i e f l y these opposing views. 
R e l i g i o n was n a t u r a l because i t was reasonable, and i t was a 
r e l i g i o n because i t s t i l l recognised a d i v i n i t y (though t h i s was not 
always so i n the second h a l f of the eighteenth c e n t u r y ) . Natural 
r e l i g i o n was e s t a b l i s h e d by understanding the nature of the world, 
i t s r e l a t i o n to God, and the laws of God's c r e a t u r e s , and t h i s process 
of understanding occurs through reason and experience. The world was 
no longer explained i n d i v i n e but human terms. A c e r t a i n group of 
people who shared such b e l i e f s were the D e i s t s , as they are now c a l l e d . 
T h i s was no s p e c i a l s e c t ; Deism was represented by the v a r i o u s i d e a s , 
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u n i t e d by common c o n v i c t i o n s , of a number of men over a century and 
a h a l f . The main c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of Deism was a f i e r c e a t t a c k on 
t r a d i t i o n a l Church d o c t r i n e . D e i s t s maintained that i t was unreason-
dale and impossible not to b e l i e v e i n God, but R e v e l a t i o n was unnec-
e s s a r y and i n c r e d i b l e . Reminding one of the a t t i t u d e of some p h i l -
osophers to metaphysics, the D e i s t s sought to r i d r e l i g i o n of a l l 
t h a t was 'mysterious'. They were i n d i f f e r e n t to the a u t h o r i t y of 
the B i b l e , d i s b e l i e v e d m i r a c l e s , the do c t r i n e of the Holy S p i r i t , 
v e r b a l i n s p i r a t i o n s and were a l s o a n t i - c l e r i c a l . The D e i s t s d o c t r i n e 
was e s s e n t i a l l y t h a t human reason, unaided by r e v e l a t i o n , can grasp 
those p a r t s of r e l i g i o n t h a t most mattered, and human happiness i s 
promoted when these t r u t h s a r e u l t i m a t e l y r e l a t e d to the p r a c t i c a l 
d u t i e s of l i f e . R e l i g i o n should be simple and reasonable and 
should provide r u l e s f o r human behaviour; and these r u l e s , the source 
of m o r a l i t y were not found i n the s c r i p t u r e , the ultimate r a t i o n a l 
standard becamie the law of nature. 'True r e l i g i o n ' was thus a 
phenomenon noted i n nature and was e a s i l y a c c e s s i b l e to a l l men. 
' I t i s as b r i g h t as the heavenly l i g h t and f r e e 
from a l l a m b i g u i t i e s .... The common understanding 
inherent i n man's nature i s s u f f i c i e n t , without 
s k i l l i n books and languages to lead him;.to the 
necessary knowledge of h i s f a i t h and obedience.' 
( P e t e r Annet The R e s u r r e c t i o n of Jes u s , 1744 p.9; 
quoted by Stromberg R e l i g i o u s L i b e r a l i s m i n 
Eig h t e e n t h Century England p.65) 
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I t i s hardly s u r p r i s i n g that t h i s n a t u r a l r e l i g i o n became 
reduced to r a t i o n a l e t h i c s ; r e l i g i o u s e x planations were slowly 
d i s p l a c e d from the c e n t r e of ILfe to i t s periphery, and indeed, i n 
some c a s e s , vanished completely. The D e i s t s held that God was a 
b e n e f i c i e n t C r e a t o r who had r e t i r e d from a c t i v i t y l e a v i n g man to 
understand the g e n e r a l mechanical laws of n a t u r e . He was a remote, 
impersonal God, f o r the D e i s t s encouraged by Newtonian d i s c o v e r i e s 
found i t d i f f i c u l t to r e c o n c i l e Newton's master p h y s i c i s t with the 
Jehovah of the Old Testament. But t h i s does not mean that Deism 
i s to be confused w i t h any form of atheism. The D e i s t s as a group 
a s s e r t e d God's e x i s t e n c e as an absolute c e r t a i n t y . For example, 
Thomas Chubb wrote, 
'That t h e r e i s a Deity, or governing mind, who 
gave being to a l l things e x t e r n a l to h i m s e l f , 
and who e x i s t s by or from, an.absolute neces-
s i t y i s to me, most evident and p l a i n 
I t h i n k atheism, i n point of argument, i s 
unsuppertable.' 
(Thomas Chubb i n Posthumous Works quoted by Stromberg 
R e l i g i o u s L i b e r a l i s m i n Eighteenth Century England p.59) 
B u t l e r who a t t a c k e d D e i s t i c views i n h i s Analogy was q u i t e as 
a b l e to r e c o n c i l e God's v a r i o u s a t t r i b u t e s as could Locke, one of 
h i s p h i l o s o p h i c a l mentors. Both men d e s i r e d a r a t i o n a l i s t theology 
which s t i l l maintained a r e v e a l e d r e l i g i o n . L i k e the D e i s t s , they 
wished to exclude the 'mysteries' and high flown metaphysical spec-
u l a t i o n s of C h r i s t i a n i t y , but r e v e l a t i o n they considered, was not p a r t 
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of such p a r a p h e r n a l i a . Because of man's l i m i t a t i o n s , reason alone 
was not adequate i n the obtaini n g of knowledge and so the a d d i t i o n of 
r e v e l a t o r y information was necessa r y . 
'But n a t u r a l r e l i g i o n , i n i t s f u l l extent, was 
nowhere th a t I know, taken c a r e of by the form 
of n a t u r a l reason. I t should seem by the l i t t l e 
t h a t has h i t h e r t o been done i n i t , that i t i s too 
hard a t a s k for u n a s s i s t e d reason to e s t a b l i s h , 
m o r a l i t y i n a l l i t s p a r t s , upon i t s t r u e found-
a t i o n , with a c l e a r and convincing l i g h t . ' 
(Locke, The Reasonableness of C h r i s t i a n i t y , V o l . V I I p.139) 
B u t l e r i n the Analogy put forward a s i m i l a r argument; an examination 
of the world g i v e s evidence t h a t the l i g h t of Nature i s not s u f f i c i e n t 
f o r a l l r e l i g i o u s i n s t r u c t i o n a s , 
'no man i n s e r i o u s n e s s and s i m p l i c i t y of mind 
can p o s s i b l y think i t so, who consider the s t a t e 
of r e l i g i o n i n the heathen world before r e v e l -
a t i o n and i t s present s t a t e i n those p l a c e s 
which have borrowed no l i g h t from i t ; p a r t i c -
u l a r l y the doubtfulness of some of the g r e a t e s t 
men, concerning things of the utmost importance, 
as w e l l as the n a t u r a l i n a t t e n t i o n and ignorance 
of mankind i n g e n e r a l . ' 
(Analogy I I . 1. 1. p.185) 
W h i l s t B u t l e r b e l i e v e d men a r e a l l i n var y i n g degrees of 
ignorance, Locke i s more concerned with the 'common' man - 'the 
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mul t i t u d e ' who a r e d i s t i n g u i s h e d from men of understanding. The 
l a t t e r can u s u a l l y apprehend r e l i g i o u s t r u t h s by their own reasoning. 
He t a l k s of, 
'where the hand i s used to the plough and the 
spade, the head i s seldom el e v a t e d to sublime 
notions or e x e r c i s e d i n mysterious reasonings'. 
(Locke, The Reasonableness of C h r i s t i a n i t y , V o l . V I I p.157) 
The way to b r i n g such people to duty and obedience was by p l a i n 
commands - 'the g r e a t e s t p a r t cannot know and th e r e f o r e they must 
b e l i e v e ' , (Locke, The Reasonableness of C h r i s t i a n i t y ) 
B u t l e r appears to have more r e s p e c t for the humbler members of s o c i e t y , 
f o r he maintains t h a t a person who does h i s duty with l i t t l e knowledge 
of why he i s doing i t , i m p l i e s a b e t t e r c h a r a c t e r than a d u t i f u l man 
who has good reasons f o r doing h i s duty. He uses C h r i s t ' s words 
29 
i n John XX f o r i l l u s t r a t i o n of h i s point", 'Blessed a r e they t h a t 
have not seen and yet b e l i e v e d ' . 
However, t h i s does not mean that Locke and B u t l e r concluded 
t h a t knowledge could be founded on r e v e l a t i o n alone, and the former 
e s p e c i a l l y c l o s e l y couples the two concepts, 
'Reason i s n a t u r a l r e v e l a t i o n , whereby the e t e r n a l 
F a t h e r of L i g h t , the Foundation of a l l knowledge, 
communicates to mankind th a t p o r t i o n of t r u t h which 
he has l a i d w i t h i n the reach of t h e i r n a t u r a l 
f a c u l t i e s . R e v e l a t i o n i s n a t u r a l reason enlarged by 
a new s e t of d i s c o v e r i e s communicated by God immed-
i a t e l y , which reason vouches the t r u t h of, by the 
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testimony and proof i t g i v e s that they come 
from God.' 
(Locke, Essay IV. 18) 
T h i s r e c o g n i t i o n of the c l a i m s of reason was duly echoed by B u t l e r , 
and one wonders how e x a c t l y he i s using t h i s term, for consider the 
f o l l o w i n g comments by him. 
' I express myself with c a u t i o n , l e s t I should 
be mistaken to v i l i f y reason, which i s indeed 
the only f a c u l t y we have wherewith to judge 
concerning anything, even r e v e l a t i o n i t s e l f . ' 
(Analogy I I . 3 p.222) 
and, 
'Reason can, and i t ought to judge, not only of 
the meaning, but a l s o of the morality and the 
evidence of r e v e l a t i o n . ' 
(Analogy I I . 3. 26. p 238) 
His opinion upon t h i s s u b j e c t , I think, stems from h i s 
i n s i s t e n c e , as we have p r e v i o u s l y seen, on examining things as they 
a r e . Reason i s u s e f u l i n such an e x e r c i s e , i t explores what i s 
a c t u a l and extant i n the scheme of t h i n g s , i . e . matters of f a c t . 
B u t l e r has not suddenly taken to s p e c u l a t i v e reasoning, but on the 
other hand he would be f o o l i s h to ignore what would help to c l a r i f y 
and v e r i f y i nformation. Reason, t h e r e f o r e , not only e l u c i d a t e s 
the meaning of whatever i s r e v e a l e d , but i t a l s o judges the morality 
o f S c r i p t u r e , i . e . whether i t contains any c o n t r a d i c t i o n s or incon-
s i s t e n c i e s when compared to what we experience of wisdom, j u s t i c e 
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or goodness. For i f a c o n t r a d i c t i o n were proved, r e v e l a t i o n would 
be f a l s e . Consider the i m p l i c a t i o n s of such a c o n f l i c t between 
n a t u r a l r e l i g i o n and what might be claimed to be part of r e v e a l e d 
r e l i g i o n ; where o b l i g a t i o n s and d u t i e s a r e demanded, the l a t t e r 
commands a r e not always the ones to follow r a t h e r than the commands 
of c o n s c i e n c e . V e r i f i c a t i o n i s according to analogy; with matters of 
f a c t , and not to the c o n c l u s i o n s of s p e c u l a t i v e reason; and so we 
see t h a t B u t l e r ' s epistemology does proceed along e m p i r i c a l l i n e s , 
f o r reasoning which i s l e g i t i m a t e i s that which j o i n s ' a b s t r a c t 
reasonings w i t h observatjons of f a c t s ' . (Analogy I n t r o d u c t i o n , 9. 
p.11) R e l i g i o n i s a p r a c t i c a l t h i n g s a i d B u t l e r , and i f we are to 
understand God's laws, we must r e l y upon what our d a i l y l i f e teaches 
us, f o r , 
'God i n s t r u c t s us by experience ( f o r i t i s not 
reason, but experience which teaches u s ) . ' 
(Analogy I I . 5) 
I n view of t h i s , the very i n t r o d u c t i o n of r e v e l a t i o n as a means 
of communicating information to man seems a l i t t l e strange i n an 
otherwise e m p i r i c i s t philosophy. B u t l e r did admit that i d e a l l y 
n a t u r a l r e l i g i o n would be s u f f i c i e n t guide f o r l i f e , but because of 
man's l i m i t a t i o n s r e v e l a t i o n i s necessary to supplement our knowledge, 
i ndeed to provide t h a t which can be obtained i n no other way. 
'As God governs the world and i n s t r u c t s h i s 
c r e a t u r e s , according to c e r t a i n laws or r u l e s , 
i n the known course of nature: known by reason 
together with experience so the s c r i p t u r e informs 
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us of a scheme of d i v i n e Providence a d d i t i o n a l 
to t h i s ' . 
(Analogy I I , 3. 5. p 223) 
Revealed r e l i g i o n a l s o endorses the claims of n a t u r a l r e l i g i o n , because 
C h r i s t i a n i t y i s a r e p u b l i c a t i o n of n a t u r a l r e l i g i o n , i t s i n t e n t i o n 
being to promote n a t u r a l p i e t y and v i r t u e . 
' I t i n s t r u c t s mankind i n the moral system of the 
world; that i t i s the work of an i n f i n i t e l y 
p e r f e c t Being and under h i s government; that 
v i r t u e i s h i s law; and that he w i l l f i n a l l y 
judge mankind i n righteousness and render to 
a l l according to t h e i r works i n a fu t u r e 
s t a t e . ' 
(Analogy I I , 1. 5 p.188) 
According to B u t l e r , r e l i g i o n was not something separate from 
e t h i c s , and indeed the Importance of n a t u r a l r e l i g i o n f o r t h i s study 
i s t h a t i t was morally o r i e n t a t e d . T h i s was a popular theory to hold; 
V o l t a i r e wrote t h a t he understood by n a t u r a l r e l i g i o n those p r i n c i p l e s 
of m o r a l i t y common to the human r a c e . T h i s i s r e l i g i o n used i n i t s 
widest sense, a u n i v e r s a l r e l i g i o n , f r e e from s e c t a r i a n dogmas, and 
c h a r a c t e r i z e d by an u l t i m a t e and common s e t of r e l i g i o u s and moral 
b e l i e f s . R e l i g i o n was n a t u r a l because i t was reasonable. But B u t l e r 
was very i n s i s t e n t t h a t N a t u r a l R e l i g i o n as he conceived i t should not 
be defined only as 
'a b e l i e f of the moral system of nature, and to 
enforce the p r a c t i c e of n a t u r a l p i e t y and v i r t u e . ' 
(Analogy I I , 1) 
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R e v e l a t i o n had to be considered as a v i t a l and e s s e n t i a l element 
of r e l i g i o n , f o r together with reason i t i n s t r u c t s us i n our d u t i e s , 
and more than reason i t shows us our d e s t i n y . 
As we have seen, B u t l e r c l e a r l y d i s t i n g u i s h e s between n a t u r a l 
r e l i g i o n and C h r i s t i a n i t y . The former i s an inward p r i n c i p l e 'written 
upon our h e a r t s ' and 'interwoven i n t o our very nature', i t can be 
formulated as a n a t u r a l moral law. The l a t t e r , i . e . C h r i s t i a n i t y , 
i s an e x t e r n a l p r i n c i p l e , i n th a t d i v i n e commands come from that 
which i s o u t s i d e o u r s e l v e s , but the content i s s t i l l moral 'for the 
S c r i p t u r e s e n j o i n eyery moral v i r t u e ' . N a t u r a l r e l i g i o n i s c h a r a c t e r -
i z e d by the working of reason i n the i n t e r e s t of moral d u t i e s , and 
these a r i s e out of the nature of the case i t s e l f . C h r i s t i a n i t y however, 
i s more concerned w i t h what B u t l e r terms p o s i t i v e d u t i e s , these a r e 
r e v e a l e d to us, and i n c l u d e such demands as baptism, f u l l acquaint-
ance w i t h the S c r i p t u r e s , propagation of the gospel, support of the 
c l e r g y and other l i k e p r e c e p t s . Hence, r e v e l a t i o n was nothing near 
'the w i t n e s s of the s p i r i t ' which was popular i n the seventeenth 
century. I n f a c t , B u t l e r abhorred the r e l i g i o u s 'enthusiasm' of 
former ages, and th e r e i s i n evidence an account of a t e s t y meeting 
between him and Wesley. R e v e l a t i o n i s very s t r i c t l y l i m i t e d to the 
S c r i p t u r e s and to the v o i c e of conscience, i t s r o l e i s c l e a r l y defined. 
. I n the main, B u t l e r b e l i e v e d that a man d i s c o v e r s h i s d u t i e s by 
f o l l o w i n g h i s nature; l e t us now examine what i s meant by t h i s 
i n j u n c t i o n . 
C H A P T E R I I 
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NATURE 
B u t l e r ' s p h i l o s o p h i c a l p o s i t i o n throughout h i s w r i t i n g s on 
morals appears on the s u r f a c e e m p i r i c a l ; reason d i s c o v e r s through 
the reported evidence of the senses a l l that man I s capable of 
f i n d i n g out, and a l l t h a t he needs to d i s c o v e r f o r p r a c t i c a l l i v i n g . 
From i n t r o s p e c t i o n and observation of human nature B u t l e r had a r r i v e d 
a t the c o n c l u s i o n t h a t to f o l l o w nature was to follow the path of 
v i r t u e , w h i l s t v i c e was a v i o l a t i o n or breaking i n upon our own 
n a t u r e . T h i s , of course, was i n d i r e c t c o n t r a d i c t i o n to the r a t i o n a l i s t 
p o s i t i o n , whereby moral t r u t h s were e t e r n a l and Immutable, and v i c e 
was t h a t which was contrary to the reason and c o n s t i t u t i o n of t h i n g s . 
The area of B u t l e r ' s i n v e s t i g a t i o n i s c l e a r l y defined: 
'what the p a r t i c u l a r nature of man i s , i t s 
s e v e r a l p a r t s , t h e i r economy or c o n s t i t u t i o n ; 
from whence i t proceeds to determine what 
course of l i f e i t i s , which i s correspondent 
to t h i s whole nature.' 
(Sermons P r e f a c e . 7, p.6) 
For B u t l e r f i r m l y b e l i e v e d t h a t there i s a more exact correspondence 
between the n a t u r a l and moral world than would probably a t f i r s t 
appear. The Inward frame of man does i n a p e c u l i a r manner answer 
to the e x t e r n a l c o n d i t i o n and circumstances of l i f e i n which he i s 
placed; and nature, i f we allow i t , can guide us i n the ways we 
should behave. And s i n c e man's nature was d i v i n e l y c r e a t e d , God 
was the author of such a scheme, but does not p a r t i c i p a t e . 
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Developing the analogy, B u t l e r argues that j u s t as p h y s i c a l nature 
t e s t i f i e s to a Great Designer, human nature t e s t i f i e s that he i s 
a l s o a Moral Governor. 
'That God has given us a moral nature, may 
mostly j u s t l y be urged as a proof of our being 
under h i s moral government.' 
(Analogy I . 3, 17 p.76) 
B u t l e r ' s aim was thus to provide an e m p i r i c a l theory of morals i n 
keeping with the s e c u l a r tone of h i s age, which did not exclude the 
d i v i n e . He departed from the seventeenth century p o s i t i o n of an 
e t h i c s based on the a r b i t r a r y e d i c t of God, and advanced i n s t e a d 
an e t h i c s based on nature. Before examining the procedure whereby 
B u t l e r reaches t h i s p o s i t i o n , I think i t necessary to look a t the 
meaning of the word '^Nature' as i t can have so many d i v e r s e s e n s e s . 
Two authors have given a general a n a l y s i s of the word 'Nature'. 
M i l l i n h i s Essay on Nature (Three E s s a y s on R e l i g i o n ) forwards two 
ways i n which the word can be used. F i r s t 'Nature' i n the a b s t r a c t 
i s the sum of a l l phenomena, the aggregate of the powers and p r o p e r t i e s 
of a l l t h i n g s . Secondly, 'Nature' stands f o r everything which i s of 
i t s e l f , without voluntary human i n t e r v e n t i o n , i t s opposite being that 
which i s a r t i f i c i a l . I n the eighteenth century both these usages 
would be accepted and there was indeed a very c l e a r d i s t i n c t i o n bet-
ween a r t or a r t i f i c e (which was derived from and made by man) and 
nature (which was der i v e d from God). For example, an a c t i o n that 
d e v i a t e d from the norm such as a b i t c h e a t i n g her pups would be 
termed u n n a t u r a l , but i f the d e v i a t i o n took the form of an i n t e r f e r e n c e 
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w i t h nature by man, for example the c u t t i n g of h a i r , i t would be more 
c o r r e c t to deem such a c t i o n a r t i f i c i a l . I n c o n t r a s t 'Nature' was 
sometimes used i n such a way as to be the opposite of a r t and c u l t u r e 
which were viewed as products of reason. Thus 'Nature' became that 
which was n o n - r a t i o n a l and even non-moral, becuase i t was thought 
t h a t not only was 'Nature' p r i o r to reason, but that moral laws, 
being s u b j e c t to change and d i v e r s i t y , were t h e r e f o r e deemed by some 
t h i n k e r s to be man-made. Needless to say, t h i s i s not the viewpoint 
of B u t l e r . 
Sampson i n h i s book Progress i n the Age of Reason gi v e s 
t h r e e general meanings of th a t which i s n a t u r a l , and as I think 
t h e s e a r e h e l p f u l i n c l a r i f y i n g the concept I have l i s t e d them 
below. F i r s t , to say th a t 'the i n h a b i t a n t s of B a l i lead a more 
n a t u r a l l i f e than those of Chicago' i s to I d e n t i f y nature with the 
p r i m i t i v e , the simple c o n t r a s t e d w i t h the complex. Secondly, i n the 
sentence 'things t h a t go bump i n the night a r e not n a t u r a l ' , by 
' n a t u r a l ' i s i n d i c a t e d c o n f i r m l t y to observed c a u s a l sequences, i n 
c o n t r a s t to the abnormal or to the e x t r a o r d i n a r y . T h i r d l y , 'for a 
c a n n i b a l to eat a f e l l o w man i s unnatural, but for a c a n n i b a l to be 
eaten by a man-eating t i g e r i s not u n n a t u r a l ' . Here the contention 
I s t h a t c a n n i b a l i s m i s unworthy of fundamental human nature; for 
t h e r e I s a strong sense t h a t man i s destined f o r b e t t e r things or i s 
meant to manifest conduct of a higher standard, and i t i s t h i s sense 
t h a t i s present i n B u t l e r ' s moral theory. 
To sum up, Nature, f o r B u t l e r i s that which God caused or 
permitted, and can t h e r e f o r e be termed that which i s Good; and I n 
regard to human nature, because we are God's c r e a t u r e s and born under 
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the n a t u r a l law of v i r t u e , man has p r i o r o b l i g a t i o n s to p i e t y and 
v i r t u e . When B u t l e r t a l k s of human nature i n such a way, he i s 
r e f e r r i n g to the whole, f o r although he l i s t s t h a t which c o n s t i t u t e s 
man's i n t e r n a l frame, the v a r i o u s p r o p e r t i e s and p r i n c i p l e s , each of 
which may be considered s e p a r a t e l y , the reader i s urged to think of 
human nature as a system. B u t l e r t e l l s us that i f we think of a 
p a r t i c u l a r thing we f i n d i t i s a whole made up of p a r t s , but th a t the 
whole i s more than the sum of the s e v e r a l p a r t s , we have to incl u d e 
the r e l a t i o n s and r e s p e c t s which these p a r t s have to each other. 
I n order to c l a r i f y and empahsise t h i s conception, B u t l e r uses a number 
of a n a l o g i e s , which i n c l u d e a comparison with a watch, a t r e e , a 
machine, the p h y s i c a l body and a c i v i l government, but we w i l l look 
only a t the f i r s t and l a s t of these. I f we take a watch to p i e c e s , 
u n l e s s we know how each p a r t i s r e l a t e d to i t s neighbour, we w i l l 
have no idea of a watch; and t h i s i s the same wi t h human nature, the 
o 
c o n s i t i t u i o n of which B u t l e r sees as a kind of h i e r a r c h y with some 
inward p r i n c i p l e s s u p e r i o r to others. A p p e t i t e s , passions and a f f e c t i o n s 
could be termed the 'lower s t a t u s ' p r i n c i p l e s , w h i l s t the 'higher 
s t a t u s ' p r i n c i p l e s are conscience, s e l f - l o v e and benevolence. To 
c o n s i d e r each of these p r i n c i p l s e s e p a r a t e l y does not give us an idea 
of human nature. 
' I t i s ' , B u t l e r concludes, 'from c o n s i d e r i n g the r e l a t i o n s 
which the s e v e r a l a p p e t i t e s and passions i n the inward 
frame have to each other, and above a l l the supremacy 
of r e f l e c t i o n or conscience, that we get the idea of 
the system or c o n s t i t u t i o n of human nature.' 
(Sermons P r e f a c e , 12. p.9) 
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The only d i f f e r e n c e B u t l e r sees between a watch and human nature 
I s t h a t , whereas a machine i s inanimate and p a s s i v e , men are agents, 
and thus a r e accountable f o r any d i s o r d e r w i t h i n the human c o n s t i -
t u t i o n . 
The analogy w i t h the c i v i l government i s used because the 
l a t t e r i m p l i e s u n i t e d s t r e n g t h and v a r i o u s subordinations under one 
d i r e c t i o n , i . e . of supreme a u t h o r i t y , but the d i f f e r e n t s t r e n g t h s of 
each i n d i v i d u a l member of s o c i e t y do not come i n t o the idea of the 
c i v i l c o n s t i t u t i o n . But i f you leave out the subordination, union 
and common d i r e c t i o n , you destroy and l o s e the i d e a . I n a s i m i l a r 
manner, a l l the v a r i o u s p a r t s of our nature should be considered as 
r e l a t e d and n a t u r a l l y subordinate to the one p r i n c i p l e of r e f l e c t i o n or 
cons c i e n c e - the l a t t e r appearing to f u l f i l , i n B u t l e r ' s theory, a 
u n i f y i n g r o l e . 
B u t l e r expands h i s p s y c h o l o g i c a l observations by maintaining 
t h a t human nature has not ' f a l l e n ' i n t o a systematic form by chance, 
t h e r e i s purpose behind i t s design - j u s t as there i s i n p h y s i c a l 
n a t u r e . 
'Every work both of Nature and a r t i s a system; 
and as every p a r t i c u l a r thing both n a t u r a l and 
a r t i f i c i a l i s f o r some use and purpose out of 
and beyond i t s e l f , one may add to what has 
been a l r e a d y brought i n t o the idea of a system, 
i t s conduciveness to t h i s one or more ends.' 
(Sermon Pr e f a c e 10.p.8) 
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B u t l e r ' s conception of human nature e x h i b i t s what one may term our 
i n t e r n a l and e x t e r n a l t e l e o l o g y , f o r not only does the whole e x i s t 
f o r a purpose, t h a t i s to promote happiness and v i r t u e , the i n d i v i d -
u a l propensions and a f f e c t i o n s point to the end outside themselves 
to which they a l l r e l a t e , i . e . t o t a l i t y of man's nature. T h i s 
t e l e o l o g i c a l p a r t of B u t l e r ' s moral philosophy i s not to be underest-
imated, f o r e v e r y t h i n g i s judged according to i t s conformation with 
the purpose f o r which i t was intended. 
'The due and proper use of any n a t u r a l f a c u l t y 
or power i s to be judged of by the end and 
design f o r which i t was given us.' 
(Sermons IV, 8. p.82) 
J u s t as the f a c u l t y of speech was given to man f o r communication, 
and the eye to see with , so man's nature was c o n s t i t u t e d to lead him 
to do good; and B u t l e r j u s t i f i e s t h i s c o n c l u s i o n i n the f o l l o w i n g way: 
' I f the r e a l nature of any c r e a t u r e l e a d s him, 
and i s adapted to such and such pucposes only, 
or more than to any other: t h i s i s a reason 
to b e l i e v e the Author of that nature intended 
i t f o r those purposes.' 
(Sermon I I . 1. p.51) 
According to B u t l e r ' s own observations, human nature e x h i b i t s a 
tendency to v i r t u e over and above everything e l s e , and th e r e f o r e 
each i n d i v i d u a l should f o l l o w h i s own nature i f he wishes to do that 
which i s r i g h t i n the s i g h t of God. 
- 52 -
From i n v e s t i g a t i n g the p a r t i c u l a r concept of 'Nature', we 
s h a l l now precede to d i s c u s s the meaning of t h i s phrase 'to foUow 
nat u r e ' . By the time B u t l e r was w r i t i n g h i s Sermons he found i t 
n e c e s s a r y to s t a t e c l e a r l y what was e n t a i l e d by h i s use of the maxim, 
f o r i t had a l r e a d y i n v i t e d a v a r i e t y of m i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . He e l u c -
i d a t e s h i s own p o s i t i o n by l i s t i n g avnumber of ways i n which the 
i n j u n c t i o n has been used by other philosophers. F i r s t , 'to follow 
n a t u r e ' can mean to a c t as we p l e a s e , but B u t l e r maintained that i f 
t h i s were the case then to d e v i a t e from nature would be absurd f o r 
does anyone ever a c t otherwise than as to be pleased? Secondly, 
'to f o l l o w nature' can r e f e r to the expression of any p r i n c i p l e i n 
man without regard e i t h e r to the kind or degree of i t . T h i s a l s o 
' i s regarded as being of l i t t l e use as a guide i n moral behaviour, 
i n t h a t : 
'The same person hath often contrary p r i n c i p l e s 
which a t the same time draw contrary ways, he 
may by the same a c t i o n s both follow and c o n t r a d i c t 
h i s nature i n t h i s sense of the word; he may 
f o l l o w one p a s s i o n and c o n t r a d i c t another.' 
(Seim ons I I , 7.p.57) 
T h i r d l y , 'to f o l l o w nature' can mean to follow those passions which 
a r e the s t r o n g e s t and thus i n f l u e n c e a c t i o n s more than the others. 
I f a man d i d so, B u t l e r b e l i e v e d that he would be l i v i n g at the l e v e l 
of brute e x i s t e n c e , f o r man's s e l f - e x p r e s s i o n would l i e mechanically 
i n the b l i n d p u r s u i t of i n s t i n c t i v e s a t i s f a c t i o n . T h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
i s s i m i l a r to t h a t given by Wollaston i n R e l i g i o n of Nature Delineated. 
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He maintains t h a t some philosophers t a l k of man's nature as not 
being purely r a t i o n a l , t h e r e i s a part of i t that i s i n common with 
b r u t e s ; so t h a t to f o l l o w nature i s to appoint a guide that Wollaston 
f e e l s w i l l only mislead, f o r t h i s l a t t e r b r u t i s h part of man w i l l 
more oft e n p r e v a i l over h i s reason. Such an argument i s t h e r e f o r e 
d i s m i s s e d by Wollaston a s , a t the best, a loose way of t a l k . 
B u t l e r agrees w i t h Wollaston t h a t such a s t a t e of mind i s u n s a t i s -
f a c t o r y and does not deny that i t ever occurs, f o r to t a l k of 
f o l l o w i n g : R a t u r e i n c l u d e s a l l passions and emotions. For i n s t a n c e , 
both anger and love are n a t u r a l , and the l a t t e r i s not always the 
s t r o n g e s t impulse. 
'The g e n e r a l i t y of mankind a l s o obey t h e i r i n s t i n c t s 
and p r i n c i p l s e , a l l of them: those propensiohs 
we c a l l good, as w e l l as the bad, according to 
the same r u l e s ; namely the c o n s t i t u t i o n of 
t h e i r body, and the e x t e r n a l circumstances 
which they are i n . ' 
(Sermons Preface 16. p. 12) 
What B u t l e r does a s s e r t i s t h a t human nature c o n s i s t s of something more 
than b l i n d p a s s i o n s and a f f e c t i o n s , i t forms ,a system i n which consc-
i e n c e i s the u n i f y i n g p r i n c i p l e , and thus to follow one's nature i s 
to e xpress o n e s e l f according to the d i c t a t e s of conscience. The 
p r i n c i p l e of r e f l e c t i o n or conscience - as i t i s more often termed -
approves or condemns, and passes judgement upon man and h i s a c t i o n s . 
I n other words, i t i s used to d i s t i n g u i s h between good and e v i l . 
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I t i s by conscience t h a t men are a 'law unto themselves', n a t u r a l 
law belongs to our c o n d i t i o n of being, and according to B u t l e r t h i s 
law of our nature I s the law of c o n s c i e n c e . W e are obliged to obey 
t h i s law, to f o l l o w our own nature, f o r i t contains i t s own a u t h o r i t y , 
i t i s our n a t u r a l guide to moral behaviour. By ' n a t u r a l ' i n t h i s 
sense, B u t l e r means t h a t without conscious reasoning, man has an 
i n s t i n c t i v e or n a t u r a l d i s p o s i t i o n to kindness and compassion which 
i s manifested i n the commands of conscience. Man n a t u r a l l y a c t s 
out a j u s t and good r o l e i n s o c i e t y , u n l e s s other passions or i n t e r e s t s 
l e a d him a s t r a y . Thus men's obedience or d e v i a t i o n from conscience 
renders t h e i r a c t i o n s n a t u r a l or unnatural. I n the Second Sermon 
B u t l e r g i v e s a very c l e a r example of t h i s point. An animal i s l u r e d 
i n t o a snare by a b a i t , thereby bringing about h i s own d e s t r u c t i o n 
by the immediate need - hunger. By t h i s a c t i o n he i s e n t i r e l y 
f o l l o w i n g h i s nature and t h e r e f o r e there i s a correspondence between 
h i s a c t i o n s and nature. But I f a man i n a s i m i l a r p o s i t i o n rushed 
i n t o the snare i n order t h a t h i s hunger might be appeased, he would 
be f o l l o w i n g h i s s t r o n g e s t d e s i r e l i k e the animal, but there would be 
a g r e a t d i s p r o p o r t i o n between the nature of man and such an a c t i o n . 
According to B u t l e r man should a c t not simply according to h i s strongest 
d e s i r e of the moment but reason and r e f l e c t . I t i s Important to appreciate 
t h a t B u t l e r i s not c o n s i d e r i n g the a c t i o n i n I t s e l f or i t s consequence, 
but the comparison of the a c t i o n with the nature of the agent. (We 
can now see more c l e a r l y the relevance of Sampson's I l l u s t r a t i o n 
concerning c a n n i b a l i s m (mentioned above) to B u t l e r ' s moral t h e o r y ) . 
According to B u t l e r , the words 'disproportionate' and "unnatural' 
^ B u t l e r takes as the t e x t f o r Sermon I I Romans I I ' . I t i s 
i n t e r e s t i n g to see t h a t C l a r k e a l s o r e f e r s to t h i s P a u l i n e verse which 
was much quoted i n t h e o l o g i c a l c i r c l e s . B u t l e r departs from both 
C l a r k e and Paul by the i n c l u s i o n of conscience as that by which men are 
a law to themselves. 
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when r e f e r r e d to man's nature a r e synonomous i n meaning. 
The c o n c l u s i o n t h a t c e r t a i n a c t i o n s were worthy of man's 
nat u r e and t h a t others were not worthy followed from B u t l e r ' s idea 
t h a t the c o n s t i t u t i o n and purpose of human nature lead men to a c t 
v i r t u o u s l y , i n t h e i r everyday l i v e s . However, a c r i t i c i s m has been 
made i n our time by C.D. Broad, who considered that B u t l e r r e f e r r e d 
to an i d e a l nature of man, not h i s a c t u a l nature: Broad answers the 
problem of how men reach such an i d e a l when they have only examples 
of i m p e r f e c t i o n before them, i n the f o l l o w i n g a n a l o g i c a l way: 
'We see such t h i n g s as cakes and b i s c u i t s and pennies. 
On r e f l e c t i o n we see th a t they f a l l i n t o a s e r i e s -
cake, b i s c u i t penny - i n which a c e r t a i n a t t r i b u t e 
i s more and more f u l l y r e a l i z e d . F i n a l l y , we form 
the concept of a p e r f e c t c i r c l e as the i d e a l l i m i t 
to such a s e r i e s . Thus we can form the concepts 
of such i d e a l l i m i t s as c i r c l e s and s t r a i g h t l i n e s 
by r e f l e c t i n g upon imperfect i n s t a n c e s arranged 
i n s e r i e s ; and here there i s no need to know 
what the o b j e c t s are f o r . ' 
( F i v e Types of E t h i c a l Theory I I I p.59) 
To begin from a general point of view, I f i n d t h i s concept u n h e l p f u l . 
How does one know how to order o b j e c t s , u n l e s s one already has the 
concept of our i d e a l , and i f t h i s i s so, then there i s no need to 
oifder o b j e c t s i n the f i r s t p l a c e . More s p e c i f i c a l l y , as an i n t e r p -
r e t a t i o n of B u t l e r t h i s theory of an i d e a l nature i s inadequate on 
two counts. F i r s t , I can d i s c o v e r no evidence f o r such a theory i n 
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B u t l e r ' s own w r i t i n g s . To the contrary only consider the following 
words: 
'That which renders beings capable of moral 
government i s t h e i r having a moral nature 
and moral f a c u l t i e s of perception and of 
a c t i o n ' . 
( D i s s e r t a t i o n I I Of the Nature of V i r t u e 1. p.397) 
B u t l e r ' s main concern i s w i t h man's n a t u r a l sense of v i r t u e ; the 
f a i l u r e to a c t always morally i s due to t h i s misuse of man's own 
n a t u r a l f a c u l t i e s . Everyone has an i d e a l nature, i t i s j u s t a 
que s t i o n of f o l l o w i n g i t . 
Secondly, an examination of p h i l o s o p h i c a l t r a d i t i o n s 
contemporary w i t h B u t l e r r e v e a l a s i m i l a r i t y of thought i n which 
the c o i c e p t of an i d e a l nature i s quit e out of pla c e . Indeed, one 
s u s p e c t s Broad of s u b j e c t i n g B u t l e r ' s t e x t to a n a l y s i s i n i s o l a t i o n , 
without c o n s i d e r i n g h i s p h i l o s o p h i c a l background. In my opinion 
t h e r e a r e two p a r t i c u l a r t h e o r i e s , c u r r e n t a t the w r i t i n g of the 
Sermons, which undoubtedly must have i n f l u e n c e d B u t l e r ' s thoughts. 
F i r s t , t here was advanced what Arthur Lovejoy terms 'an e t h i c s of 
prudent m e d i o c r i t y ' . A man's duty was to keep h i s place and not 
to transcend i t , the good f o r a given c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of l i v i n g 
t h i n g s c o n s i s t e d i n conformity to i t s type. 
'The b l i s s of Man (could Pride that b l e s s i n g f i n d ) 
I s not to a c t or think beyond mankind; 
No Pow'rs of body or of soul to share. 
But what h i s nature and h i s s t a t e can bear.' 
(Pope, E s s a y on Man E p i s t l e I , p.42) 
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The d i s c o v e r y of what was t y p i c a l of such a s p e c i e s as man, c o n s i s t e d 
i n t a k i n g stock of h i s a c t u a l c o n s t i t u t i o n , h i s d e s i r e s , i n s t i n c t s , 
a f f e c t i o n s and ' i n formulating h i s good i n terms of some balanced 
and p r a c t i c a b l e f u l f i l m e n t of these'. (Lovejoy,p.201) 
The second theory w i t h which the reader has already been acquainted 
i n Chapter I , views a l l of nature as that which is, and not what 
cou l d be, and to t h i s B u t l e r s u b s c r i b e s . However, the main 
proponents of the d o c t r i n e , C l a r k e and Wollaston, go f u r t h e r . 
They p o s i t a connection between wrongness i n a c t i o n and falsehood 
or s e l f - c o n t r a d i c t i o n i n theory. For C l a r k e , the r i g h t n e s s of an 
a c t i o n c o n s i s t e d i n i t s 'propriety', i . e . i t s s u i t a b i l i t y to the 
s i t u a t i o n i n M4iich i t i s performed. Accordingly, he seemed to 
b e l i e v e t h a t c e r t a i n s i t u a t i o n s c a l l f o r c e r t a i n kinds of a c t s , 
and to deny t h i s , would be to deny that t h i n g s are as they are. 
'Inquiry i s the very same i n a c t i o n as f a l s i t y 
or c o n t r a d i c t i o n i n theory.' 
( C l a r k e , A Discourse of Natural R e l i g i o n 
i n Raphael, p.208) 
'Wherefore a l l r a t i o n a l c r e a t u r e s , whose w i l l s 
a r e not c o n s t a n t l y and r e g u l a r l y determined, and 
t h e i r a c t i o n s governed, by r i g h t reason and the 
necessary d i f f e r e n c e s of good and e v i l , according 
to the e t e r n a l and i n v a r i a b l e r u l e s of j u s t i c e , 
e q u i t y , goodness and t r u t h : but s u f f e r themselves 
to be swayed by unaccountable a r b i t r a r y humours, 
and r a s h p a s s i o n s , by l u s t s , v a n i t y and pride: 
by p r i v a t e i n t e r e s t , or present sensual p l e a s u r e s ; 
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these s e t t i n g up t h e i r own unreasonable s e l f -
w i l l i n opposition to the nature and reason 
of t h i n g s , endeavour ( a s much as i n them l i e s ) 
to make thin g s be what they are not and 
cannot be.' 
( C l a r k e , A Di s c o u r s e of Natural R e l i g i o n 
i n Raphael, p.201) 
Wollaston was of the same opinion: 
'Whoever a c t s as i f thin g s were so, or not so, 
doth by h i s a c t s d e c l a r e , that they are so 
or not so.' 
( R e l i g i o n of Nature, S e c t i o n I i i i p.13) 
For him t r u t h was conformity to nature; i f a pr o p o s i t i o n i s t r u e , 
i t e x p r e s s e s t h i n g s as they a r e , and t h e r e f o r e i s determined and 
f i x e d by the natur e s of the thin g s themselves. So, to i n t e r f e r e 
w i t h any p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t i s t r u e , i s f o r Wollaston, to i n t e r f e r e 
w i t h nature. A c t s have a s p e c i a l s i g n i f i c a n c e f o r Wollaston, f o r 
words a re but the a r b i t r a r y s i g n s of our i d e a s , but f a c t s are the 
e f f e c t s of them, or the thoughts themselves produced i n t o a c t s . 
C onsider the f o l l o w i n g i l l u s t r a t i o n : a man g i v e s h i s oath to 
Caesar, then d e s s e r t s and f i g h t s a g a i n s t h i s Emperor, and a f t e r 
c a p t u r e he attempts to proclaim that d i d not deny Caesar. 
Wollaston's i s s u e i s th a t although the man may not have denied 
h i s former oath w i t h h i s tongue, he most c e r t a i n l y d i d with h i s 
a c t s . 
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As we have e a r l i e r observed when d i s c u s s i n g B u t l e r ' s 
methodology, he r e f u s e d to adopt the a b s t r a c t moral reasoning 
of such men as C l a r k e and Wollaston. He p r e f e r r e d to think of 
a wrong a c t as a v i o l a t i o n of man's nature, r a t h e r than something 
c o n t r a r y to the nature and reason of t h i n g s . Although B u t l e r did 
not admit any l o g i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p between 'what i s ' and r i g h t n e s s , 
he most c e r t a i n l y held the view of 'everything i s what i t i s and 
not another t h i n g ' . (Sermons, Preface 30. p.25) 
By examining the r a t i o n a l i s t p o s i t i o n and B u t l e r ' s a t t i t u d e 
towards i t , one can begin to a p p r e c i a t e the co n d i t i o n s i n which 
B u t l e r formed h i s own d o c t r i n e . I t appears to me that the whole 
question of whether B u t l e r p o s i t s an i d e a l nature or an a c t u a l 
one i s bound up w i t h the problem of wrong-doing. Broad main-
t a i n e d t h a t w i t h h i s (Broad's) conception of nature B u t l e r ' s 
n a t u r a l i s m i s 'sound'.but without t h i s conception i t i s not. 
I n an i d e a l nature conscience i s supreme over s e l f - l o v e and 
benevolence, but i n a c t u a l nature s e l f - l o v e more often than not 
overpowers the former. According to Broad's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n man 
a s p i r e s to h i s i d e a l nature, but B u t l e r maintained quite d e f i n i t e l y 
and c l e a r l y t h a t man's b a s i c n a t u r a l c h a r a c t e r i s v i r t u o u s , 
c o n s c i e n c e always has a u t h o r i t y , but often l a c k s power. By denying 
t h i s , Broad i s sweeping away the whole a t t a c k made by Shaftesbury 
(whom B u t l e r followed i n t h i s i n s t a n c e ) on the Hobbesian a p p l i c a t i o n 
of the word 'Nature' to man's s e l f - c e n t r e d motives. Consider 
B u t l e r ' s conception of human nature by h i s given analogy with a 
watch. When the l a t t e r breaks down i t i s because the p a r t s no 
longer stand i n r e l a t i o n to each other. Both watch and human 
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na t u r e , when c r e a t e d , s t a r t e d o f f i n p e r f e c t working order: the 
l a t t e r never r e v e r t s to t h i s o r i g i n a l s t a t e , according to B u t l e r 
p e r f e c t i o n i s never obtained by man. I f the higher p r i n c i p l e of 
r e f l e c t i o n maintains i t s p l a c e and as much as i t can c o r r e c t s 
t h a t d i s o r d e r and hin d e r s i t from breaking out i n t o a c t i o n , t h i s 
i s a l l t h a t can be expected i n such a c r e a t u r e as man. As long 
as the s u p e r i o r i t y of conscience i s maintained, the c h a r a c t e r i s 
good, worthy and v i r t u o u s . 
One does not know i f Wollaston was f a m i l i a r w i t h t h i s 
f o r m u l a t i o n , but a t any r a t e he saw the f a c t of man's imperfections 
as an impassable o b s t a c l e to any adherence to the 'following 
n a t u r e ' t h e s i s . According t o Wollaston to seek the p e r f e c t i o n 
t h a t r e l i g i o n approves of, i . e . t r u t h , human nature cannot be 
urged to fo l l o w i t s e l f ; f o r were the nature of man already p e r f e c t , 
the d i c t a t e s of a moral r e l i g i o n urging him to follow h i s nature 
would be meaningless, and s i n c e i t i s not p e r f e c t one cannot urge 
man to f o l l o w i t . However, as we have noted, B u t l e r ' s point i s 
t h a t man does have the p o t e n t i a l f o r p e r f e c t or r i g h t a c t i o n , 
and i t makes sense f o r man to f o l l o w nature, because more often than 
not he disobeys or misunderstands nature's commands. 
The whole question of how man comes to behave u n n a t u r a l l y , 
i . e . v i c i o u s l y , or indeed whether such an idea i s at a l l meaningful, 
i s one t h a t c o n s t a n t l y concerned B u t l e r ' s f e l l o w philosophers. 
The weakness or v i c e of man could be explained by the f a c t that 
h i s nature i s so as to be n a t u r a l l y wicked and weak. T h i s was 
the opinion of men such as Hobbes, Mabdeville and Soame Jenyns, 
the l a s t f o r example b e l i e v e d t h a t because of the imperfections 
of man he was incapable of ever a t t a i n i n g a high l e v e l of p o l i t i c a l 
wisdom or v i r t u e . 
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' A l l these e v i l s a r i s e from the nature of 
th i n g s and the nature of man, and not from 
the weakness or wickedness of p a r t i c u l a r 
men or t h e i r ascendental ascendency i n 
p a r t i c u l a r governments; the degrees of 
them may indeed be owing to these; but 
t h e i r e x i s t e n c e i s immutable.' 
(Nature and O r i g i n of E v i l (1759) pp.124-126 
quoted i n Lovejoy L e c t u r e V I I , 
C l a r k e had a s i m i l a r standpoint i n h i s a t t r i b u t i o n of e v i l to a 
n e c e s s i t y i n h e r i n g i n the nature of t h i n g s , thus i t s avoidance 
was l o g i c a l l y i n c o n c e i v a b l e . But i f the B u t l e r i a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
i s followed t h a t man has f a l l e n from h i s o r i g i n a l nature, i t i s 
h a r d to e x p l a i n how such a s i t u a t i o n should occur when t h i s 
s p e c i e s of being was c r e a t e d by God f o r the very purpose of prac-
t i s i n g v i r t u e . One presumes that B u t l e r would have agreed with 
Bolingbroke who s a i d t h a t i f man has been so c o n s t i t u t e d as to 
f o l l o w , i n every c a s e , the e t h i c a l law of nature, the moral s t a t e 
of mankind would have been p a r a d i s i c a l , but i t would not have 
been human. (Fragments or Minutes of E s s a y s , S e c t i o n XVI (1754) 
Quoted i n Lovejoy L e c t u r e V I I ) 
A number of l a t e r philosophers b e l i e v e d that i f nature 
i n c l u d e s a l l t h a t i s , to say man behaves u n n a t u r a l l y i s meaningless. 
Grimm, f o r i n s t a n c e , wrote: 
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'What d e v i l i s h nonsense.' What i s na t u r e ? 
I s i t not a l l that i s ? How can what 
i s be c o n t r a r y to nature.' 
(Correspondence L i t t e r a r i e s IX 1770 quoted 
i n Crocker Age of C r i s i s , pp.XVII) 
W h i l s t Adam Fergerson argued: 
'Of a l l the terms t h a t we employ i n t r e a t i n g 
of human a f f a i r s , those of n a t u r a l and unnatural 
are the l e a s t determinate i n t h e i r meaning. 
Opposed to a f f e c t i o n , forwardness, or any 
other d e f e c t of the temper or c h a r a c t e r the 
n a t u r a l i s an e p i t h e t of p r a i s e ; but employed 
to s p e c i f y a conduct which proceeds from the 
nature of man can serve to d i s t i n g u i s h 
nothing; f o r a l l the a c t i o n s of man are 
e q u a l l y the r e s u l t of t h e i r nature.' 
(An E s s a y on the H i s t o r y of C i v i l S o c i e t y (1793) 
P a r t I , 1, p.15) 
Obviously, to recommend man to a c t i n accordance with nature 
concluding t h a t anything n a t u r a l was p e r m i s s i b l e , as Fergerson 
pointed out. Yet i n the eighteenth century there was confusion 
between what i s r i g h t by nature and what i s according to nature, 
as evidenced i n the f o l l o w i n g quotation: 
'Above a l l , the c o n c l u s i o n i s not c e r t a i n t h i s 
comes from nature t h e r e f o r e t h i s i s good and 
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r i g h t . We see i n the human s p e c i e s many 
very bad thin g s although i t cannot be 
doubted t h a t they a r e the work of 
nature Nature i s i n a s t a t e of 
s i c k n e s s . ' 
(An Essay on the H i s t o r y of C i v i l S o c i e t y 
I , I ) 
I n order t h a t moral concepts such as ' r i g h t ' and 'wrong', 'good' ^ 
and 'bad' might be rendered s i g n i f i c a n t , nature had to be defined 
i n terms of v i r t u e or goodness, but t h i s reduction poses a f u r t h e r 
s e t of problems. 
The d i f f i c u l t i e s a r e around the reduction of e t h i c a l terms 
to n o n - e t h i c a l ones which i s a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of na t u r a l i s m and 
a consequence of i t s being an e m p i r i c a l theory. Naturalism and 
emp i r i c i s m are u s u a l l y the same t h i n g , both c l a i m i n g t h a t there 
a r e r a t i o n a l methods of s e t t l i n g moral disagreement, which a r e 
e m p i r i c a l ; admittance that moral judgements a r e r a t i o n a l does 
not p reclude an e m p i r i c i s t t h e s i s . Both d o c t r i n e s presupposing 
a p a r t i c u l a r theory of r e a l i t y , that what e x i s t s i s known to us 
only through our se n s e s , thereby attempt to e x p l a i n the r e l a t i o n 
of e t h i c a l concepts to experience. 
The re-awakened i n t e r e s t i n e t h i c a l n a t u r a l i s m during the 
present century, which was encouraged by G.E. Moore's i d e n t i f i c a t i o n 
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and r e f u t a t i o n of the n a t u r a l i s t i c f a l l a c y has r e s u l t e d i n some 
d i v i s i o n amongst s c h o l a r s , which the present reader may share, 
as t o the proper a p p l i c a t i o n of the term 'naturalism'. R.M. Hare, 
attempting to c l a r i f y the i s s u e , l i m i t s the name to those t h e o r i e s 
a g a i n s t which Moore's r e f u t a t i o n i s v a l i d . He argues: 
'that what i s wrong w i t h n a t u r a l i s t t h e o r i e s i s that 
they l e a v e out the p r e s c r i p t i v e or commendatory 
element i n value judgements, by seeking to make 
them d e r i v a b l e from statement of f a c t . ' 
(Language of Morals Chpt. I I . p.82) 
Hare i s not c o n f i n i n g h i m s e l f to a l l that one would c a l l n a t u r a l . 
Both he and Moore s t a t e t h a t a moral theory u s i n g metaphysical 
or s u p r a s e n s i b l e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s may a l s o commit the n a t u r a l i s t i c 
f a l l a c y . Consider the statement 'Right i s what God commands', 
i f these words a re not understandable per se and i n a n a l y s a b l e , 
then the p r o p o s i t i o n i s n a t u r a l i s t i c and Hare and Moore consider 
t h a t i t does commit the n a t u r a l i s t i c f a l l a c y d e s p i t e i t s meta-
p h y s i c a l r e f e r e n c e . For the purposes of t h i s study I would p r e f e r 
to accept Raphael's wider d e f i n i t i o n of 'naturalism', as i t bears 
a c l o s e r r e l a t i o n s h i p to the older form of the theory as used by 
B u t l e r , and so f a c i l i t a t e s d i s c u s s i o n concerning s i m i l a r i t i e s 
between the two. 
'Any theory which e x p l a i n s the meaning and fun c t i o n of 
e t h i c a l words wholly by r e f e r e n c e to human nature 
and which denies t h a t the f a c t s to be taken i n t o account 
i n c l u d e e n t i t i e s and c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s transcending 
human thoughts, connotation and f e e l i n g s . I c a l l 
n a t u r a l i s t i c not only a theory which says that 
e t h i c a l words d e s c r i b e human a t t i t u d e s , but a l s o 
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a theory which says t h a t the f u n c t i o n of such 
words i s to express or evoke human a t t i t u d e s . ' 
(Moral Judgement I n t r o d u c t i o n , p.9) 
N a t u r a l i s t s t h e r e f o r e hold t h a t there i s no sharp d i v i s i o n 
between ordinary judgements of f a c t and the concepts they i n v o l v e , 
and moral judgements. There i s no i n a n a l y s a b l e idea whatever, 
which i s p e c u l i a r to moral judgements. N o n - n a t u r a l i s t s , however 
hold t h a t moral judgements form a s e l f - c o n t a i n e d system t o t a l l y 
d i s t i n c t from matter of f a c t judgements. The m a t u r a l i s t i s not 
denying any kind of moral study concerning concepts such as 
Goodness, Duty, O b l i g a t i o n and so f o r t h , merely t h a t these are not 
to be t r e a t e d any d i f f e r e n t l y from concepts.in ordinary, non-
moral language. We should be c a r e f u l of any d i s t o r t i o n concerning 
the purpose of a n a t u r a l i s t i c theory as P.F. Strawson pointed 
out ' i t should not be regarded as g i v i n g a t r a n s l a t i o n of e t h i c a l 
terms'. ( " E t h i c a l I n t u i t i o n i s m " , Philosophy, 1949) I t w i l l not 
do to present a n a t u r a l i s t i c theory as a theory of the meaning 
of e t h i c a l terms, f o r example 'abortion i s wrong' means ' I d i s -
approved of a b o r t i o n ' . T h i s would be to study the l o g i c of morals, 
and should not be confused w i t h what the e m p i r i c i s t s are t r y i n g to 
do; t h a t i s , account f o r the e x i s t e n c e of moral concepts and 
judgements as they are o r d i n a r i l y used. I n f a c t , what the natur-
a l i s t i s t a l k i n g about, i s entailment, f o r i n s t a n c e , 'murder i s 
wrong' i s e n t a i l e d by '1^ disapprove of murder'; or to say a c e r t a i n 
a c t i o n i s good i s to say t h a t t h i s a c t i o n i s approved of by most 
people; both statements can be v e r i f i e d by observation. 
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Having now a r r i v e d a t some s o r t of understanding of the 
n a t u r a l i s t p o s i t i o n , we have to consider how f a r B u t l e r adopted 
t h i s s t a n c e and indeed whether he can be accused of committing the 
n a t u r a l i s t i c f a l l a c y . I f B u t l e r says t h a t whatever i s n a t u r a l , i s 
and must be good or th a t whatever i s good i s and must be n a t u r a l , 
and i n f e r s from t h i s that goodness and n a t u r a l n e s s a r e one and the 
same q u a l i t y he would indeed be committing the n a t u r a l i s t i c f a l l a c y . 
He does not say what he means by goodness. B u t l e r comes near to t h i s 
on only two o c c a s i o n s . F i r s t , when he says: 
'Goodness i s the n a t u r a l and j u s t o b j e c t of 
the g r e a t e s t f e a r to an i l l man 
goodness i s a f i x e d steady immovable 
p r i n c i p l e of a c t i o n . ' 
(Sermons P r e f a c e 25, p.18) 
To take the quotation i n context, B u t l e r i s d i s a g r e e i n g with Shaftesbury, 
who maintained t h a t i t was only malice and not goodness that made 
one a f r a i d . B u t l e r pointed out that only i n the face of goodness 
w i l l our crimes be punished and j u s t i c e meted out, for goodness i s 
un c b r r u p t a b i a . I n the P r e f a c e B u t l e r i s t e l l i n g us what goodness i s , 
he i s not i d e n t i f y i n g It with any other q u a l i t y , and t h i s point i s 
c l e a r l y made i n h i s f o l l o w i n g words: 
'The goodness and badness of a c t i o n s does not 
a r i s e from hence, t h a t the e p i t h e t , i n t e r e s t e d 
or d i s i n t e r e s t e d , may be app l i e d to them, any 
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more than t h a t any other i n d i f f e r e n t e p i t h e t , 
suppose i n q u i s i t i v e or j e a l o u s , may or may 
not be a p p l i e d to them; not from t h e i r 
being attended with present or f u t u r e 
p l e a s u r e or pain; but from t h e i r being what 
they a r e , namely, what becomes such c r e a t u r e s 
as we a r e , what the s t a t e of the c a s e r e q u i r e s , 
or the c o n t r a r y . ' 
(Sermons, P r e f a c e 33. p.25) 
I think i t i s s i g n i f i c a n t that Moore borrowed B u t l e r ' s 
phrase "ever y t h i n g i s what i t i s and not another t h i n g " , f o r B u t l e r 
s t i c k s r i g i d l y to t h i s maxim i n h i s moral s t u d i e s . I t seems a l s o 
s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t B u t l e r never a n a l y s e s goodness. Perhaps, l i k e 
Moore, he maintained t h a t i t was incapable of d e f i n i t i o n . B u t l e r 
was w i s h i n g to escape from the Hobbesian reduction of a good a c t i o n 
to an i n t e r e s t e d a c t i o n ; f o r according to Hobbes a l l moral concepts 
were b u i l t upon the a p p e t i t e s and a v e r s i o n s of man. To say that 
something i s good, i s to say that i t w i l l l ead to the g r a t i f i c a t i o n 
of a d e s i r e , f o r Hobbes maintained that there was no such thing as 
a b s o l u t e goodness. 
'Every man, f o r h i s own p a r t , c a l l e t h that 
which p l e a s e t h and i s d e l i g h t f u l to h i m s e l f , 
good: and that e v i l which d l s p l e a s e t h him; 
i n so much th a t w h i l e every man d i f f e r e t h 
from another i n c o n s t i t u t i o n , they d i f f e r 
a l s o from one another concerning the common 
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d i s t i n c t i o n of good and e v i l . 
(Human Nature, Raphael, Vol. I , p.4) 
B u t l e r was a l s o r e f r a i n i n g from a 'pure' n a t u r a l i s m , whereby, moral 
good and e v i l were reduced to a form of n a t u r a l good and e v i l , that 
i s p l e a s u r e and pa i n , as evidenced i n Locke's w r i t i n g s . 
'Things a r e good and e v i l , only i n r e f e r e n c e to 
pl e a s u r e and pa i n . That we c a l l good, which i s 
apt to cause or i n c r e a s e p l e a s u r e , or diminish 
pain i n us, or e l s e to procure or preserve us 
the p o s s e s s i o n of any other good or absence of 
any e v i l . And, on the co n t r a r y , we name that 
e v i l which i s apt to produce or i n c r e a s e any 
pain , or d i m i n i s h any pl e a s u r e i n us; or e l s e 
to procure us any e v i l , or deprive us of any 
good.' 
(Es s a y concerning Human Understanding I I , 
Chpt. XX, 2, p.159) 
For B u t l e r , happiness and v i r t u e or goodness were c o i n c i d e n t a l , 
the one promoted the other, but never was one defined i n terms of the 
o t h e r . S i m i l a r l y , v i r t u e was not i d e n t i f i e d with nature. B u t l e r 
r e a l i z e d the need f o r the r e to be something over and above the 
n a t u r a l which was recognized as y a l i d and binding on the i n d i v i d u a l 
and h i s n a t u r a l e g o i s t i c impulses. B u t l e r must have been only too 
w e l l aware t h a t those who t a l k e d i n terms of the 'moral-sense' 
p a r t i c u l a r l y Hutcheson, were open to the charge of r e l a t i v i s m . 
I f actions can be j u s t i f i e d u l t i m a t e l y only by r e f e r e n c e to f e e l i n g s 
and d e s i r e s , i t f o l l o w s t h a t r i g h t and wrong are r e l a t i v e to f e e l i n g s 
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and d e s i r e s , whether human or d i v i n e . Thus, to say that something 
i s good i s to say th a t men i n general approve i t , so that i f human 
nature were d i f f e r e n t , what i s now r i g h t would be wrong. I f a 
'moral sense' t h e o r i s t was faced with a s o c i e t y which b e l i e v e d 
t h a t burying babies a l i v e was 'r i g h t , to be c o n s i s t e n t he would 
have no grounds f o r condemnation of such an a c t i o n , other than that 
the conduct i s d i f f e r e n t from h i s own. Hutcheson t r i e d to answer 
t h i s problem by p o s i t i n g t h a t such a s o c i e t y had a s i c k l y moral 
sense, but to say t h i s i m p l i e s that one must have some way of knowing 
when a moral sense i s healthy or not. 
'Must we not know t h e r e f o r e antecedently what 
i s morally good or e v i l by our reason, before 
we can know th a t our moral sense i s r i g h t . ' 
(Hutcheson I l l u s t r a t i o n s . Selby-Bigg, Vol.1 
pp.214-215) 
We w i l l not go i n t o the v a r i o u s ways i n which Hutcheson t r i e d to 
e x t r i c a t e h i m s e l f from t h i s problem, i t i s s u f f i c i e n t to say he 
d i s t i n g u i s h e s between what seems good and what i s good. 
On occ a s i o n s i t would appear t h a t B u t l e r maintains that 'good' 
i s t h a t of which conscience approved. Does t h i s mean he f a l l s i n t o 
the t r a p of r e l a t i v i s m ? The answer- i s s u r e l y i n the negative, f o r 
by making conscience a r a t i o n a l moral f a c u l t y B u t l e r saves h i s theory 
from being based on ' f e e l i n g s ' alone, and thereby from the a d d i t i o n a l 
charge of c i r c u l a r i t y . To say th a t v i r t u e l i e s i n fo l l o w i n g human 
nature, i s to say nothing of any va l u e . I f the s e l f were l i m i t e d to 
a r e f l e c t i o n upon i t s a c t u a l impulses, and i f i t would do no more 
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than to r e a l i s e one or the other i n the presence of a s u i t a b l e o b j e c t , 
then the above charge a g a i n s t B u t l e r would be c o r r e c t . But the 
proper i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of conscience i s one th a t sees i t to be r e v e l -
a t o r y of standards and p r i n c i p l e s of a c t i o n t h a t make t h e i r demands 
upon the i n d i v i d u a l f o r r e c o g n i t i o n and f u l f i l m e n t . The p r i n c i p a l 
f u n c t i o n of conscience i s l e g i s l a t i v e , f o r once i n poss e s s i o n of 
thes e guiding moral p r i n c i p l e s , the i n d i v i d u a l i s able to s t r i v e 
f o r goodness and v i r t u e by c o n t r o l l i n g h i s a f f e c t i o n s and d e s i r e s . 
T h i s i s c h i e f l y achieved through the medium of reason, and the more 
r a t i o n a l and r e f l e c t i v e the man, the nearer he i s to God. F u r t h e r -
more, B u t l e r ' s idea t h a t human nature has a p r i o r o b l i g a t i o n to v i r t u e 
and h i s conception of f i t t i n g n e s s both preclude a charge of r e l a t i v i s m , 
although the c o n c l u s i o n cannot be avoided that he i s not such a 
thorough-going e m p i r i c i s t as one a t f i r s t might th i n k . I n order to 
complete our p i c t u r e of B u t l e r as a m o r a l i s t two more questions 
have to be s t u d i e d : what i s B u t l e r ' s concept of conscience, and 
what i s i t th a t motives our moral actions?. 
C H A P T E R I I I 
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HAPPINESS 
The i n v e s t i g a t i o n of the eighteenth century t h i n k e r s i n t o the 
c o n s t i t u t i o n of human nature i n e v i t a b l y l e d them to consider what 
was the p r i n c i p a l motivating f o r c e of man's a c t i o n s . Such a c o n s i d -
e r a t i o n i s not easy: to a n a l y s e our own emotions i s often d i f f i c u l t 
and r e q u i r e s scrupulous honesty; w h i l s t to i n v e s t i g a t e the motives 
of others i s n o t o r i o u s l y d i f f i c u l t and n e c e s s i t a t e s c a r e f u l and 
unbiased o b s e r v a t i o n . But t h i s has not deterred c o u n t l e s s moral 
ph i l o s o p h e r s over the ages from d i s c u s s i n g the question. The ancient 
Greeks formulated the problem i n terms of a supreme good, the end 
a t which a l l men aimed, t h i s being e i t h e r v i r t u e or happiness. 
Towards the end of the eighteenth century Kan^t c h a r a c t e r i z e d the two 
Greek schools of thought who were divided on t h i s s u b j e c t . "The 
E p i c u r e a n s a i d , ' to be conscious that one's maxims lead to happiness 
i s v i r t u e ' ; the S t o i c s a i d , ' to be conscious of one's v i r t u e i s 
happiness.' I n t h a t century the debate took the form of a question 
'Do we a c t from a wish to be v i r t u o u s ? ' 
Any d i s c u s s i o n of human m o t i v i a t i o n must acknowledge two 
moral t h e o r i e s which were p a r t i c u l a r l y prominent i n that age. 
They a r e what we now term' P s y c h o l o g i c a l Egoism and P s y c h o l o g i c a l 
Hedonism, and B u t l e r has become w e l l known fo r h i s r e f u t a t i o n of the 
l a t t e r . P s y c h o l o g i c a l Egoism i s the view t h a t man fol l o w s h i s own 
i n t e r e s t , whether t h i s be p l e a s u r e , money or power. I t i s d e s c r i p t i v e 
of mankind, and i s not to be confused with E t h i c a l Egosim which i s 
p r e s c r i p t i v e , t h a t i s i t advances the theory that a man ought to 
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f o l l o w h i s own i n t e r e s t . An E t h i c a l E g o i s t i s concerned only with 
h i s own happiness. The second moral theory, P s y c h o l o g i c a l Hedonism, 
i s a form of P s y c h o l o g i c a l Egoism, and maintains that a l l men's 
motives are reduced to a d e s i r e for p l e a s u r e . In the period with 
which we are concerned i t i s remarkably easy to confuse the two 
d o c t r i n e s , but I think t h a t i t i s t r u e to say that most of the 
w r i t e r s of the century were P s y c h o l o g i c a l Hedonists. 
The d i s e a s e of the age was a c o n t i n u a l preoccupation with 
s e l f - i n t e r e s t manifested i n an obsession with the attainment of 
happiness. For many happiness was the g r a t i f i c a t i o n of the d e s i r e 
f o r p l e a s u r e , so the moral agent was always prompted by e g o i s t i c 
motives. Such sentiments were c e r t a i n l y t r u e of French l i f e i n that 
p e r i o d , indeed, Hazard quotes Mme. de P u i s i e u x as saying of her 
contemporaries: 
'Happiness i s a b a l l which we chase when i t r o l l s 
i n f r o n t of us, and k i c k along when i t stops .... 
One must be very t i r e d indeed to give up the 
p u r s u i t , and l e t the b a l l run on.' 
(European Thought i n the Eighteenth Century 
Chpt 2, p.27) 
But i n England too t h i s game obsessed the n o v e l i s t s , the poets, the 
p h i l o s o p h e r s : 
'Oh Happiness 1 Our Beings End and Aiml 
Good, P l e a s u r e . E a s e . Content. Whate'er 
thy Namel' 
(Pope, Essay on Man E p i s t l e IV, p.71) 
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The b a l l had to be pursued as happiness was not bestowed from 
b i r t h , although there grew the idea that a l l i n d i v i d u a l s had a 
n a t u r a l r i g h t to happiness. I t was obvious t h a t most men d e s i r e d 
t o be happy, so tha t i t was a simple step f o r eighteenth century 
t h i n k e r s re-examining e t h i c s from a n a t u r a l i s t i c and more often 
s e c u l a r viewpoint, to maintain that happiness was the primary o b j e c t 
of d e s i r e , the aim of a l l i n t e l l i g e n t beings. 
But to say tha t we a c t f o r our own happiness i s very d i f f e r e n t 
from s a y i n g what i t i s t h a t produces happiness. For how can one 
know what i s happiness f o r a man? I s the r e a common s e n s a t i o n which 
c a n be i d e n t i f i e d as happiness? I t c e r t a i n l y seems t r u e from observ-
a t i o n t h a t people d e r i v e what they c a l l t h e i r own happiness from 
d i f f e r e n t a c t i o n s . X may f e e l happy i n the presence of person A, 
w h i l s t Y i n the same s i t u a t i o n i s uncomfortable and i r r i t a t e d . On 
the other hand Y f e e l s happy when rock-climbing, but X f e e l s f r i g h t e n e d 
and m i s e r a b l e . How then do we know th a t when using the term 'happiness' 
we a r e a l l d e s c r i b i n g the same s e n s a t i o n ? There must be c e r t a i n common 
f e a t u r e s which can be di s c e r n e d when one man says he i s happy, and 
another man says he i s happy. 
Wollaston wrote i n 1724 tha t "happiness must not be derived 
to be what i t i s " , we must not e x p l a i n away happiness i n terms of 
something e l s e . (The R e l i g i o n of Nature, S e c t i o n I I , p.31). 
( T h i s echoes B u t l e r ' s famous a s s e r t i o n , everything i s what i t i s and 
not another t h i n g , and I think B u t l e r would c e r t a i n l y apply t h i s 
to happiness.) Wollaston a l s o warns th a t "every man's happiness 
i s h i s happiness, what i t i s to him". (The R e l i g i o n of Nature 
S e c t i o n I I , p . 3 3 ) . A man's happiness cannot or should not be estimated 
by anyone e l s e . N e v e r t h e l e s s , I think one can d i s c u s s what a r e the 
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possible c o n d i t i o n s f o r happiness as envisaged by the w r i t e r s of t h i s 
p e r i o d . Happiness was oft e n a l l i e d to p l e a s u r e and the a s s o c i a t e d 
notions of enjoyment and l i k i n g . Hutcheson wrote that happiness 
denotes p l e a s a n t s e n s a t i o n s of any kind, or a continued s t a t e of 
such s e n s a t i o n s . ( I l l u s t r a t i o n s upon the Moral Sense, quoted i n 
Raphael, p.305.) According to Locke, happiness i n i t s f u l l extent 
i s the utmost p l e a s u r e we a r e capable of: 
'And the lowest degree of what can be c a l l e d 
happiness, i s so much ease from a l l pain 
and so much present p l e a s u r e , as without 
which anyone cannot be content.' 
(E s s a y Concerning Human Understanding, Chpt. XXI, 
42, i n Raphael, p.152) 
C e r t a i n l y i t would seem th a t p ain and p l e a s u r e a r e c o n s t i t u e n t s of 
the s t a t e s of unhappiness and happiness, j u s t as gladness and joy 
a r e p a r t s of our happiness. To quote Wollaston again, the happiness 
of any being cannot be t h a t which i s bad f o r him, n e i t h e r can i t be 
d i s a g r e e a b l e . I n proper speaking happiness always i n c l u d e s something 
p o s i t i v e . 
'A sense indeed of being f r e e from the pains 
and t r o u b l e s i s attended with happiness, but 
t h e i r happiness flows from the sense of the 
case and i n a p o s i t i v e happiness.' 
( R e l i g i o n of Nature, S e c t i o n I I , p.37) 
But our per c e p t i o n of our happiness comes and goes, we can be happy 
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when p a i n t i n g , walking, dancing, but when not doing these things 
we a r e not unhappy, we j u s t cease to be i n a happy s t a t e ; so 
t h a t we can become happy and not be happy many times i n our l i f e -
time. But d e s p i t e t h i s happiness i s not so t r a n s i e n t as gladness 
or j o y , and during the eighteenth century t h e r e was much debate as 
to what gave men l a s t i n g happiness. Shaftsbury asked: 
'What a r e those which we c a l l p l e a s u r e s or 
s a t i s f a c t i o n s : from whence happiness i s 
genera1ly computed.' 
and concluded: 
'They a r e ( a c c o r d i n g to the common d i s t i n c t i o n ) 
e i t h e r s a t i s f a c t i o n s and p l e a s u r e s of the body 
or of the mind.' 
(An I n q u i r y Concerning V i r t u e , Book I I , P a r t I I , 
S e c t i o n I , Raphael, p.181) 
A number of t h e o l o g i a n s , B u t l e r included, were more concerned 
w i t h mental happiness and s p i r i t u a l s a t i s f a c t i o n s , r a t h e r than any 
s h o r t - l i v e d p l e a s u r e or enjoyment such as bodily s a t i s f a c t i o n . 
Indeed, B u t l e r s t r o n g l y condemned t h e fashionable way of l i v i n g w h i c h 
he considered was to make pl e a s u r e and mirth and j o l l i t y , and to 
c o n s t a n t l y hurry about a f t e r gay amusement, or some new g r a t i f i c a t i o n 
of sense or a p p e t i t e . 
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Although he knew th a t the m a j o r i t y of men would agree t h a t , were 
r e l i g i o n out of the c a s e , the happiness of the present l i f e would 
c o n s i s t i n having r i c h e s , honours, s e n s u a l g r a t i f i c a t i o n and wealth, 
y e t he would argue t h a t such a c q u i s i t i o n s do not b r i n g happiness, 
the c a r e s and disappointments of ambition' often are g r e a t e r than 
the s a t i s f a c t i o n s . 
'For i n s t a n c e , s i c k n e s s and untimely death i s 
the consequence of intemperance, though 
accompanied with the h i g h e s t mirth and 
j o l l i t y . ' 
(Analogy I , I I , 12, p.56) 
Such arguments a r e p l a i n l y good sense, B u t l e r was confronted - as 
we a r e today to a f a r g r e a t e r extent - with an i n c r e a s i n g l y m a t e r i a l -
i s t i c and s e c u l a r s o c i e t y confused i n i t s values and consequently 
d i s t u r b e d i n thought. 
The eighteenth century witnessed a r e a c t i o n a g a i n s t the 
promises of a f u t u r e reward and the s u f f e r i n g i n everyday l i f e which 
t h e E s t a b l i s h e d Church apparently supported and condoned. There 
was a demand for happiness here and now r a t h e r than i n some vague, 
u n c e r t a i n p a r a d i s e . Thus the churchmen, B u t l e r included, found them-
s e l v e s i n something of a quandary. They had postulated a l i f e here-
a f t e r as a reward f o r v i r t u o u s behaviour, so they had to make i t a 
p l e a s a n t and happy s t a t e , or most of i t s e f f e c t i v e n e s s as a s a n c t i o n 
would be l o s t . However, faced with the p l e a s u r e - l o v i n g , o p t i m i s t i c 
s o c i e t y the theologians had to present t h e i r f a i t h i n a more a t t r a c t i v e 
garb; and had to show th a t v i r t u o u s behaviour had some rewards i n t h i s 
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l i f e too. But such a move could r u l e out a c t i n g morally f o r the 
sake of v i r t u e ; one would a c t v i r t u o u s l y f o r the sake of happiness, 
e i t h e r i n t h i s world or i n the next. Even T i n d a l maintained t h a t : 
' I t can't be denied t h a t the end f o r which 
God had implanted t h i s r e l i g i o n i n human 
nature was to make men happy here and here-
a f t e r . ' 
( C h r i s t i a n i t y as Old as the C r e a t i o n (1730) 
quoted i n Cragg Reason and A u t h o r i t y , p.81) 
We s e e here the i n f l u e n c e of the P s y c h o l o g i c a l Hedonists, and men l i k e 
Hobbes who concentrated on rewards and punishments i n t h i s world, 
and r e a c t e d a g a i n s t the E s t a b l i s h e d Church's r e s t r i c t i n g and some-
times bleak theology i n the seventeenth century. B u t l e r was much 
concerned over t h i s pre-occupation with happiness, and drew a t t e n t i o n 
t o : 
'the strange a f f e c t i o n i n many people of e x p l a i n i n g 
away a l l p a r t i c u l a r a f f e c t i o n s , and r e p r e s e n t i n g 
the whole of l i f e as nothing but one continued 
e x e r c i s e cf s e l f - l o v e . ' 
(Sermons, P r e f a c e 29, p.21) 
Of the "many people", he s p e c i f i c a l l y mentions a r e the Epicureans, 
Hobbes and Rochefoucauld. Although I think B u t l e r understood the 
causes behind t h i s r e v o l t , he did not approve or f i n d s a t i s f a c t o r y 
the s o l u t i o n advanced by these men. Let us b r i e f l y look a t what 
these w r i t e r s s a i d , before c o n s i d e r i n g B u t l e r ' s a t t a c k on t h e i r 
views and h i s own c o n t r i b u t i o n to the problem. 
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The Epicureans founded m o r a l i t y on p l e a s u r e and the avoidance 
of pain; our f e e l i n g s of pain and pleasure are the t e s t by which 
we determine what i s bad and good f o r us. V i r t u e has no value on 
i t s account, but d e r i v e s i t s value from the pleasure which accompanies 
i t . The p l e a s u r e s the Epicureans followed were those that would 
endure through l i f e , they regarded s p i r i t u a l and mental p l e a s u r e s 
as f a r s u p e r i o r to those of the body. They b e l i e v e d t h a t d e s i r e s 
c o u l d be d i v i d e d i n t o those t h a t were n a t u r a l and those that were 
v a i n , the former were subdivided i n t o necessary and unnecessary 
d e s i r e s . The n a t u r a l and necessary ones are those which are conducive 
to s e l f - p r e s e r v a t i o n , which b r i n g t r a n q u i l i t y of the mind and happiness. 
The E p i c u r e a n i d e a l was a minimizing of d e s i r e s , a simple and a s c e t i c 
l i f e of q u i e t contentment, c h e e r f u l n e s s , moderation, temperance, are 
the best means to happiness. Yet they were not r u t h l e s s to others 
i n t h e i r quest f o r p l e a s u r e , but c u l t i v a t e d the a r t of f r i e n d s h i p on 
the grounds t h a t i t was p l e a s a n t e r to do a kindness than to r e c e i v e one. 
In an attempt to answer the question "What i s i t that motivates 
our a c t i o n s ? " the a n c i e n t theory of the Epicureans had been r e v i v e d , 
and men l i k e Hobbes and Rochefoucauld developed from i t a n a t u r a l i s t i c 
d o c t r i n e t h a t was a l s o a g g r e s s i v e and e g o i s t i c . They a l l b e l i e v e d 
t h a t d i s i n t e r e s t e d a c t i o n was not p o s s i b l e , men acted always from 
t h e i r own i n t e r e s t s . Hobbes f o r i n s t a n c e a s s e r t e d the following: 
granted t h a t an a p p e t i t e i s the beginning of animal motions towards 
something which p l e a s e s us, a l l our motivations f o r a c t i o n s stem 
from e i t h e r a p p e t i t e s or f e a r : 
' E x t e r n a l o b j e c t s cause conceptions and conceptions 
a p p e t i t e and f e a r which are the f i r s t unperceived 
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beginnings of our a c t i o n s . ' 
(Human Nature, Chpt.XII i n Raphael, p.15) 
We then e i t h e r immediately f o l l o w the f i r s t a p p e t i t e , or because of 
f e a r d e l i v e r a t e . For example, repentance i s : 
'the p a s s i o n which proceedeth from opinion 
or knowledge th a t the a c t i o n they have done 
i s out of the way to the end they would a t t a i n . ' 
(Human Nature (1651) Chpt. IX i n Raphael, p.8) 
Whereas p i t y : 
' i s imagination or f i c t i o n of f u t u r e calamity 
to o u r s e l v e s , proceeding from the sense of 
another man's c a l a m i t y . ' 
(Human Nature, Chpt. IX i n Raphael, p.9) 
When c a l a m i t y f a l l s on a man who has not deserved i t , the compassion 
i s g r e a t e r , because the e v i l t h a t may happen to an innocent man may 
happen to every man. Thus the i n d i v i d u a l i s always pursuing h i s own 
g r e a t e s t advantage which may not be i n the i n t e r e s t s of men i n g eneral, 
f o r Hobbes b e l i e v e d t h a t b a s i c a l l y man was a n t i - s o c i a l . C o n f l i c t was 
bound to f o l l o w , which would no doubt prevent i n d i v i d u a l s from g r a t i -
f y i n g t h e i r d e s i r e s . The s o l u t i o n was found i n the formation of s o c i e t i e s 
f o r the purpose of s e l f - p r e s e r v a t i o n , and c e r t a i n r u l e s were l a i d down 
t h a t would ensure the peace necessary f o r each man -to pursue h i s 
i n d i v i d u a l ends. Every man's o b l i g a t i o n s stemmed from the formation of 
the s o c i a l compact; and the supreme;.ruler, a man, was " j u s t " only i f 
i t was i n h i s own i n t e r e s t . As we have noted i n Chapter I I , Hobbes 
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b e l i e v e d there was no moral d i f f e r e n c e i n h e r i n g i n a c t i o n s , there 
was no such th i n g as absolute goodness. 
Mandeville, who was a s a t i r i s t and wrote the c e l e b r a t e d 
F a b l e of the Bees a s a comment on s o c i e t y , followed the Hobbesian 
t r a d i t i o n . He maintained t h a t man's s o c i a l behaviour does not stem 
from n a t u r a l a l t r u i s m , but from s e l f i s h d e s i r e s such as pr i d e and 
se l f - e s t e e m . Moral r e g u l a t i o n i s not n a t u r a l to man, but i s e x t e r n a l l y 
imposed upon him by the min o r i t y of s o c i e t y , the " c i v i l i s e r s " , with 
the f a l s e argument t h a t the m a j o r i t y would b e n e f i t . 
'The c h i e f t h i n g t h e r e f o r e , which law g i v e r s and 
the other wise men, t h a t have laboured f o r the 
establishment of s o c i e t y , have endeavoured, has 
been to make the people they were to govern, 
b e l i e v e , t h a t i t was more b e n e f i c i a l f o r 
everybody to conquer than indulge h i s a p p e t i t e s , 
and much b e t t e r t o mind the p u b l i c than what 
seemed h i s p r i v a t e i n t e r e s t . ' 
(Enquiry i n t o the O r i g i n of Moral V i r t u e (1714) 
i n Raphael, p.230) 
For Mahdeville, the reasoning i s f a l s e , because he b e l i e v e d that p r i v a t e 
v i c e s promoted p u b l i c b e n e f i t s ; i n the Fable^ s o c i e t y i s p i c t u r e d as a 
bee-hive which i s prosperous so long as co r r u p t i o n , hypocrisy, s e l f -
i s h n e s s and pr i d e continue to be p r a c t i s e d . Once these cease, the 
s o c i e t y d i s i n t e g r a t e s . " V i r t u e " i s necessary to the well-being of s o c i e t y 
and t h e r e f o r e has to be made to pay. 
- 81 -
The ' v i r t u e ' t h a t men are induced to p r a c t i s e i n Mandeville's 
i d e a l s o c i e t y i s e n t i r e l y s e l f - c e n t r e d , and t h i s a p p l i e d even to the 
ca s e of a liian who performs a good a c t i o n i n s i l e n c e . 
'The reward of a v i r t u o u s A c t i o n , which i s 
the s a t i s f a c t i o n t h a t ensues upon i t , c o n s i s t s 
i n a c e r t a i n p l e a s u r e which he procures to 
him s e l f by contemplating on h i s own worth.' 
(Enquiry i n t o the O r i g i n of Moral V i r t u e i n 
Raphael p.236) 
I t i s c l e a r t h a t Marixleville was drawing the e t h i c a l c o n c l u s i o n that 
' v i r t u e ' as pop u l a r l y known was c l o s e l y a k i n to hypocrisy, and 
moreover was a n t i s o c i a l . Men were to recognise t h e i r v i c e s , r a t h e r 
than pretend they d i d not e x i s t . 
'Then leave complaints: Fools only s t r i v e 
To make a Great, an Honest Hive 
T'enjoy the World's Conveniences, 
Be famed i n War, y e t . l i v e i n Ease, 
Without great V i c e s , i s a v a i n 
Eutopia s e a l e d i n the B r a i n . 
Bare V i r t u e can't make nations l i v e 
I n splendour ' 
(Mandeville The Fable of the Bees i n Kaye p.37) • 
Hobbes and Mandeville both advance a very c y n i c a l view of mankind. 
There i s no p u f f i n g up of our s p e c i e s , but r a t h e r we are s t r i p p e d 
of a l l the h y p o c r i s i e s and falsehoods with which we attempt to 
d i s g u i s e bur emotions and motives. When comparing t h i s theory with 
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B u t l e r ' s philosophy, the modern reader o f t e n f i n d s that both appeal 
i n d i f f e r e n t ways. W.H.F. Barnes comments: 
'Read Hobbes and you admire the ingenuity 
he shows i n exposing the entrenched egoism 
of the human h e a r t , tho' from time to time a 
s u s p i c i o n , as w e l l as a hope, obtrudes that 
perhaps we a r e not"a11 of us a l l of the time 
q u i t e as e g o i s t i c as h i s a n a l y s i s suggests. 
Read B u t l e r on Hobbes and you r e a l i z e that 
Hobbes was a very ingenious man who traded 
on our n a t u r a l d e s i r e to be f r e e from 
sentimental o b f u s c a t i o n and to see people 
as they r e a l l y a r e . ' 
(Durham U n i v e r s i t y J o u r n a l , March 1951) 
Yet i t i s most c e r t a i n l y t r u e that B u t l e r appears to have s u c c e s s -
f u l l y quashed the Hobbesian v e r s i o n of P s y c h o l o g i c a l Hedonism by h i s 
own e x p l a n a t i o n s of man's motivations. According to B u t l e r , the 
two main p r i n c i p l e s of a c t i o n ( e x c l u d i n g conscience) are s e l f - l o v e 
and benevolence, and by c a r e f u l a n a l y s i s ' of these B u t l e r concludes 
t h a t Hobbes has m i s i n t e r p r e t e d the nature of man's b a s i c d e s i r e s 
and i n c l i n a t i o n s . We s h a l l thus have to examine s e p a r a t e l y 
B u t l e r ' s concepts of s e l f - l o v e and benevolence and t h e i r r e l a t i o n -
s h i p to happiness. 
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With r e f e r e n c e to s e l f - l o v e , B u t l e r a t t a c k s the 
P s y c h o l o g i c a l Hedonists from two standpoints. F i r s t , he denies 
t h a t men behave, i n a l l circumstances, according to t h e i r own 
i n t e r e s t e n t i r e l y . 
'Men d a i l y , hourly, s a c r i f i c e the g r e a t e s t known 
i n t e r e s t to fance, i n q u i s i t i v e n e s s , love or 
hatred, any vagrant i n c l i n i a t i o n . ' 
(Sermons, P r e f a c e , 35, p.26) 
Indeed, t h i s argument c l e a r l y p o i n t s to one of the g r e a t e s t weaknesses 
i n the e t h i c a l e g o i s t ' s philosophy. To take a modern example, the 
Czechoslovakian student who burns h i m s e l f to death a s a p r o t e s t 
a g a i n s t R u s s i a n i n v a s i o n does not appear to be a c t i n g f o r personal 
gain or happiness.^ 
The second and most important argument t h a t B u t l e r uses 
a g a i n s t the P s y c h o l o g i c a l Hedonists concerns the meaning a s c r i b e d 
to s e l f - l o v e i n moral d i s c o u r s e . B u t l e r i s convinced t h a t what 
Hobbes b e l i e v e s i s man's own i n t e r e s t i s i n f a c t not f o r man's own 
i n t e r e s t , and B u t l e r ' s case revolved around h i s d e f i n i t i o n of s e l f -
The P s y c h o l o g i c a l Hedonist, no doubt, would p o s i t one of the 
f o l l o w i n g e x p l a n a t i o n s : the student may have taken p l e a s u r e i n preparing 
h i m s e l f f o r s a c r i f i c e ; or perhaps he was escaping a f a r g r e a t e r 
misery; or perhaps the way to happiness i n the next l i f e i s through 
such an a c t i o n . Even so, one cannot help concluding that the 
P s y c h o l o g i c a l Hedonists' p o s i t i o n on t h i s v i r t u e i s r a t h e r weak. 
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love and the c o n d i t i o n s necessary to b r i n g happiness to a man: 
' a l l t h i s confusion might e a s i l y be avoided, 
by s t a t i n g to o u r s e l v e s where i n the idea 
of s e l f - l o v e i n general c o n s i s t s , as d i s t i n g -
uished from a l l p a r t i c u l a r movements towards 
p a r t i c u l a r e x t e r n a l o b j e c t s . The a p p e t i t e s 
of sense, resentment, compassion, c u r i o s i t y , 
ambition and the r e s t . ' 
(Sermons, P r e f a c e , 29. p.22) 
B u t l e r ' t a l k s a t great length 6f the d i s t i n c t i o n between s e l f - l o v e 
and the other p r i n c i p l e s of human nature f o r t h i s i s the area of 
disagreement between him and the P s y c h o l o g i c a l Hedonists. He admits 
t h a t i n one sense we could say t h a t our a f f e c t i o n s and a p p e t i t e s 
can be r e s o l v e d i n t o s e l f - l o v e i n that they a r e our p l e a s u r e , 
our p r i d e , our ambition, but t h i s i s not to say that a l l we ever 
want i s our own g r a t i f i c a t i o n . 
B u t l e r s e a r c h e s f o r words to express the d i f f e r e n c e between 
an a c t i o n of revenge or f r i e n d s h i p , by which a man runs upon 
c e r t a i n r u i n to do good or e v i l to another, and an a c t i o n proceeding 
from a cool c o n s i d e r a t i o n of what w i l l be to h i s own advantage. 
According to him these a c t i o n s a r e t o t a l l y d i f f e r e n t ; t h e i r only 
s i m i l a r i t y i s t h a t they proceed from and are done to g r a t i f y a man's 
i n c l i n a t i o n . To a i d him i n h i s task B u t l e r separates cool s e t t l e d 
s e l f i s h n e s s , which he terms s e l f - l o v e , from passionate or s e n s u a l 
s e l f i s h n e s s . The l a t t e r i s a movement towards something e x t e r n a l , 
such as honour or power, of which there i s always a p a r t i c u l a r idea 
or p e r c e p t i o n . S e l f - l o v e pursues the i n t e r n a l , we d e s i r e our own 
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i n t e r e s t , our happiness, and p r i v a t e good, and i n 'the proportion 
a man hath t h i s he i s i n t e r e s t e d or a l o v e r of h i m s e l f . B u t l e r 
reasons t h a t a c t i o n s a r e named according to t h e i r o b j e c t s , a c t s of 
s e l f - l o v e have the o b j e c t of s e l f and a r e t h e r e f o r e c a l l e d i n t e r e s t e d 
a c t i o n s ; by i n t e r e s t e d B u t l e r does not mean merely concerned with 
s e l f , r a t h e r t h e r e i s the i m p l i c a t i o n of what i s good for s e l f i s 
s e l f - l o v e . P a r t i c u l a r a f f e c t i o n s , o r what i s the same thin g a c t i o n s 
proceeding from p a s s i o n a t e s e l f i s h n e s s , are not to our own i n t e r e s t 
i n the long run; they tend toward p a r t i c u l a r e x t e r n a l o b j e c t s 
and a r e t h e r e f o r e d i s i n t e r e s t e d . To c l a r i f y the d i s t i n c t i o n between 
t h e two kinds of a c t i o n s , l e t us consider the fol l o w i n g example. I f 
you a d v i s e another person to i n v e s t money i n an undertaking from which 
you hope to make a p r o f i t , i s t h i s d i s i n t e r e s t e d a d v i c e ? B u t l e r 
would argue t h a t you a r e a c t i n g from greed or ambition d i s t i n c t from 
s e l f - l o v e as he d e f i n e s i t , c l e a r l y h i s notion of what i s an i n t e r e s t e d 
a c t i o n must proceed from h i s p a r t i c u l a r d e f i n i t i o n of s e l f - l o v e . 
I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g that B u t l e r maintains that a l l p r i n c i p l e s 
and a f f e c t i o n s which a r e d i s t i n c t from s e l f - l o v e a r e equally d i s t i n c t . 
The d e s i r e f o r revenge and the d e s i r e f o r the p r e s e r v a t i o n of a 
f r i e n d have the same r e s p e c t to s e l f - l o v e . 
'The o b j e c t of s e l f - l o v e i s expressed i n the 
term s e l f and every a p p e t i t e of sense and every 
p a r t i c u l a r a f f e c t i o n of the h e a r t , a r e equally 
i n t e r e s t e d or d i s i n t e r e s t e d because the ob j e c t s 
of them a l l a r e e q u a l l y s e l f or somewhat e l s e . ' 
(Sermon X I , 10, p.195) 
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I t h i n k B u t l e r i s s a y i n g something very simple here concerning the 
r e l a t i o n s h i p of the p a r t i c u l a r a f f e c t i o n s and s e l f - l o v e . Revenge 
i s i n t e r e s t e d because i t i s alone f o r the g r a t i f i c a t i o n of s e l f , 
d i s i n t e r e s t e d because i t i s not f o r the w e l f a r e of s e l f . B u t l e r 
i s making no moral judgements i n t h i s i s s u e , the c r i t e r i o n of good 
and e v i l i s not whether an a c t i o n i s i n t e r e s t e d or d i s i n t e r e s t e d . 
The goodness or badness of a c t i o n s a r i s e s , 
'not from t h e i r being attended with present 
or f u t u r e p l e a s u r e or p a i n , but from t h e i r being 
what they a r e ; namely, what becomes such 
c r e a t u r e s as we a r e , what the s t a t e of the case 
r e q u i r e s , or the c o n t r a r y . ' 
(Sermons, P r e f a c e , 33 p.25) 
Despite these c a r e f u l d i s t i n c t i o n s , B u t l e r does not deny that 
i t i s sometimes very d i f f i c u l t to c a l c u l a t e whether we a c t from the 
p r i n c i p l e of s e l f - l o v e or some p a r t i c u l a r passion, because the two 
may o f t e n be j o i n e d together. But he s t i l l i n s i s t s t h a t , 
'we d i s t i n c t l y d i s c e r n what one i s , and 
what i s the other, though we may be u n c e r t a i n 
how f a r one or the other i n f l u e n c e s us.' 
(Sermons, P r e f a c e , 30, p.23) 
And thus he maintains t h a t i t i s absurd to say that mankind i s wholly 
a c t i v a t e d by e i t h e r , both a r e present and both have t h e i r i n f l u e n c e 
i n v a r y i n g s t r e n g t h s i n v a r i o u s men. 
Le t us look a l i t t l e c l o s e r a t the operation of these 
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p r i n c i p l e s of nature as observed by B u t l e r . An i n t e r e s t e d p u r s u i t 
n e c e s s a r i l y presupposes p a r t i c u l a r passions or a p p e t i t e s . 
'The very idea of i n t e r e s t or happiness 
c o n s i s t s i n t h i s , that an a p p e t i t e ot 
a f f e c t i o n enjoys i t s o b j e c t . ' 
(Sermon X I , 6, p.190) 
We f i n d d e l i g h t i n e a t i n g an apple, because we d e s i r e the o b j e c t , 
and g a i n s a t i s f a c t i o n from e a t i n g i t ; we cannot enjoy e a t i n g an 
apple without the apple. I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note the d i f f e r e n c e 
between Hobbes and B u t l e r on t h i s p o i n t . Hobbes, as a m a t e r i a l i s t , 
perhaps cannot be termed a P s y c h o l o g i c a l Hedonist i n the s t r i c t e s t 
sense of the word. (Although, i n the main, I have c l a s s e d him as 
such f o r the purposes of t h i s study.) A P s y c h o l o g i c a l Hedonist 
would hold t h a t the motivating f o r c e of my a c t i o n i s the prospect of 
p l e a s u r e , but Hobbes does not c l e a r l y separate the t h i n k i n g of the 
p l e a s u r e s you may get i n d r i n k i n g wine, from the p l e a s u r e you get 
from so t h i n k i n g . As f a r as B u t l e r i s concerned the p l e a s u r e that 
comes from e a t i n g an apple and the passion of hunger i s what motivates 
u s to e a t . I t thus almost seems as i f B u t l e r i s more the P s y c h o l o g i c a l 
Hedonist here than Hobbes, and indeed, there are a number of passages 
i n B u t l e r ' s work th a t a t f i r s t s i g h t appear to support t h i s opinion. 
For example: 
' I t i s manifest t h a t nothing can be of 
consequence to mankind or any c r e a t u r e , but 
happiness.' 
(Sermon X I I , 20, p.224) 
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'When we s i t down i n a co o l hour we can 
n e i t h e r j u s t i f y to o u r s e l v e s t h i s or any 
other p u r s u i t , t i l l we a r e convinced that 
i t w i l l be f o r our happiness or a t l e a s t 
not c o n t r a r y to i t . ' 
(Sermon X I , 21, p.206) 
What e x a c t l y i s B u t l e r s a y i n g here? I f we ask for j u s t i f i c a t i o n of 
why we should a c t v i r t u o u s l y , would h i s answer be 'for the sake of 
happiness'? I f t h i s were so, then he would c e r t a i n l y be undermining 
the a u t h o r i t y of conscience ( a s w e l l as l o s i n g the immediacy of 
c o n s c i e n c e ) , f o r s e l f - l o v e would be enthroned over that moral 
f a c u l t y . 
C e r t a i n l y , B u t l e r does not i n any way reduce the importance 
of happiness i n the present world. I t i s n a t u r a l that men seek t h e i r 
own happiness, and to expect a man to d i s r e g a r d wholly t h i s d e s i r e 
would be unreasonable, i n the sense that i t would be a g a i n s t the 
s t r o n g e s t impulses of the man's own nature. But :to advance the maxim 
'follow only your own happiness' i s fraught with d i f f i c u l t i e s . 
F i r s t , although we may want to keep our o b l i g a t i o n s , our sense that 
we ought to keep them I s somewhat le s s e n e d . I t was Richard P r i c e 
who recognised t h i s f a c t , when he s t a t e d that to define o b l i g a t i o n 
as the n e c e s s i t y of doing a thi n g i n order to be happy, would make 
r i d i c u l o u s the statement t h a t a man i s obliged to study h i s own 
happiness. Secondly, as B u t l e r very f i r m l y contends, happiness does 
not c o n s i s t e n t i r e l y i n s e l f - l o v e , f o r people can love themselves 
with 'the most e n t i r e and unbounded a f f e c t i o n and yet be extremely 
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m i s e r a b l e ' . (Sermon X I , 6, p.190.) The maxim 'the more you have 
the more you want' i s a very true one, and to indulge o n e s e l f 
does" not always make f o r happiness. Happiness c o n s i s t s i n the 
g r a t i f i c a t i o n of p a r t i c u l a r p a s s i o n s , which supposes t h a t we have 
those p a s s i o n s , and t h a t , 
' I f s e l f - l o v e wholly engrosses us and l e a v e s 
no room f o r any other p r i n c i p l e , there can 
be a b s o l u t e l y no such t h i n g at. a l l as 
happiness o r enjoyment of any kind whatever.' 
(Sermon X I , 6, p.190) 
B u t l e r s t r e s s e s t h a t 'disengagement i s a b s o l u t e l y necessary to 
enjoyment', and he gives the example of over-fondness f o r a c h i l d 
which :is.-not to i t s advantage (Sermon X I ) . Happiness i s not obtained 
by t h i n k i n g about happiness i t s e l f , but by 
'enjoyment of those o b j e c t s which a r e by 
nature s u i t e d to our s e v e r a l p a r t i c u l a r 
a p p e t i t e s , p a s s i o n s and a f f e c t i o n s . ' 
(Sermon X I , 6, p.190) 
T h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p between the p u r s u i t of happiness and 
the p u r s u i t of o b j e c t s r e q u i r e s b r i e f i n v e s t i g a t i o n . I f p a r t of 
happiness l i e s i n the enjoyment of c e r t a i n o b j e c t s , then i n a world 
where there may not be enough to go around, competition has to 
e x i s t ; would B u t l e r condone t h i s ? Some idea of the value placed on 
the p u r s u i t of o b j e c t s i n B u t l e r ' s philosophy i s given i n Sermon X I . 
There B u t l e r supposes a man to contemplate how he could a t t a i n h i s 
- 90 -
own g r e a t e s t happiness, the s o l u t i o n , the man b e l i e v e s , l i e s i n 
those p a r t i c u l a r enjoyments such as r i c h e s , honours and g r a t i f -
i c a t i o n of s e n s u a l a p p e t i t e s ; but B u t l e r concludes thus: 
'yet non p r o f e s s themselves so completely 
happy i n these enjoyments, but t h a t there 
i s room l e f t i n the mind f o r o t h e r s , i f 
they were presented to them: nay, these, 
as much as they engage us, are not thought so 
high, but t h a t , human nature i s capable 
even of g r e a t e r . ' 
(Sermon X I , 13, p.199) 
The d i s t i n c t i o n B u t l e r makes when advocating the way to happiness, 
i s between l i v e s where o b j e c t - g e t t i n g i s important, and those where 
i t i s not; he recommends the l a t t e r to h i s readers. 
S e l f - l o v e never seeks anything f o r the sake of the t h i n g 
i t s e l f , but only a s a means o f happiness or good. What saves B u t l e r ' s 
theory from degenerating i n t o P s y c h o l o g i c a l Hedonism i s not only 
the e x p l a n a t i o n of happiness i n terms of v i r t u e , a point we have 
ye t to d i s c u s s f u l l y , but h i s p a r t i c u l a r d e f i n i t i o n of s e l f - l o v e and 
the r o l e of reason. For when the p r i n c i p l e of cool s e l f - l o v e i s a t 
work i t i s a s i g n of a reasonable man, 'a s e n s i b l e c r e a t u r e ' who 
can r e f l e c t upon h i m s e l f and h i s own i n t e r e s t . Suppose, 
'one man rushes upon d e s i r e : nobody w i l l c a l l 
the p r i n c i p l e of t h i s a c t i o n s e l f - l o v e . ' 
But 
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'suppose another man to go through some l a b o r -
i o u s work upon promise of a great reward, without 
any d i s t i n c t knowledge what the reward w i l l be, 
t h i s course of a c t i o n cannot be a s c r i b e d to any 
p a r t i c u l a r p a s s i o n . ' 
(Sermons I , Note to 6, p.39) 
Cool s e l f - l o v e i s not impulsive a c t i o n . As a motivating p r i n c i p l e 
i t conforms to the law of f i t t i n g n e s s ; that i s to say i f passions 
p r e v a i l over s e l f - l o v e , the consequent a c t i o n i s unnatural: but 
i f s e l f - l o v e p r e v a i l s over p a s s i o n s the a c t i o n i s n a t u r a l . Thus 
t h e r e i s no reason to wish t h a t s e l f - l o v e was any weaker i n the 
world, but r a t h e r t h a t there was more of i t . Indeed, i f the p r i n c i p l e 
of s e l f - l o v e alone, were adopted by man, i n the sense that they s a t 
down and considered what was the g r e a t e s t happiness they could a t t a i n 
f o r themselves i n t h i s world ' i t would m a n i f e s t l y prevent numberless 
f o l l i e s and v i c e s ' . T h i s resembles what the Epicureans advocated 
and although such a l i f e would be by no means moral or r e l i g i o u s 
a c c o r d i n g to B u t l e r , he does not deny that i t would be ' l e s s mischievous 
than the extravagances of mere a p p e t i t e , w i l l and p l e a s u r e ' . Accord-
ing to B u t l e r , we a r e meant to take care of our own l i f e and h e a l t h , 
p r i v a t e good and happiness. 
Our d i s c u s s i o n of benevolence, the second motivating p r i n c i p l e 
of a c t i o n w i l l f a l l under two headings: the f i r s t w i l l consider 
i t s c l a i m s to e x i s t e n c e , and the r e l a t i o n i t bears to happiness. 
B u t l e r was most concerned to e x p l a i n the presence of benevelonce 
w i t h i n men i n order to give a d e c i s i v e r e f u t a t i o n of Hobbes and h i s 
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f o l l o w e r s , who were convinced that there was no such thing as 
benevolence i n the sense t h a t benevolence was u s u a l l y defined. 
'There can be no g r e a t e r argument to a 
man of h i s own power, than to f i n d h i m s e l f 
a b l e not only to accomplish h i s own d e s i r e s 
but to a s s i s t other men i n t h e i r s : and 
t h i s i s th a t conception wherein c o n s i s t e t h 
c h a r i t y . ' 
(Hobbes Human Nature, Chpt. IX, i n Raphael 
p.12) 
B u t l e r ' s contention t h a t d e l i g h t of power can be served by c r u e l t y 
j u s t as much as by goodwill, would hardly touch h i s opponents, who 
he l d anyway t h a t there was no d i s t i n c t i o n between the two. Instead, 
the main defence of benevolence turned on h i s c o n v i c t i o n that i t s 
e x i s t e n c e was a matter of f a c t most p l a i n l y proved. Indeed, the 
very c o n s t i t u t i o n of man le a d him to proinot'e "the happiness 
of a l l men. B u t l e r i l l u s t r a t e s t h i s by drawing the analogy between 
the r e l a t i o n which s e v e r a l p a r t s of the body have to each other and to 
the whole body, w i t h the r e l a t i o n t h a t each p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l i n 
s o c i e t y has to dther p a r t i c u l a r persons and to the whole s o c i e t y . 
So t h a t men are intended to do good to oth e r s , j u s t as the s e v e r a l 
members o f the n a t u r a l body were intended to be instruments o f good 
to each other and to the whole body. One of B u t l e r ' s primary 
premises i s th a t t h e r e i s a n a t u r a l p r i n c i p l e of a t t r a c t i o n i n man 
towards man. We are by nature and design s o c i a l animals, w h i l s t 
the seeds of benevolence were implanted w i t h i n man by God. I t i s 
because o f these c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s t h a t men manufacture r e l a t i o n s h i p s 
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to hold together small f r a t e r n i t i e s and p a r t n e r s h i p s . These t i e s 
a r e more than merely the o c c a s i o n s 'upon which our nature c a r r i e s us 
on according to i t s own previous bent and b i a s ' . 
I n support of t h i s theory, B u t l e r g i v e s a number of p r a c t i c a l 
i n s t a n c e s which i l l u s t r a t e benevolence i n the behaviour of men. An 
i n d i v i d u a l r e j o i c e s i n the w e l l - b e i n g or advancement of a f e l l o w -
being, even though he has no share i t i t ; or to give another example, 
' I s t here not o f t e n the appearance of men's 
d i s t i n g u i s h i n g between two or more persons, 
p r e f e r r i n g one before another, to do good to, 
i n c a s e s where love of power cannot i n the 
l e a s t account f o r the d i s t i n c t i o n and preference?' 
(Sermon I , note, p.35) 
I n both these c a s e s there i s e x h i b i t e d a f e e l i n g whose presence 
cannot be accounted f o r by narrow s e l f - l o v e . Moreover, B u t l e r was 
not alone i n h i s a s s e r t i o n t h a t our a c t i o n s were not a l l narrowly 
e g o i s t i c , those p h i l o s o p h e r s who had b e l i e v e d i n a moral sense, had 
h e l d a s i m i l a r opinion. Shaftesbury, for i n s t a n c e , was puzzled as 
to why men l i k e Hobbes r e v e a l e d to the r e s t of mankind the f a c t 
t h a t only p r i v a t e i n t e r e s t governs men's motives, when such a d i s -
c l o s u r e i s a g a i n s t t h e i r own personal i n t e r e s t . He concluded that 
such g e n e r a l s c e p t i c i s m was pursued only i n order to 
'deal w i t h the dogmatical s p i r i t which p r e v a i l s 
i n some p a r t i c u l a r s u b j e c t s . And when they 
have accustomed men to bear c o n t r a d i c t i o n i n 
the main and hear the nature of things disputed 
- 94 -
a t l a r g e ; i t may be s a f e r they conclude to argue 
s e p a r a t e l y , upon c e r t a i n n i c e p o i n t s i n which 
they a r e not a l t o g e t h e r so w e l l s a t i s f i e d . ' 
(Shaftesbury, An E s s a y on the Freedom of Wit and 
Humour, 1709, i n Monro, p.95) 
Having c a s t doubts upon the very i n t e n t i o n s of these 'Gentlemen' 
c y n i c s , Shaftesbury s t a t e s t h a t f o r a man to be v i r t u o u s , he must 
a c t i n accordance w i t h what i s best f o r the system of which he i s 
a p a r t . An i n d i v i d u a l 
'only i s supposed Good, when the good or i l l 
of the System to which he has r e l a t i o n i s 
the immediate o b j e c t of some P a s s i o n or 
A f f e c t i o n moving him.' 
(An I n q u i r y concerning V i r t u e or Merit, Book I , 
P a r t I I , 1, i n Raphael, p.172) 
So t h a t v i r t u e c o n s i s t s i n a c t i n g not only f o r one's own i n t e r e s t s 
but f o r the i n t e r e s t s of s o c i e t y , to be concerned f o r the w e l f a r e 
of o t h e r s and to promote t h e i r good. C o n f l i c t does not occur 
between p u b l i c and p r i v a t e v i r t u e , because i t i s to the i n d i v i d u a l ' s 
own i n t e r e s t to work f o r o t h e r s . To do so i s not only a necessary 
c r i t e r i o n of v i r t u e , i t i s the only way to happiness:. 
'Thus the wisdom of what r u l e s , and i s F i r s t 
and C h i e f i n nature, has made i t to be according 
to the p r i v a t e i n t e r e s t and good of every one, 
to work towards the general good, which i f a 
c r e a t u r e c e a s e s to promote, he i s a c t u a l l y wanting 
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so f a r to h i m s e l f , and ceases to promote h i s 
own happiness and w e l f a r e . ' 
(An I n q u i r y concerning V i r t u e or Merit, Book I I , 
P a r t I I , Conclusion, i n Raphael, p.188) 
Hutcheson c a r r i e d on the work of Shaftesbury and made i t 
h i s main concern to show t h a t we admire and do a c t i o n s f o r other 
reasons than a regard f o r our own i n t e r e s t . 
'The i n t e n t i o n of Moral Philosophy i s to 
d i r e c t men to that course of a c t i o n which 
tends most e f f e c t u a l l y to promote t h e i r 
g r e a t e s t happiness and p e r f e c t i o n . ' 
(System of Moral Philosophy, 1755 i n i t i o ) 
Hutcheson, however, goes f u r t h e r than h i s predecessor i n maintaining 
t h a t a l l v i r t u e presupposes a f f e c t i o n and d i s p o s i t i o n to promote 
p u b l i c good, and t h a t the degree of v i r t u e depends on the quantity 
o f happiness expected to r e s u l t and on the number of persons 
a f f e c t e d : 
' t h a t i n equal degrees of happiness, 
expected to proceed from the a c t i o n , the v i r t u e 
i s i n proportion to the number of persons to 
whom the happiness s h a l l extend.... and i n 
equal numbers, the v i r t u e i s as the quantity 
of the happiness,or n a t u r a l good, or that the 
v i r t u e i s i n a compound r a t i o of the q u a n t i t y 
of good and the number of e n j o y e r s . ' 
(An I n q u i r y concerning Moral Good and E v i l . 
S e c t i o n I I I , i n Raphael, p.283) 
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The above passage i s i n t e r e s t i n g i n a general p h i l o s o p h i c a l way: 
as Raphael p o i n t s out, i t i s an e a r l y e x p l i c i t formulation of the 
U t i l i t a r i a n d e c t r i n e . But f o r the purposes of our own study i t puts 
c l e a r l y a p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of benevolence that B u t l e r 
d i s c a r d s . Hutcheson a s c r i b e s a s u p e r i o r p o s i t i o n to benevolence i n 
human nature; he reduces a l l v i r t u e to benevolence; and e x p l a i n s 
benelovence s o l e l y i n terms of happiness. These are c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s 
he s h a r e s w i t h Shaftesbury, but they a r e a l s o t h e o r i e s which have 
been a t t r i b u t e d to B u t l e r by c r i t i c s i n past c e n t u r i e s . 
L e t us f i r s t take the r e l a t i o n s h i p between benevolence and 
v i r t u e . I t i s f a i r to say that B u t l e r i s a l i t t l e misleading a t 
f i r s t s i g h t on t h i s question, p r i n c i p a l l y because i n one of h i s 
Sermons he does seem to a s s e r t t h a t a l l common v i r t u e s and v i c e s 
can be t r a c e d to benevolence or to the l a c k of i t . 
'From hence i t i s manifest that the common 
v i r t u e s , and the common v i c e s of mankind, 
may be t r a c e d up to benevolence, or the 
want of i t . ' 
(Sermon X I I , 22, p.226) 
The reader must beware of t a k i n g such words out of the general 
context of B u t l e r ' s moral theory. I t i s to be remembered that 
t h i s quotation occurs w i t h i n a Sermon on 'The Love of our Neighbour', 
and B u t l e r i s r a i s i n g the p r i n c i p l e of benevolence to the same l e v e l 
a s t h a t of s e l f - i n t e r e s t i n order to persuade h i s congregation to be 
concerned f o r the w e l f a r e of ot h e r s . Note a l s o that B u t l e r i s t a l k i n g 
of common v i c e s , such as h a b i t u a l excess, a d i s s o l u t e course of l i f e , 
wrong-doings that a f f e c t o t h e r s not j u s t o u r s e l v e s ; he has alr e a d y 
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d e a l t w i t h i n d i v i d u a l v i c e i n a previous sermon. There a r e , i n 
f a c t , a number of i n s t a n c e s where B u t l e r t a l k s of s e l f - l o v e and 
benevolence as being 'the two general a f f e c t i o n s ' which 'denominates 
men's c h a r a c t e r as to v i r t u e ' . (Sermon X I I , 8 p.216.) Indeed, 
the i l l u s t r a t i o n s he g i v e s throughout h i s works concerning the 
r e l a t i o n s of p a r t s to the whole, and the promoting of v i r t u e by 
the i n t e r - r e l a t i n g of s e l f - l o v e and benevolence a l l c l e a r l y point 
to the e q u a l i t y of these two p r i n c i p l e s , but not to t h e i r i d e n t i t y . 
' I must however remind you that though 
benevelonce and s e l f - l o v e are d i f f e r e n t ; 
though the former tends most d i r e c t l y to 
p u b l i c good, and the l a t t e r to p r i v a t e : 
yet they are so p e r f e c t l y c o i n c i d e n t , that 
the g r e a t e s t s a t i s f a c t i o n s to o u r s e l v e s 
depend upon our having benevolence i n a 
due degree, and t h a t s e l f - l o v e i s one 
c h i e f s e c u r i t y of our r i g h t behaviour towards 
s o c i e t y . ' 
(Sermon I , 5, p.38) 
Perhaps the f i n a l proof l i e s i n the ' D i s s e r t a t i o n upon V i r t u e ' , 
where he seems to deny c a t e g o r i c a l l y that benevolence i s the sum 
of a l l v i r t u e . 
'Without i n q u i r i n g how f a r , and i n what 
sense, v i r t u e i s r e s o l v a b l e i n t o benev-
olence, and v i c e i n t o the want of i t ; i t 
may be proper to observe, that benevolence 
and the want of i t , s i n g l y considered, are 
- 98 -
i n no s o r t the whole of v i r t u e and v i c e . ' 
( D i s s e r t a t i o n I I , S e c t i o n 12, p.407) 
Upon reading t h i s passage we e i t h e r conclude t h a t B u t l e r has 
simply c o n t r a d i c t e d what he a s s e r t s i n Sermon X I I , or that readers 
have m i s i n t e r p r e t e d the meaning of the l a t t e r . As B u t l e r was 
such a c a r e f u l and almost pedantic w r i t e r , I do not t h i n k he would 
have made such a gross c o n t r a d i c t i o n : besides as the D i s s e r t a t i o n 
on V i r t u e should r i g h t l y appear i n h i s l a t e r work, the Analogy, one 
tends to t h i n k of anything there as h i s f i n a l words - w r i t t e n upon 
r e f l e c t i o n . 
Hence, w h i l e B u t l e r agreed with these two predecessors of 
h i s , t h a t d i s i n t e r e s t e d benevolence c o n s t i t u t e d a s p e c i f i c a t t r i b u t e 
of the moral man, he c l e a r l y l i m i t e d i t s r o l e , perhaps because he 
saw the dangers of c l a i m i n g v i r t u e to be the r e s u l t of a c t i o n s , 
which were i n t u r n deduced to be prompted merely by motives of 
happiness. I f the maxim of g e n e r a l i s e d benevolence alone i s 
f o l l o w e d , then the man would be approved, who took from another 
the f r u i t of h i s labour by fraud or v i o l e n c e w i t h the i n t e n t to 
g i v e i t to a t h i r d , who he thought would have as much ple a s u r e 
from i t . I t i s p a r t l y a g a i n s t such i n j u s t i c e that B u t l e r spoke 
so s h a r p l y i n the passage below. 
'Some authors of great and d i s t i n g u i s h e d merit 
have, I t h i n k , expressed themselves i n a manner 
which may o c c a s i o n some danger, to c a r e l e s s 
r e a d e r s , of imagining the whole of v i r t u e to 
c o n s i s t i n s i n g l y aiming, according to the best 
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of t h e i r judgement, a t promoting the happiness 
of mankind i n t h e i r present s t a t e ; and the 
whole of v i c e i n doing what they f o r e s e e , 
or might f o r e s e e , i s l i k e l y to produce an 
overbalance of unhappiness i n i t ; than which 
mistakes none can be conceived more t e r r i b l e . ' 
( D i s s e r t a t i o n on the Nature of V i r t u e . S e c t i o n 
15, p.409) 
T h i s does not mean th a t B u t l e r underestimated the power of benev-
olence as a p r i n c i p l e of a c t i o n , but he d i d not cons i d e r i t purely 
as a means f o r maximising the happiness of humanity. He frequently 
mentions goodness as being an e s s e n t i a l p a r t of benevolence. 
'Benevolence seems i n the s t r i c t e s t sense to 
in c l u d e i n i t a l l t h a t i s good and worthy.' 
( Sermons X I I , 22, p.227) 
And i n order to d i s t i n g u i s h which a c t i o n s are l i k e l y to produce the 
g r e a t e s t good, reason and r e f l e c t i o n have been given to a s s i s t us. 
'Thus, when benevolence i s s a i d to be the 
sum of v i r t u e , i t i s not spoken of as a b l i n d 
propension, but as a p r i n c i p l e i n reasonable 
c r e a t u r e s , and so to be d i r e c t e d by t h e i r 
reason.' 
(Sermon X I I , 19, p.223) 
Our aim t h e r e f o r e , i s not to promote happiness by any meais, but 
to pursue goodness which w i l l n a t u r a l l y r e s u l t i n happiness. 
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'A benevolent man w i l l be easy and kind to 
h i s dependents, compassionate to the poor 
and d i s t r e s s e d , f r i e n d l y to a l l with whom 
he has to do.' 
(Sermons X I I , 14, p.221) 
A l l t h a t has been s a i d i s of course only my i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
of B u t l e r , and there are some philosophers who s t i l l maintain 
t h a t he recc»miiends u t i l i t a r i a n i s m e s p e c i a l l y regarding o b l i g -
a t i o n . C e r t a i n l y , B u t l e r was no exception i n the popular b e l i e f 
of h i s day t h a t every i n d i v i d u a l had a r i g h t to happiness. 
' I t i s manifest t h a t nothing can be 
of consequence to mankind or any 
c r e a t u r e but happiness. T h i s then 
i s a l l which any person can i n 
s t r i c t n e s s of speaking, be s a i d to 
have a r i g h t t o . ' 
(Sermon X I I , 20, p.224) 
There a r e two ways i n which the term ' r i g h t ' can be used; f i r s t , 
i n the sense t h a t t e l l i n g the t r u t h i s r i g h t ( t h a t i s , not wrong) 
and secondly, i n the sense that i t i s r i g h t f o r promises to be 
kefpt, r i g h t i m p l i e s o b l i g a t i o n . Not only would B u t l e r say that 
i t was not wrong to pursue happiness, but i n f a c t i t was our 
duty to so do to others as w e l l as to o u r s e l v e s . To go back 
to a metaphor used before - the happiness b a l l had to be passed 
around a l l the p l a y e r s i n the game. We thus owe no man anything 
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but only the promotion of h i s happiness, t h i s i s our s o l e 
o b l i g a t i o n ; such views appear dangerously near the popular 
d o c t r i n e formulated by John Gay when he wrote of o b l i g a t o r y 
a c t s being those which l e a d to happinessi. 
I n f a c t , B u t l e r does not agree w i t h the above view, 
and the reason why t h i s i s so p l a y s an important part i n h i s 
philosophy. B u t l e r a s s e r t s t h a t because i t i s so d i f f i c u l t 
f o r us as mere mortals, to know where our true i n t e r e s t l i e s , 
the way most l i k e l y to b ring our happiness i s the path of 
v i r t u e along which conscience guides us. In order to under-
stand f u l l y t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p between v i r t u e and happiness, 
l e t us study how these two concepts f i t i n t o God's t o t a l 
scheme as envisaged by B u t l e r . 
When d i s c u s s i n g B u t l e r ' s moral philosophy i t i s 
important to remember th a t he begins from c e r t a i n t h e o l o g i c a l 
premises; and t h i s i s p a r t i c u l a r l y the case with v i r t u e and 
happiness. We do not j u s t e x i s t i n t h i s world, we are under 
the moral government of God. The r e l a t i o n between God and man 
i s l i k e n e d to t h a t of a c i v i l m a g istrate over h i s s u b j e c t s , 
or a master over h i s s e r v a n t s ; and as we have already r e a l i z e d 
t h i s f a c t i s f o r B u t l e r , not so much a deduction of reason as 
a matter of experience. From observing the course of nature 
B u t l e r has concluded t h a t v i r t u e and v i c e a re n a t u r a l l y 
rewarded and punished, and t h a t the p l e a s u r e and pain attached 
to voluntary a c t i o n s demonstrate that God i s a n a t u r a l governor 
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2 of the world. He g i v e s us an example of t h i s , d i s c i p l i n a r y 
p r o c e s s , the oain we should f e e l upon c l o s e l y approaching a 
f i r e ; B u t l e r a s s e r t s t h a t the pain i n f l i c t e d on us as a 
punishment f o r going.too near the f i r e i s as much an i n d i c a t i o n 
of God's government of us as would be an e x p l i c i t i n s t r u c t i o n 
and warning from heaven. 
I t does not seem to me th a t B u t l e r has i n mind so 
anthropomorphic a . d e i t y as t h i s example suggests a t f i r s t 
s i g h t . To be burnt by f i r e i s a n a t u r a l process: t h a t i s , 
a process-which has not been c o n t r i v e d by man; f o r i t i s an 
undeniable f a c t t h a t f l e s h w i l l be burnt by f i r e and pain w i l l 
f o l l o w , and man cannot prevent t h i s sequence of cause and 
e f f e c t ; However, the r e a r e s e v e r a l ways of viewing t h i s 
p r o c e s s . I f we ask what i s the moral c r i t e r i o n f o r deciding 
. which c l a s s e s of a c t i o n a r e to be punished, we could say 
simply t h a t those a c t i o n s which l e a d to p h y s i c a l harm and 
i n j u r y are punished. Or one could say t h a t God d i s l i k e s our 
, going near the f i r e , and punishes us f o r so doing, which would 
be to envisage a kind of Old Testament God. But, B u t l e r i s 
sa y i n g t h a t we l e a r n from n a t u r a l examples t h a t some a c t i o n s 
b r i n g pain and harm, t h a t others bring p l e a s u r e and reward, 
and he maintains t h a t t h i s n a t u r a l system proclaims the workings 
of God, because he holds t h a t God was author and c r e a t o r of 
a l l t h i n g s . B u t l e r b e l i e v e d t h a t the i n f l i c t i o n of pain and 
2 
The p a i n and p l e a s u r e argument does not a s s e r t that God 
e x i s t s , t h a t i s not taken as proof of h i s e x i s t e n c e . 
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s u f f e r i n g i s not random, but purposine, i t s aim being to l e a d 
man to avoid misery and i n c l i n e towards p l e a s u r e and happiness. 
And t h i s b u i l t - i n system of rewards and punishments i s supported 
by man's nature, which i s so c o n s t i t u t e d that he wishes more 
f o r happiness than s u f f e r i n g . Indeed, B u t l e r f i r m l y s t a t e s : 
'that God has given us a moral nature, may 
most j u s t l y be urged as a proof of our 
being under h i s moral government.' 
(Analogy, Chpt I I I , , 17, p.76) 
He provides evidence f o r h i s f i r s t point of view i n h i s 
Sermons, and attempts to b r i n g evidence f o r h i s second i n the 
Analogy. 
I t i s n e c e s s a r y to note t h a t B u t l e r does not make the 
mistake of t h i n k i n g t h a t n a t u r a l government proves moral govern-
ment. The l a t t e r i s not merely a matter of rewarding the 
ri g h t e o u s and punishing the wicked, ' i n rendering to men 
accord i n g to t h e i r a c t i o n s , considered as good or e v i l * . Accord-
i n g to B u t l e r , some s o r t of government i s p l a i n l y implied by 
the f o l l o w i n g f a c t s : t h a t God governs the world by general f i x e d 
laws; and th a t God has given man c a p a c i t i e s f o r r e f l e c t i n g upon 
the c o n s t i t u t i o n of t h i n g s , and f o r e s e e i n g the good and bad 
consequences of h i s own behaviour. 
God i s more d e i t y of d e s s e r t s than a U t i l i t e r i a n God; 
B u t l e r doubts whether d i v i n e goodness i s a bare s i n g l e d i s p o s i t i o n 
to produce happiness, r a t h e r i t i s a d i s p o s i t i o n to make the 
good, the f a i t h f u l , the honest man happy. I th e r e f o r e t h i n k 
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t h a t Raphael i s m i s i n t e r p r e t i n g B u t l e r , when he says t h a t 
B u t l e r ' s God may w e l l be concerned only w i t h the production 
of the maximum p o s s i b l e amount of happiness. B u t l e r emphasises 
t h a t p a r t i c u l a r a c t i o n s are not e s p e c i a l l y m e r i t o r i o u s , i t i s 
the v i r t u o u s c h a r a c t e r that i s rewarded and attended by 
happiness. 
The reason f o r t h i s s t r e s s i n g of v i r t u o u s behaviour, 
i s our ignorance of the ways of the u n i v e r s e . The end f o r which 
man aims i s 'virtuous happiness' which can only be achieved with 
c e r t a i n t y by obeying God, who 'speaks' through conscience. 
B u t l e r surmises t h a t the end f o r which God made the world 
i s beyond the r e a c h of our f a c u l t i e s and furthermore t h a t , 
' i t must be owned a t h i n g of d i f f i c u l t y 
to weigh and balance p l e a s u r e s and u n e a s i -
nesses each among themselves, and a l s o 
agains each other, so as to make an estimate 
w i t h any e x a c t n e s s , of the overplus of 
happiness on the s i d e of v i r t u e . ' 
(Analogy, P a r t I , I I I , 5, p. 67; t h i s 
p o int can a l s o be found i n P a r t I I , V I , 
3, and P a r t I I , V I I I , 9) 
Happiness i s not always c o i n c i d e n t w i t h v i r t u e i n t h i s l i f e , 
f o r as B u t l e r remarks even those persons who l e a d blameless 
l i v e s from t h e i r youth may not be happy; so one may say that 
v i r t u e i s not a s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n of happiness. W h i l s t men 
of v i c e may not be unhappy, 
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'a person w i t h h i s passions inflamed, h i s 
n a t u r a l f a c u l t y of self-government impaired 
by h a b i t s of indulgence, and w i t h a l l h i s v i c e s 
about him l i k e so many h a r p i e s , c r a v i n g f o r 
t h e i r accustomed g r a t i f i c a t i o n : who can say 
how long i t might be, before such a person 
would f i n d more s a t i s f a c t i o n i n the reasonable-
ness and present good consequences of v i r t u e , 
than d i f f i c u l t i e s and s e l f - d e n i a l i n the 
r e s t r a i n t s of i t . ' 
(Analogy. P a r t I , I I I , 6 p.67) 
So v i r t u e seems a l s o not a necessary c o n d i t i o n of happiness. 
One can be happy without being v i r t u o u s , but would B u t l e r 
c a l l t h i s t r u e l a s t i n g happiness f o r he b e l i e v e s that the 
l a t t e r could be gained only by v i r t u o u s behaviour. The s i t u a t i o n 
reminds the modern reader of Flow's 'no true Scotsman' f a l l a c y . 
Suppose a man says 'no true Scotsman ever beats h i s w i f e ' , and 
then you show him a newspaper c u t t i n g which r e p o r t s that a 
Scotsman, McTaggart, has beaten h i s w i f e and been sent to 
g a o l . I f the man r e p l i e d t h a t McTaggart wasn't a true Scotsman, 
he would be implying t h a t to never beat t h e i r wives i s a nec-
e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n of being a t r u e Scotsman. Unless B u t l e r 
shows what he means by long l a s t i n g happiness, d e f i n i n g i t 
s e p a r a t e l y from v i r t u e then any statement about a r e l a t i o n s h i p 
between the two must be p u r e l y a n a l y t i c a l and thereby not 
meaningful. 
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I t h i n k B u t l e r would s t a t e h i s p o s i t i o n on t h i s 
d i f f i c u l t y i n the f o l l o w i n g way. Men a c t v i r t u o u s l y , because 
they are secure i n the knowledge that they are obeying God 
and so w i l l be rewarded u l t i m a t e l y ; but when men a c t v i c i o u s l y 
any happiness so d e r i v e d w i l l be very i n s e c u r e , and punishment 
w i l l be the eventual outcome.. As an a d d i t i o n a l s a n c t i o n there 
w i l l be a b e t t e r chance of happiness by a c t i n g v i r t u o u s l y 
because, - and t h i s i s B u t l e r ' s main point, a g a i n s t the above 
argument - i t i s obeying our nature to so do. To a c t 
v i c i o u s l y i s to go a g a i n s t our nature, becuase we have a p r i o r 
s u i t a b l e n e s s to v i r t u e . Hence ' v i r t u e i s demonstrably the 
happiness of man'. (Sermon XV, 15 p.273) 
Why do we have to make a choice between v i r t u e and 
v i c e ? I f we l i v e d i n a world where men found themselves from 
t h e i r b i r t h to t h e i r death i n t h e i r n a t u r a l c a p a c i t y , i n a 
s e t t l e d s t a t e of contentment and happiness without any e f f o r t 
on t h e i r p a r t , then t h e r e would be no i n c e n t i v e to behave i n 
a c e r t a i n way. Indeed, i t would be meaningless to say that 
our f u t u r e i n t e r e s t depends upon our present behavioir which 
r e q u i r e s self-government, f o r the u n i v e r s e and i t s c r e a t o r 
would be p u r e l y m e c h a n i s t i c . Without moral freedom B u t l e r ' s 
e l a b o r a t e system of punishments and rewards d i s i n t e g r a t e s ; 
men need the opportunity to show God that they can a c t v i r t -
u ously. Thought and c o n s i d e r a t i o n , the denying of o u r s e l v e s 
t h i n g s we d e s i r e and the r e g u l a t i o n of behaviour i n a manner 
we may not always l i k e , i s necessary i f we are to pass w i t h 
any s a t i s f a c t i o n through the present world and be r e c e i v e d upon 
any t o l e r a b l e good terms i n i t . One could add R u s s e l l ' s maxim 
here, t h a t to be without some of the t h i n g s you want i s an 
- 107 -
i n d i s p e n s i b l e p a r t of happiness. (The Conquest of Happiness) 
I t h i n k t h e r e f o r e t h a t George Watson i s r i g h t when he says 
t h a t B u t l e r b e l i e v e d t h a t happiness was more l i k e an e s c a l a t o r 
than a p e d e s t a l . (The E n g l i s h Mind; e d i t e d by H.S. Davis & 
G. Watson) For only c o n s i d e r the f o l l o w i n g words: 
'Whoever w i l l i n the l e a s t attend to the 
th i n g , w i l l see th a t i t i s the g a i n i n g , 
not the having of i t , which i s the e n t e r -
tainment of the mind.' 
( B u t l e r , Sermon XV, 13, p.270) 
C H A P T E R IV 
- 108 - ^ 
CONSCIENCE 
Within the f i e l d of morals B u t l e r s t a t e s how impossible 
i t i s t h a t the same words always stand f o r the same i d e a s , 
even i n the same author (Sermons, P r e f a c e , 3, p.3). 'Conscience' 
i s a good example of t h i s ambiguity, i t i s a complex moral 
f a c u l t y , and was known i n the eighteenth century by many names, 
"moral sense", "moral reason", "Divine Reason" and so on. 
For i n s t a n c e , Hutcheson wished to prove 
'That some a c t i o n s have to man an immediate 
goodness; or, t h a t by a s u p e r i o r sense, which 
I c a l l a moral one, we approve the a c t i o n s of 
ot h e r s , and p e r c e i v e them to be t h e i r p e r f e c t i o n 
and d i g n i t y , and are determined to love the 
agent; a l i k e p e rception we have i n r e f l e c t i n g 
on such a c t i o n s of our own, without any view 
of n a t u r a l advantage from them.' 
(An I n q u i r y Concerning Moral Good and E v i l , 
I n t r o d u c t i o n , i n Raphael, p. 263) 
C l a r k e emphasises the r a t i o n a l p a r t of conscience. For men to 
a l l o w themselves to be swayed by 'unaccountable a r b i t r a r y 
humours', 'rash p a s s i o n s ' , and p r i v a t e i n t e r e s t ' 
' i s a c t i n g c o n t r a r y to that understanding, 
reason and judgement, which God has 
implanted i n t h e i r natures on purpose to 
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enable them to d i s c e r n the d i f f e r e n c e 
between good and e v i l . ' 
(A D i s c o u r s e on Natural R e l i g i o n . 3, i n 
Raphael, p.201) 
The e x i s t e n c e of some s o r t of moral perception was never doubted; 
the controversy arose as to i t s c o n s t i t u t i o n . The d i f f i c u l t i e s 
i n the works of B u t l e r , r e l a t i n g to t h i s s u b j e c t appear to be 
t h a t he never g i v e s a c l e a r s a t i s f a c t o r y d e f i n i t i o n , and t h i s 
has l e d to commentators' p o s i t i n g somewhat confused i n t e r -
p r e t a t i o n s of conscience. Raphael, who maintained that B u t l e r ' s 
d e s c r i p t i o n of the working of conscience i s unsurpassed, 
suggests that no c l e a r d e f i n i t i o n was given, because a t the 
time of w r i t i n g the Sermons, the controversy about sense and 
reason had hot begun. B u t l e r would thus c o n s i d e r that no-one 
would be i n any doubt as to what he meant by conscience; and 
indeed I maintain t h a t i f the Analogy and the Sermons are looked 
a t together an i n t e l l i g i b l e general idea of conscience may 
be apprehended. 
B u t l e r maintains t h a t a l l i n d i v i d u a l s experience 
through i n t r o s p e c t i o n the workings of a moral f a c u l t y . We 
can a l s o observe the process i n ot h e r s , and indeed we pass 
judgement on t h e i r a c t i o n s as w e l l as our own, using moral 
vocabulary such as 'good' and 'bad', ' r i g h t ' and 'wrong', 
which presuppose t h a t we have approved or disapproved of c e r t a i n 
behaviour. Our sense of g r a t i t u d e , the d i s t i n c t i o n we make 
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between d e l i b e r a t e i n j u r y and a c c i d e n t a l harm, and between 
i n j u r y and punishment: a l l these, B u t l e r s t a t e s , are reasons 
f o r t h i n k i n g t h a t t h e r e i s a moral f a c u l t y present i n our 
n a t u r e . He f u r t h e r reminds us t h a t there are many learned 
works on the s u b j e c t of morals and 
' i t cannot be imagined t h a t a l l these authors, 
throughout a l l those t r e a t i s e s had a b s o l u t e l y 
no meaning a t a l l to t h e i r words, or a meaning 
metely c h i m e r i c a l . ' 
( D i s s e r t a t i o n Upon V i r t u e , 2, p.398) 
As B u t l e r ' s method of study was e m p i r i c a l , he would not r e l y 
upon a p r i o r i reasoning as evidence f o r the e x i s t e n c e of 
c o n s c i e n c e . In the F i r s t Sermon he defends the presence of 
benevolence i n man's nature by appealing to man's own obser-
v a t i o n s , men need only look a t themselves and others, and 
they w i l l see the p r i n c i p l e of benevolence at work: 
'Whether man be thus, or otherwise 
c o n s t i t u t e d , what i s the inward frame i n 
t h i s p a r t i c u l a r , i s a mere question of f a c t 
or n a t u r a l h i s t o r y , not provable immediately 
by reason. I t i s t h e r e f o r e to be judged of 
and determined i n the same way as other 
f a c t s or matters of n a t u r a l h i s t o r y are; 
by appealing to the e x t e r n a l senses or 
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inward p e r c e p t i o n s . ' 
(Sermon I , note p.37) 
There i s every reason to suppose t h a t conscience i s viewed 
i n a s i m i l a r manner, f o r i n the same sermon B u t l e r puts forward 
an i l l u s t r a t i o n of the e x i s t e n c e of conscience, which he s t r o n g l y 
m a i n t a i n s cannot p o s s i b l y be denied. Suppose a man helps 
another who i s i n g r e a t d i s t r e s s , and a s h o r t time afterwards 
the same man i n a f i t of temper i n j u r e s an innocent person 
who had been a f r i e n d and to whom he owed an o b l i g a t i o n (Sermon 
I , 8, p.42). B u t l e r s t a t e d t h a t the man who had done these 
two d i f f e r e n t a c t i o n s , on c o o l l y r e f l e c t i n g upon them a f t e r -
wards, would not f e e l a f f e c t e d by both i n the same way. He 
would approved of one and condemn the other, thereby e x e r c i s i n g 
moral judgement, and 
' t h i s p r i n c i p l e i n man, by which he approves 
or disapproves h i s h e a r t , temper and a c t i o n s , 
i s c o nscience'. 
(Sermon I , 8 p.42) 
On f i r s t s i g h t t h i s e x p l a n a t i o n of conscience seems 
adequate, however examination of the D i s s e r t a t i o n Upon V i r t u e 
r e v e a l s a c e r t a i n c o nfusion. B u t l e r t a l k s there of conscience: 
'whether considered as a sentiment of 
the understanding or as a perception 
of the h e a r t , or which seems to be the 
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t r u t h as i n c l u d i n g both.'^ 
( 2 , p.398) 
Conscience i s thus p a r t l y i n t e l l e c t u a l and p a r t l y emotional, 
and i t i s t h i s i n c l u s i o n of both reason and f e e l i n g w i t h i n 
the concept of conscience t h a t has r a i s e d v a r i o u s d i f f i c u l t i e s 
w i t h succeeding generations of s c h o l a r s . When attempting to 
e l u c i d a t e the meaning of conscience i n the w r i t i n g s of B u t l e r , 
I t h i n k i t i s important to keep i n mind E.M. F o r s t e r ' s w e l l -
known epigraph to Howards End 'only connect-f. As we have 
seen, B u t l e r maintains t h a t man's inward nature i s made up of 
s e v e r a l p a r t s , and he warns us t h a t to have an idea of such 
a c o n s t i t u t i o n n e c e s s i t a t e s an understanding of the r e l a t i o n s 
between these v a r i o u s p a r t s . Hence, the f i r s t s p e c i a l connection 
we s h a l l d i s c u s s i s t h a t between reason, r e f l e c t i o n and the 
moral f a c u l t y . 
Confusion appears to have a r i s e n because of the seeming 
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of these three concepts; r e f l e c t i o n i s reason 
and reason i s the same as conscience. Throughout the Sermons 
B u t l e r c a l l s c o n s cience 'a p r i n c i p l e of r e f l e c t i o n ' and t a l k s 
of ' r e f l e x approbation or disapprobation', apparently taking 
i t f o r granted t h a t the reader understands what i s meant by 
r e f l e c t i o n . I n the eighteenth century t h i s would probably be 
•'• He a l s o says i n Sermon X t h a t conscience 'our understanding 
and sense of good or e v i l ' . (12 p.178) 
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the c a s e , and i t would t h e r e f o r e be h e l p f u l to look at 
w r i t e r s more or l e s s contemporary w i t h B u t l e r . Locke, f o r 
example, who had a c e r t a i n amount of i n f l u e n c e upon B u t l e r , 
t a l k s of a l l i d e a s coming from sen s a t i o n ^ o r r e f l e c t i o n . 
'Whence has i t a l l the m a t e r i a l s of reason 
and knowledge? To t h i s I answer, i n one 
word, from experience. In that a l l our 
knowledge i s founded, and from that i t 
u l t i m a t e l y d e r i v e s i t s e l f . Our observation 
employed e i t h e r about e x t e r n a l s e n s i b l e o b j e c t s , 
or about the i n t e r n a l operations of our minds 
per c e i v e d and r e f l e c t e d on by o u r s e l v e s , i s 
t h a t which s u p p l i e s our understandings w i t h 
a l l the m a t e r i a l s of t h i n k i n g ' . 
(An E s s a y Concerning Human Understanding, 
Book I I , Chpt.I, 2, pp.89-90) 
Thus, i d e a s of r e f l e c t i o n a r e formed as a r e s u l t of r e f l e c t i o n , 
and as Hutcheson so r i g h t l y i n t e r p r e t e d Locke, by r e f l e c t i o n 
i s meant an inward power of perception or i n t e r n a l s e n s a t i o n . 
Shaftesbury, on the other hand, t a l k s of a r e f l e c t i n g f a c u l t y 
which approves of moral q u a l i t i e s . Conscience was f o r man 
'to have the r e f l e c t i o n i n h i s mind of any 
u n j u s t a c t i o n or behaviour, which he knows 
to be n a t u r a l l y odious or i l l - d e s e r v i n g . ' 
( I n q u i r y Concerning V i r t u e , B k . I I , P a r t I I , 1, i n 
Raphael, p.185) 
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B u t l e r took the opportunity to say what he meant by r e f l e c t i o n 
i n h i s d i s c u s s i o n o o f the f u t u r e l i f e . He considered that men 
e x i s t i n two s t a t e s of l i f e and perception, t h a t of s e n s a t i o n 
and that of r e f l e c t i o n ; and that the l a t t e r i s probably not 
destroyed by death, f o r s e n s a t i o n i s not e s s e n t i a l to r e f l e c t i o n 
once i d e a s a r e gained. B u t l e r continues by t a l k i n g of men 
w i t h mortal d i s e a s e s which do not harm t h e i r r e f l e c t i n g 
powers; even to j u s t before death, these men 
'discover, apprehension, memory, reason, a l l 
e n t i r e ; w i t h the utmost f o r c e of a f f e c t i o n ; 
sense of a c h a r a c t e r , of shame and honour; 
and the h i g h e s t mental enjoyments and 
s u f f e r i n g s even to the l a s t gasp.' 
(Analogy. P a r t I , Chpt I , 25, p.41) 
I t thus would appear t h a t by r e f l e c t i o n , Locke, Shaftesbury 
and B u t l e r a r e r e f e r r i n g to a process of f i x i n g one's thoughts 
upon i n t e r n a l matters such as memory, apprehension and so f o r t h . 
Conscience i s what B u t l e r c a l l s a p a r t i c u l a r kind of r e f l e c t i o n , ' 
and t h i s i n v o l v e s a process i n which reason i s used, but there 
i s no simple equivalence between reason, r e f l e c t i o n and cons-
c i e n c e . 
L e t us now t u r n to the connection between reason and 
f e e l i n g : f o r t h i s i t w i l l be u s e f u l to study D.D . Raphael's 
e x p l a n a t i o n of the d e f i n i t i o n of conscience given i n the 
D i s s e r t a t i o n Upon V i r t u e . Basing h i s a s s e r t i o n s on c l o s e 
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knowledge of eighteenth century terminology, Raphael concludes 
t h a t the phrase 'a sentiment of the understanding' r e f e r s to 
a r a t i o n a l judgement. His opinion i s s u b s t a n t i a t e d by 
Thomas Reid who speaks of the popular abuse of the word 
'sentiment' as f e e l i n g 
'For the word 'sentiment' i n the E n g l i s h 
language, never as I conceive, s i g n i f i e s , 
mere f e e l i n g but judgement accompanies with 
f e e l i n g . I t was wont to s i g n i f y opinion 
or judgement of any kind, but of l a t e , i s 
appropriated to s i g n i f y an opinion or 
judgement that s t r i k e s and produces some 
agreeable or uneasy emotion.' 
( E s s a y s on the A c t i v e Powers of Man V, 7, 
quoted i n Raphael, Moral Judgement p.153) 
From a l l t h i s , Reid concluded that moral determinations may 
be r i g h t l y termed moral sentiments. Accordingly, Raphael 
maintains t h a t i n the other phrase 'perception of the h e a r t ' 
B u t l e r by p e r c e p t i o n , means something analogous to the perception 
of sense, and when r e f e r r i n g to the 'heart* he i s meaning 
p e r c e p t i o n by the i n n e r sense, as d i s t i n g u i s h e d from the e x t e r n a l 
s e n s e s . By the 'perception of the h e a r t ' we d i s c e r n r i g h t and 
wrong, good and e v i l ; by the means of reason a moral judgement 
i s then made. The c o g n i t i v e and moral aspects of conscience 
a r e c l e a r l y defined f o r 
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'Reason alone, whatever any one may wish, 
i s not i n r e a l i t y a s u f f i c i e n t motive of 
v i r t u e i n such a c r e a t u r e as man, but t h i s 
reason j o i n e d w i t h those a f f e c t i o n s which 
God has impressed upon h i s h e a r t , and when 
thes e a r e allowed scope to e x e r c i s e themselves, 
but under s t r i c t government and d i r e c t i o n of 
reason, then i t i s we a c t s u i t a b l y to our 
nature and to the circumstances God has placed 
us i n . ' 
(Sermon V, 4, p.98) 
We have thus d i s c o v e r e d that w i t h i n the moral f a c u l t y 
two procedures can be d i s c e r n e d , which n e v e r t h e l e s s are 
e s s e n t i a l l y r e l a t e d . The r a t i o n a l i t y of conscience i s emp-
i r i c a l and p a r t i c u l a r i s t i c , i t i s concerned w i t h the motives 
and a c t i o n s of men i n concrete s i t u a t i o n s : but as a moral 
a c t i v i t y , i t i s meaningless u n l e s s a r e f e r e n c e to moral worth 
i s i ncluded. For conscience not only notes the causes and 
consequences of a c t i o n s , i t pronounces them good or bad. The 
ex a c t nature of t h i s procedure by which we award approval 
i s s t i l l a l i t t l e obscure. Are we p e r c e i v i n g by means of a 
f e e l i n g , t h a t i s do we have a c e r t a i n f e e l i n g of approval 
t h a t always accompanies a good a c t i o n ? Or i s the o b j e c t of 
our p e r c e p t i o n the f e e l i n g i t s e l f . According to B u t l e r , we 
come to 'know' immediately what i s good, we have a moral 
i n t u i t i o n , which i s very d i f f e r e n t from having a c l e a r knowledge 
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of what we have come to know. 
'In a l l common ordinary cases we 
see i n t u i t i v e l y at f i r s t view what i s 
our duty, what i s the honest p a r t . ' 
(Sermon V I I , 14, p.132) 
C e r t a i n l y , i t would be very u n s a t i s f a c t o r y to view conscience 
as -no more than a moral sense, as Hutcheson did . Tihe f a c u l t y 
t h a t has the f u n c t i o n of choosing between f e e l i n g s cannot be 
a f e e l i n g i t s e l f , f o r i f i t were merely a d e s i r e alongside 
the other d e s i r e s there would be no good reason why i t should 
take precedence over the o t h e r s . I f you follow the maxim 
" I ought to do X because I have a f e e l i n g I ought to do x', 
c onfusion may follow, not only w i t h how you formulate c o n f l i c t s , 
but a l s o how you r e s o l v e them, when o b l i g a t i o n i s derived from 
only a f e e l i n g . 
I t i s because I maintain t h a t B u t l e r ' s use of the 
term 'conscience' i n v o l v e s both a r a t i o n a l and i n t u i t i o n a l 
meaning, t h a t I f i n d d i f f i c u l t y i n accepting Raphael's 
'double-aspect theory', which he forwards i n h i s paper 
'Bishop B u t l e r ' s view of Conscience'. (Philosophy 1949 Vol. 
XXIV) Raphael p o s t u l a t e s that there are two f a c u l t i e s which 
may judge matters of m o r a l i t y : s p e c u l a t i v e reason, which 
p e r c e i v e s the f i t n e s s and u n f i t n e s s of a c t i o n s ; and conscience 
which p e r c e i v e s the r i g h t n e s s of p a r t i c u l a r a c t i o n s . P a r t 
of the evidence f o r h i s theory i s that i t bears out B u t l e r ' s 
o r i g i n a l statement t h a t a p r i o r i and e m p i r i c a l methods of 
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t r e a t i n g morals l e a d us to the same co n c l u s i o n s (Sermons, 
Pre f a c e 7, p . 5 ) . There are two p o i n t s we may make a t once 
concerning t h i s passage. F i r s t , one may d i s t i n g u i s h between 
how e t h i c a l arguments a r e conducted, and how a man deduces 
h i s d u t i e s . I t seems to me that i n the Preface B u t l e r i s 
concerned only w i t h the former. Secondly, I think that both 
methods of d e a l i n g w i t h morals would appeal to the r e l a t i o n 
of ' f i t t i n g n e s s ' , and t h i s concept i s not to be l i m i t e d to 
s p e c u l a t i v e reason. 
' F i t n e s s ' was a popular eighteenth century term used 
by a number of theologians and philosophers. For i n s t a n c e , 
T i n d a l wrote: 
'His (God's) commands are to be measured 
by the antecedent F i t n e s s of Things.' 
( C h r i s t i a n i t y Old as C r e a t i o n 1730) 
W h i l s t C l a r k e t a l k e d of there being 
'a f i t n e s s or s u i t a b l e n e s s of c e r t a i n 
circumstances to c e r t a i n persons, and 
an u n s u i t a b l e n e s s of o t h e r s . ' 
(A D i s c o u r s e of N a t u r a l R e l i g i o n I , i n 
Raphael, p.192) 
As Richard P r i c e explained: 
' F i t n e s s and u n f i t n e s s most f r e q u e n t l y 
denote the congruity or i n c o n g r u i t y . 
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aptitude or inaptitude of any means 
to accomplish an end. But when applied 
to actions, they generally signify the 
same with right and wrong,' 
(Review of Principal Questions in Morals 
Chpt. VI in Raphael, p.161) 
'Fitness' can thus be used as a moral or non-moral term, 
but when Butler applied i t to actions I do not consider that 
he used 'right' and ' f i t t i n g ' synonymously. Suppose we ask 
the question 'can anything be f i t t i n g , but not right, or 
right but not f i t t i n g ' , i f the reply i s negative to both, 
then there can be no difference in meaning. So, i f Butler 
makes the move, as I believe he does, of distinguishing 
between the two concepts, then i t must be possible to find 
an example when one term holds and one does not. In fact, 
there i s no such concrete i l l u s t r a t i o n in his doctrine, but 
by studying certain passages we can discern the different 
senses in which he used 'rightness' and 'fittingness', and 
t h e i r relationship to the moral faculty. 
According to Butler, and indeed to Price, ' f i t t i n g ' 
was an indefinable term, but as we look at the text we may 
conclude that Butler uses i t in much the same way as the 
words 'suitable' and 'correspond'. When Butler says that 
the notions we have of reward and i l l dessert, come from a 
comparison of actions with the nature and capacities of the 
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agent, he refers to some actions - vicious ones - as 'unsuit-
able' to the nature of man. 
'And hence a r i s e s a proper application of 
the epithets incongruous, unsuitable, 
disproportionate, unfit , to actions which 
our moral faculty determine to be vicious.' 
(Dissertation Upon Virtue, Section 7, 
p.404) 
Thus an action i s ' f i t t i n g ' i f i t conforms to our 
nature, and as our nature i s adapted to virtue, such action 
must be right. 'Fittingness' could be explained as prior 
s u i t a b i l i t y to virtue. In man, therefore, 'fittingness' and 
'rightness' coincide, but when we turn to the animal kingdom 
i t i s a different matter. I f i t i s in the nature of an 
animal to eat i t s young when in a state of extreme d i s t r e s s , 
one could say that such an action was ' f i t t i n g ' ( in a non-
moral sense) but not right. Butler talks of brutes acting 
according to i n s t i n c t , their bodily constitution and circum-
stances, thereby acting suitably to their whole nature, but 
not in a moral manner, for they have no principle of reflection, 
no power of decision. Wheareas in man, the a b i l i t y to 
recognise the relation between 'fittingness' and virtue s i g n i f i e s 
a simple perception of the understanding, i . e . moral judgement. 
The l i n k between reason and 'fitness' i s most c l e a r l y seen in 
the Analogy where Butler i s preoccupied with more than arb i t -
rary orders issuing from the divine; he consequently states 
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that the w i l l of God i s determined by what i s f i t , by the 
right and reason of the case. 
'And i t seems as inconceivable to suppose 
God to approve one course of action, one 
end, preferably to another, which yet 
his acting at a l l from design implies 
that He does, without supposing some-
what prior i n that end, to be the ground 
of the preference; as to suppose Him to 
discern an abstract proposition to be 
true, without supposing somewhat 
( i . e . something) prior i n i t , to be 
the ground of the discernment. I t doth 
not therefore appear, that moral right i s 
any more r e l i a b l e to perception, than abstract 
truth i s ; or that i t i s any more improper 
to speak of the fitness and rightness of 
actions and ends, as founded in the nature 
of things, than to speak of abstract truth 
as thus founded.' 
(Analogy note to Chpt. VI, 16 p.151) 
What i s f i t i s therefore reasonable and right, and we discover 
what i s ' f i t t i n g ' by that part of conscience that i s rational, 
for we cannot 'sense' f i t n e s s . But what textual evidence i s 
there for concluding that i t i s the rational part of cons-
cience that discerns 'fittingness'? Raphael, for instance. 
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strongly states that i t i s the function of speculative reason 
to Judge which actions are f i t to be done, and he gives in 
par t i c u l a r three quotations from the Analogy in support 
of h i s theory, which I w i l l now b r i e f l y discuss. 
The f i r s t passage occurs when Butler i s discussing 
moral d i s c i p l i n e and improvement; he states that even a 
f i n i t e l y perfect being, 
'endued with such propensions, together with 
moral understanding, as well including a 
p r a c t i c a l sense of virtue, as a speculative 
perception of i t . ' 
(Analogy. Part I , Chpt V, 27 p.123) 
can come to do wrong. My interpretation of this text, taken 
in conjunction with what Butler states in the Dissertation upon 
Virtue, i s that he i s talking again of the two aspects of 
conscience: the fi r s t , a sense of virtue and of what i s right, 
which he l a t e r terms a 'perception of the heart'; and the 
second, a moral judgement or sentiment of the understanding. 
The second statement adduced by Raphael i s when Butler says 
that the experience of the world 
'hath a tendency to give us a p r a c t i c a l 
sense of things very different from a 
mere speculative knowledge, that we 
are l i a b l e to vice and capable of misery.' 
(Analogy, Part I , Chpt, V, 31, p.127) 
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I think that here Butler i s only saying that from a p r i o r i 
reasoning we can i n f e r the p o s s i b i l i t y of vice from the 
existence of free w i l l ; but that t h i s inference i s very 
different from the experience of doing w rong ourselves or 
of seeing others act wrongly. The third passage adduced i s 
the most d i f f i c u l t to interpret: Raphael suggests that in 
i t Butler distinguishes between speculative and p r a c t i c a l 
f a c u l t i e s of perception, the former being identified with 
speculative reason, and the l a t t e r with the moral understanding. 
'As speculative reason may be neglected, 
prejudiced and deceived, so also may our 
moral understanding be impaired and perverted, 
and the dictates of i t not impartially attended 
to. This indeed proves nothing against the 
r e a l i t y of our speculative or p r a c t i c a l 
f a c u l t i e s of perception ' 
(Analogy, Part I , Chtp.VI, 19 p.156) 
The exact role of speculative reason within Butler's moral 
philosophy i s a l i t t l e d i f f i c u l t to decipher, but I suggest 
that Butler talks of speculative reason in conjunction with 
religious matters, whilst p r a c t i c a l reason i s part of the 
2 
mechanism of the moral faculty. This interpretation i s not 
2 
See Chpt. I , p 28. I t i s because of the confusion and 
complexities surrounding the use of speculative reason in 
other theories, that Butler says he prefers to use p r a c t i c a l 
reason, and to view re l i g i o n as a matter of fact. 
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only indicated i n the particular text j u s t mentioned, but i s 
indeed borne out by Butler's predilection for empirical 
methods i n moral studies. I t i s debatable whether he i s 
saying that as an alternative to conscience, speculative 
reason could discern the relation of fittingness, by showing 
us when we act conformably to the right and wrong existent 
i n the universe. For instance, i f there were a race of men 
who had no conscience, only the faculty of reason, would 
Butler say that they would be able to find out what i s right 
aid wrong? Certainly these, men could know that there was an 
inherent system of rewards and punishment in the universe, 
and that certain actions would be more to their advantage 
than others, but I think Butler would hold that they had no 
sense of right and wrong. His whole notion of conscience 
turns on the fact that men have an innate sense of the good 
and e v i l which independently e x i s t s , and from t h i s the 
individual can deduce his duties. 
For Butler completely disagreed with the Nominalists' 
view that the ultimate standard of morality was the arbitrary 
w i l l of God. He and many of his contemporaries had followed 
Aquinas's doctrine, that while God always w i l l s what i s j u s t , 
nothing i s j u s t solely because he w i l l s i t ; the ideas of 
right and wrong are eternal and immutable. Hence Clarke 
maintained: 
'There i s such a thing as Fitness and 
Unfitness, eternally necessary and 
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unchangeably i n the Nature and Reason 
of things.' 
(On the Attributes of God. Proposition X I I ) 
Shaftesbury also adheres to t h i s doctrine. 
'Whoever thinks there i s a God, and 
pretends formally to believe that 
He i s j u s t and good, must suppose that 
there i s independently such a thing as 
Justice and I n j u s t i c e , Truth and 
Falsehood, Right and Wrong, according 
to which he pronounces that God i s j u s t , 
righteous and true.' 
(Inquiry, Book I I , Chpt Section 2 
Butler i n turn uses the phrase 'immutable morality' (Analogy 
Part I I , I I I , 13) and speaks of 'the external rule of right". 
(Analogy, Part I I , V, 6) and in Sermon XIV he talks of the 
'conformity of the Divine Will to the Law 
of Truth i n which the moral attributes 
of God consist.' 
(Sermon XIV, 17, p.255) 
Again, he firmly states i n the second part of the Analogy, 
that he believes in 
'the moral f i t n e s s and unfitness of actions 
prior to a l l w i l l whatever, which I apprehend 
as c e r t a i n l y to determine the Divine conduct, 
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as speculative truth and falsehood nec-
e s s a r i l y determine the Divine judgement.' 
(Chpt. V I I I , 24, p.367) 
Despite the fact that Butler does not care to dwell 
on t h i s doctrine of an eternal and immutable morality, i t 
i s an important part of h i s philosophy. I f man has a 
natural predisposition to kindness and companion, and i f our 
actions have to f i t a permanent standard of virtue, to be 
right, then our morality has objectivity. The implication of 
t h i s , as I see i t , i s that the ultimate moral c h a r a c t e r i s t i c 
i s goodness or rightness, wheareas Raphael would say that i t 
was 'fittingness': and i f we ask f i t t i n g to what, he would 
say to the production of the greatest amount of happiness. 
The function of conscience according to Raphael i s to make 
sure we act conformably to our nature, and t h i s a c t i v i t y as 
such i s not a moral one; whether our actions are f i t t i n g i s 
to talk of the genuine moral attribute which i s discerned by 
speculative reason. .The following example w i l l i l l u s t r a t e 
what Raphael i s saying: i f animal x bathes i t feels good, 
when i t doesn't bathe i t f e e l s bad, and so i t usually t r i e s 
to bathe. However, animal x l a t e r finds out that i f i t did 
not bathe then i t would be l i a b l e to catch diseases, so that 
there i s an additional reason, and indeed now an 'over-riding' 
motive for i t s beahviour, for even i f the weather i s cold i t 
s t i l l bathes. 
My disagreement with Raphael i s over his separation 
of conscience and reason. I maintain that conscience i ^ a 
moral faculty which has two operational l e v e l s ; the rational 
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part which takes note of a l l the facts i n a moral situation 
and the i n t u i t i o n a l part by which a moral pronouncement i s 
made. This l a t t e r process as we have noted i s rather complex, 
but perhaps becomes clearer when we r e a l i s e that conscience 
for Butler i s not merely a psychological faculty, but i s a 
mediiim of communication between God and man: in the Sermons 
he speaks of conscience as 'the voice of God' - a similar 
view to that held by the Cambridge Platonists. Conscience 
acts according to general rules, but the source of this 
morality i s divine, Butler sees the dictates of conscience 
as laws of God which contain certain sanctions. God makes 
hi s w i l l known, not only through the conventional medium 
of the Scriptures, but through the nature of man, and 
s p e c i f i c a l l y through the divinely implanted moral faculty. 
Our discussion has now reached a position, when 
i t i s necessary to consider the claim, that Butler in his 
3 
notion of conscience, i s forwarding an i n t u i t i o n i s t theory. 
Intuitionism i s usually explained as the direct and immediate 
awareness of moral principles, without inference or calcu-
l a t i o n . Moral judgements on individual actions or on part-
i c u l a r classes of action, are thereby Independent intuitions 
3 
Amongst the scholars who have maintained that Butler i s to be 
classed as an i n t u i t i o n i s t are Hudson, Rogers, L i l l i e and 
Frankena. 
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of transcendent truth. According to Raphael the difference 
between naturalism and intuitionism i s ultimately a 
metaphysical one, namely: 
'whether there are e n t i t i e s or 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of goodness 
and rightness transcending 
the feelings, conations 
and thoyghts of men.' 
(Moral Judgement, Introduction, p.10) 
An i n t u i t i o n i s t holds that moral truths are fundamental, 
self-evident and universally applicable to a l l men; 
he would explain a different e t h i c a l system to his own 
by attributing i t to moral blindness. Sometimes the 
def i n i t i o n of intuitionism i s widened in order to ascribe 
the immediate awareness of moral values to reason or 
understanding. As a consequence philosophers such as 
Clarke and Price have been classed as Rational I n t u i t i o n i s t s , 
I am a l i t t l e suspicious of this l a t t e r definition and 
would prefer to use Raphael's explanation of the term. 
Representatives of t h i s ' s t r i c t ' intuitionism in the 
eighteenth century would be Shaftesbury and Hutcheson: 
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the l a t t e r for instance explains a 'sense' as 
'every Determination of our Minds, 
to receive Ideas Independently on 
our W i l l , and to have Perceptions 
of Pleasure and Pain.' 
(An Essay on the Nature and Conduct 
of the Passions and Affections (1728), 
Section I , in Monro, p.256) 
He continues by l i s t i n g f i v e 'senses', including the 'Moral 
Sense'. 
The difference between Butler and i n t u i t i o n i s t s such 
as Hutcheson and Shaftesbury, l i e s in the very complexity of 
his concept of conscience. Having found that conscience i s 
for Butler, 'our understanding and sense of good and e v i l ' 
(Sermons X, 12, p.178) that i s part reason and part feeling, 
we cannot c a l l him a thorough-going i n t u i t i o n i s t . Nevertheless, 
there are occasions when Butler appears to maintain that a man may 
see his duties i n t u i t i v e l y (for example. Sermon V I I , 14, p.132); and 
as we have already noted, t h i s procedure goes under the name 
•perception of the heart.' T. Macpherson forwards the interpretation 
that the i n t u i t i o n a l aspect of conscience i s particularly stressed in 
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the Analogy, where the intuitions are signs of God's w i l l , which 
i s determined by absolute goodness. On the other hand he considers 
that the Sermons emphasize the r e f l e c t i v e aspect of conscience. 
(Philosophy. Vol. X X I I I , and Vol. XXIV) Although I agree that 
the treatment of conscience i s not quite the same in both works, 
I do not think there i s any contradiction. The Sermons form 
an e t h i c a l t r e a t i s e , and in them conscience i s treated as a natural 
moral faculty; the Analogy i s a religious tract and so explains 
the connection between God and conscience. What unifies Butler's 
theory of conscience i s h i s consistent avowal that i t s dictates 
are the laws of our nature. Unfortunately, Butler's naturalism 
confuses the issue of whether or not he may be regarded as an 
i n t u i t i o n i s t . 
The intuitions of conscience may seem as divine commands 
or as a perception of whether an action i s suitable to our nature. 
I f we consider that Butler takes the l a t t e r view, and that man 
acts according to the way he i s by nature, then Butler i s not 
advocating intuitionism. For example, i f you are violently 
s i c k every time you did something wrong, you do not need an 
i n t u i t i o n to t e l l right from wrong. But in a moral situation 
surely the problem i s to decide whether your actions are suitable 
to your nature, and such a decision could require either a moral 
i n t u i t i o n or reason or both; and I think Butler's notion of 
conscience covers both procedures. 
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Furthennore, I see no d i f f i c u l t y i n maintaining with 
Macpherson that the intuitions of conscience are ultimately 
signs of divine goodness. Butler, true to the s p i r i t of his 
age, looked towards nature for inspiration, and there observed 
how actions were rewarded and punished, and thought he saw an 
immutable principle of goodness. Although Butler wished to advise 
men that to follow virtue was to follow nature, he did not want 
moral statements to depend on human be l i e f s or feelings. By 
maintaining that men were made to be naturally virtuous by God, 
Butler was grounding his naturalism firmly in religion. 
The doctrine that the commands of conscience have an 
objective, status has certain implications, and must be seen to f u l f i l 
a number of requirements. I f the function of the moral faculty 
i s to regulate and guide our conduct, then i t should provide 
an answer to the question 'shall I or s h a l l I not do t h i s 
p a r t i c u l a r thing?' I f I say 'I think I ought to do i t ' t h is 
does not e n t a i l that conscience demands that I do i t . Feeling 
a thing i s right i s different from the things being right. 
Furthermore, one cannot say ' I believe that to do A would be 
to obey my conscience, but that to do A would be wrong.' 
However, another person may say 'she thinks that to do A 
would be to obey her conscience, but she would be wrong.' To 
obey conscience to act according to what we are convinced 
i s right. 
- 132 -
I f the maxim 'you ought to obey conscience' i s to 
be a rule of conduct, i t must be true of a l l cases. A decision 
always to obey conscience, involves a decision made in advance 
about a great number of individual cases, with the only 
information that to obey conscience would be to do your duty. 
Such a procedure can only be concerned with a principle that 
i s i n f a l l i b l e , as Butler seemed to believe conscience to be 
(although he never uses the word i n f a l l i b l e ) , so that every 
time the original decision i s obeyed one would be convinced 
that one was doing that which was now right. There must be 
no occasion when one asked 'shall I now obey my conscience?' 
For going against conscience i s prima facie wrong. Indeed 
no general principle of conduct can be f a l l i b l e , i f i t i s to 
be of assistance i n deciding particular questions about which 
we are i n doubt. However, there may be instances when one 
person's conscience seems to give different commands in the 
same situation from another person's conscience. But how 
can conscience be i n f a l l i b l e i f there i s disagreement? Butler 
would answer, as indeed would Kant, that conscience always 
t e l l s us to do what i s right, but that we are not always 
honest with ourselves, the other principles of action, passions 
etc., obscure the voice of conscience. 
This whole idea of how men come to disobey conscience 
revolves round the concept of authority. Conscience i s vulner-
able by reason of the fact that a man's appetites and passions 
may often prove stronger than ref l e c t i o n for 
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'nothing i s more manifest, than that 
affections and passions of a l l kinds 
influence the judgement.' 
(Sermons X, 15, p.180) 
Although the moral right of conscience i s not challenged, i t s 
psychological power may be impaired. 
'Had i t strength as i t has right; 
had i t power as i t has manifest 
authority; i t would absolutely 
govern the world.' 
(Sermon H , 19 p.64) 
Man i s often led into acts which in a cooler moment he knows 
to be wrong. There are two ways i n which man can disobey 
conscience, and these are to be distinguished. F i r s t , a man 
can know what he should do, i . e . what conscience commands, 
but instead acts from a desire that w i l l give immediate grat-
i f i c a t i o n . The desire i s thus stronger than conscience, and 
so we have the age-old problem of 'right' versus weakness of 
the w i l l . 'The good that I would I do not; but the e v i l which 
I would not that I do.' Secondly, the strength of the emotions 
i s such that there i s doubt as to what conscience i s commanding 
'what s h a l l I now do?' 
Butler stated that there could be-no doubt that there 
are things about which people deceive themselves. Men may 
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try to explain away thei r duty. 
'Thus those courses, which, i f man 
would f a i r l y attend to the dictates of 
the i r own consciences, they would see 
to be corruption, excess, oppression, 
uncharitableness; these are refined upon -
things were so and so circumstantiated -
great d i f f i c u l t i e s are raised about 
fixing bounds and degrees; and thus 
every moral obligation whatever may 
be evaded.' 
(Sermon V I I , 14, p.133) 
Butler further believed that the formation of bad habits may 
make i t hard to see where duty l i e s , whilst superstition or the 
habit of substituting ceremonial observance for moral conduct 
may cause disregard of conscience. In the Analogy Butler even 
suggests that d i f f i c u l t y i n discovering the right course of 
action may be an ess e n t i a l part of some men's 'state of 
probation'. (Analogy Part I I , Chpt. VI, 18, p293 
S e l f - p a r t i a l i t y may also interfere with our moral conduct, 
a practice Butler completely condemns. 
'For a man to judge that to be the equitable, 
the moderate, the right part for him to act, 
which he would see to be hard, unjust, 
oppressive i n another: this i s plain vice. 
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and can proceed only from great 
unfairness of mind.' 
(Sermon m , 5, p.70) 
Genuine doubt i s when we are not sure what commands 
conscience i s issuing. I f at every time the moral faculty 
dictated, our thumbs pricked there would be no confusion, 
our obligations would be very clear. But t h i s would neces-
s i t a t e an original stage when we associated thumb pricking 
with right actions, which presupposes that we could recognise 
rightness. Sometimes, when reading Butler one gains the 
impression that he considers there to be few occasions for 
genuine doubt because the conscience of the Individual i s a 
c l e a r and r e l i a b l e guide to conduct. Man has a natural 
tendency to virtue, and with very l i t t l e r e f l e c t i o n , he 
naturally acts a j u s t and good part in society. Men may 
d i f f e r as to how much of the natural sense of good and e v i l they 
possess, i n that nature does not produce a mature human 
being, yet a l l are capable of improvement and development. 
So Butler thought i t was possible that every man should, by 
exercise of the moral faculty, be able to find out what i s 
good. 
'Let any plain, honest man, before he 
engages i n any course of action, ask 
himself I s t h i s I am going about right, 
or i s i t wrong? I s i t good or e v i l ? I 
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do not in the le a s t doubt, but 
that t h i s question could be answered 
agreeable to truth and virtue, by 
almost any f a i r man in almost any 
circumstance.' 
(Sermon I I I , 4, p.70) 
The d i f f i c u l t y with t h i s text i s that there are not many plain, 
honest men, either now or in the eighteenth century; and 
the majority of moral decisions are not clear cut. On the 
whole, I think t h i s was recognised by Butler, for he did 
recommend that a man knows what goodness and honesty are, by 
being honest and good. Man can act from a number of 'just 
and natural motives' such as a regard to God's authority, 
or a regard for j u s t i c e or veracity, 
'And he who begins a good l i f e from 
any one of them and perseveres in i t , 
as he i s already in some degree, so he 
cannot f a i l of becoming more and more of 
that character, which i s correspondent 
to the constitution of nature as moral'. 
(Analogy. I , V, p.133) 
There i s no c o n f l i c t or contradiction between a man 
who obeys the teachings of re l i g i o n and a man who obeys 
the injunction to follow nature. In Butler's philosophy 
both courses of action have the same r e s u l t ; and in his 
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concept of conscience the unification of the moral and the 
re l i g i o u s serves to impose a two-fold obligation on man. 
F i r s t , knowing that the laws of conscience come from God, 
men r e a l i s e d they must be obeyed, and thus there i s present 
a sense of duty, as well as a sense of security gained from 
the knowledge that they are acting according to God's wishes. 
Secondly, the obligation to obey the rule of right that i s 
innate within a l l men l i e s i n the fact that i t i s the law of 
one's own nature, and accordingly i t i s our duty to walk i n 
that path and follow the guide of conscience. 
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